IN RE HARLAN MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRYANNA NICOLE HARLAN,
JESSE THOMAS HARLAN, CAMRYN SCOTT
HARLAN, and ALORA PAULINE HARLAN,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
September 15, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 289665
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2007-000143-NA;
2007-000144-NA;
2007-000145-NA;
2007-000146-NA
MELINDA JUNE HARLAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRYAN SCOTT HARLAN,
Respondent.
In the Matter of BRYANNA NICOLE HARLAN,
JESSE THOMAS HARLAN, CAMRYN SCOTT
HARLAN, and ALORA PAULINE HARLAN,
Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 289890
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC Nos. 2007-000143-NA;
2007-000144-NA;
2007-000145-NA;
2007-000146-NA
BRYAN SCOTT HARLAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
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MELINDA JUNE HARLAN,
Respondent.
Before: Stephens, P.J., and Jansen and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated cases, respondents appeal by right the circuit court’s order
terminating their parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and
(g).1 We affirm.
We first address respondent-mother’s claim concerning the February 2007 preliminary
hearing and whether petitioner established probable cause for the petition. We note that the
circuit court ultimately exercised jurisdiction over the children in April 2007, based on the no
contest pleas of both respondents. “Matters affecting the court’s exercise of its jurisdiction may
be challenged only on direct appeal of the jurisdictional decision, not by collateral attack in a
subsequent appeal of an order terminating parental rights.” In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668,
679-680; 692 NW2d 708 (2005). Respondent-mother’s argument involving the initial
preliminary hearing relates to the circuit court’s exercise of jurisdiction, and respondent-mother
may not collaterally challenge the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this appeal. Id.
Respondent-mother also raises a due-process claim related to the services provided by
petitioner after the parent-agency agreement was adopted. However, contrary to respondentmother’s assertion on appeal, the facts of the instant matter are significantly different than those
presented in In re B & J, 279 Mich App 12, 18-20; 756 NW2d 234 (2008), wherein this Court
concluded that the state had intentionally set out to create the statutory ground for termination.
Respondent relies on the referee’s statement at a hearing of May 7, 2008, to justify why
respondents should have been afforded more time to comply with the parent-agency agreement.
The referee remarked that she believed that petitioner had “dropped the ball” for the first ten
months of these proceedings. However, this remark did not suggest intentional conduct, and the
evidence did not show that petitioner took any deliberate action to create the grounds for
termination at issue here. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s earlier services
were deficient, we conclude that the circuit court’s decision to give respondents additional time
to comply with the parent-agency agreement adequately protected respondent-mother’s right to
due process. We further find no error in the circuit court’s failure to comment on its earlier
remark at the time of the December 16, 2008, decision to terminate parental rights. The court
was only required to make “[b]rief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested
matters.” MCR 3.977(H)(1).
1
Although petitioner also requested termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), the circuit court’s
decision reveals that it did not rely on that statutory ground.
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Ultimately, the reasonableness of the services offered to respondent-mother relates to the
sufficiency of the evidence to establish the statutory grounds for termination. In re Fried, 266
Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). In this regard, the circuit court appropriately took
notice of the entire file. Indeed, evidence admitted at a prior hearing may properly be considered
at subsequent proceedings. See In re LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 391; 210 NW2d 482 (1973).
We review for clear error the circuit court’s findings of fact regarding the statutory grounds for
termination. MCR 3.977(J); In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 209; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). A finding is
clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Id. at 209-210.
With respect to both respondents, the circuit court found that the conditions leading to
adjudication involved substance abuse and an inability to provide stable housing, and that neither
respondent had satisfactorily resolved these issues. We disagree with respondent-mother’s
argument that she had rectified her substance abuse issues by demonstrating that she had
remained drug-free in the structured environment provided by Leonard House. Respondentmother had not shown an ability to remain drug-free outside a structured environment, and her
prior participation in rehabilitation programs had not been successful. Thus, the circuit court did
not clearly err by finding that this condition had not been rectified and was not reasonably likely
to be rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. The circumstances
surrounding respondent-father’s substance abuse issues—namely, issues involving his criminal
case for possession of heroin—differed from those of respondent-mother. But we reject
respondent-father’s argument that his partial compliance with the parent-agency agreement was
sufficient to show that he had rectified his substantial substance abuse issues. A court must be
able to conclude that the respondent could provide a home in which the children would no longer
be at risk of harm. See In re Gazella, 264 Mich App at 677. Considering the evidence regarding
respondent-father’s failure to submit to drug screens and failure to participate in recommended
therapy, we find no clear error in the circuit court’s determination that respondent-father’s
substance abuse issues continued to exist and were not reasonably likely to be rectified within a
reasonable time considering the children’s ages.
We further conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err by finding that both
respondents had failed to obtain stable housing. The caseworker’s inability to remember if she
had given respondents a housing list did not demonstrate that the necessary referral had not been
made, especially considering the complete absence of evidence that the lack of a housing referral
was the reason for either respondent’s inability to obtain stable housing. Cf. In re Fried, 266
Mich App at 543. Quite simply, irrespective of whether petitioner made any housing referrals in
this matter, the issue of respondents’ lack of suitable housing continued to exist and was not
reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not clearly err by finding
that the statutory ground for termination contained in § 19b(3)(c)(i) had been established by clear
and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. Nor did the circuit court clearly err
by finding that the statutory ground for termination contained in § 19b(3)(g) had been established
by clear and convincing evidence with respect to both respondents. The evidence concerning
respondents’ continuing substance abuse issues established that both respondents were incapable
of providing proper care and custody for the children and that they would not be able to do so
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within a reasonable time. See In re Conley, 216 Mich App 41, 43-44; 549 NW2d 353 (1996);
see also In re Shawboose, 175 Mich App 637, 641; 438 NW2d 272 (1989).
Finally, considering the length of time the children had been in foster care, the continued
uncertainty that either respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody for the
children, and the children’s need for permanency, we cannot conclude that the circuit court
clearly erred by finding that termination of each respondent’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). The referee’s failure to specifically comment on
the evidence of a bond between the children and respondents does not convince us otherwise.
See MCR 3.977(H)(1).
Affirmed.
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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