ROBERT D ROBINSON V GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT D. ROBINSON,
UNPUBLISHED
September 10, 2009
Plaintiff,
v
No. 285643
Workers Compensation
Appellate Panel
LC No. 06-000253
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Talbot and Stephens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, General Motors Corporation (“GM”), appeals by leave granted an order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (“WCAC”) that affirmed a magistrate’s
dismissal of GM’s petition for reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund (“SIF”). We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural History
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Plaintiff, certified as vocationally
disabled under MCL 418.901(a), was injured while working for GM in April 1992. Plaintiff and
GM entered into a voluntary pay agreement in 1993. Subsequently, GM sought reimbursement
from SIF pursuant to MCL 418.921, which provides that, in the case of a vocationally disabled
employee, the employer’s liability is limited to benefits accruing during the period of 52 weeks
after the date of the injury, and that, thereafter, “all compensation and the cost of all medical care
and expenses of the employee’s last sickness and burial shall be the liability of [SIF].” SIF
rejected GM’s reimbursement request.
Following this rejection, GM filed a petition with the workers’ compensation bureau and
sought to name SIF as a party. SIF moved for dismissal, claiming that it had no liability in this
case because GM failed to provide SIF with proper notice, as required by MCL 418.925(1). The
magistrate denied SIF’s motion for dismissal. However, the WCAC reversed, finding that the
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plain language of MCL 418.925(1) required notice to SIF within a defined timeframe, and the
failure to provide timely notice precluded reimbursement.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the WCAC’s decision, holding that MCL 418.925(1)
established a mandatory notice requirement, and that although the statute was silent with regard
to the consequences of a failure to comply with the notice requirement, “the WCAC properly
construed the statute to find that dismissal of the fund as a party from this case was proper.”
Robinson v Gen Motors Corp, 242 Mich App, 331, 335; 619 NW2d 411 (2000).1 The Michigan
Supreme Court denied GM’s application for leave to appeal. Robinson v Gen Motors Corp, 463
Mich 975; 623 NW2d 602 (2001).
On June 29, 2005, our Supreme Court released Bailey v Oakwood Hosp and Medical Ctr,
472 Mich 685; 698 NW2d 374 (2005), wherein this Court’s decision in Robinson was
specifically overruled. In Bailey the Court held that SIF has an obligation to reimburse a carrier
after the fifty-second week following the injury of a vocationally disabled employee, regardless
of the carrier’s failure to provide SIF with timely notice of the injury as required by MCL
418.925(1).
Following the release of Bailey, GM filed the instant petition for reimbursement from
SIF. The magistrate dismissed the petition on res judicata grounds. GM appealed to the WCAC,
which affirmed the dismissal. The WCAC relied on this Court’s decision in Pieser v Sara Lee
Bakery, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 20, 2008 (Docket
Nos. 275608 and 277884), which held that Bailey only applied to pending cases when the
reimbursement issue had been preserved. The WCAC concluded, “[t]he defendant has already
litigated the identical issue and lost that issue on final order from the Michigan Supreme Court.”
This Court granted GM’s application for leave to appeal, “limited to the issues raised in
the application and supporting brief.” Robinson v Gen Motors Corp, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, entered October 14, 2008 (Docket No. 285643). On appeal, GM claims that
the retroactivity issue remains an open question because Pieser is an unpublished decision, and
that Bailey should apply with full retroactivity. In contrast, SIF argues that res judicata bars the
relitigation of the reimbursement issue in this case and that a law-changing decision such as
Bailey only applies to pending cases wherein the legal question at issue has been preserved. As
such, SIF contends that because this case was not pending when Bailey was released, the
decision is inapplicable. In its reply brief, GM argues that res judicata is not an issue. GM first
notes that in granting leave, this Court limited the appeal to the issues raised by GM, and res
judicata is not such an issue. GM also contends that res judicata would not apply because there
has been a change in the law and there is no longer a final adjudication since the Supreme Court
specifically overruled the prior decision in this case.
II. Standard of Review
1
Subsequently overruled in Bailey v Oakwood Hosp and Medical Ctr, 472 Mich 685; 698 NW2d
374 (2005).
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“[Q]uestions concerning the retroactivity of earlier judicial decisions are for this Court to
decide de novo as matters of law.” Lincoln v Gen Motors Corp, 461 Mich 483, 490; 607 NW2d
73 (2000); see also MCL 418.861a(14).
III. Analysis
The sole issue presented by GM is whether Bailey is fully retroactive, and thereby
applicable to the case at bar. As in this case, there are two relevant statutory provisions
discussed by the Court in Bailey, MCL 418.921 and MCL 418.925(1). Specifically, MCL
418.921, addresses liability for injuries to employees certified as vocationally disabled and states
as follows:
A person certified as vocationally disabled who receives a personal injury
arising out of and in the course of his employment and resulting in death or
disability, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent provided in
this act, or in case of his death resulting from such injury, the compensation shall
be paid to his dependents. The liability of the employer for payment of
compensation, for furnishing medical care or for payment of expenses of the
employee's last illness and burial as provided in this act shall be limited to those
benefits accruing during the period of 52 weeks after the date of injury.
Thereafter, all compensation and the cost of all medical care and expenses of the
employee's last sickness and burial shall be the liability of the fund. The fund
shall be liable, from the date of injury, for those vocational rehabilitation benefits
provided in section 319. [Emphasis added.]
The notification provision of MCL 418.925, provides:
(1) When a vocationally disabled person receives a personal injury, the
procedure and practice provided in this act applies to all proceedings under this
chapter, except where specifically otherwise provided herein. Not less than 90 nor
more than 150 days before the expiration of 52 weeks after the date of injury, the
carrier shall notify the fund whether it is likely that compensation may be payable
beyond a period of 52 weeks after the date of injury. The fund, thereafter, may
review, at reasonable times, such information as the carrier has regarding the
accident, and the nature and extent of the injury and disability. [Emphasis added.]
In Bailey, our Supreme Court specifically overruled the prior decisions of this Court in
Valencic v TPM, Inc, 248 Mich App 601; 639 NW2d 846 (2001) and Robinson v Gen Motors
Corp, 242 Mich App 331; 619 NW2d 411 (2000), interpreting these cases as “fail[ing] to give
effect to the Legislature’s intent” when interpreting or applying the relevant statutory provisions.
Bailey, supra at 702. Accordingly, the Bailey Court ruled, in relevant part:
We find unconvincing the argument that it is a violation of the terms of the fund’s
trust to disburse benefits when the mandatory notice provision has not been
satisfied. To the contrary, the trust by its terms is required to reimburse carriers
for benefits paid to disabled employees after fifty-two weeks following an injury.
MCL 418.925(3). Notification by a carrier is not a condition precedent to the
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fund’s obligation. The trustee is not absolved of its responsibility by a settlor’s
failure to notify the trustee of a possible obligation. [Id. at 703.]
In general, judicial decisions apply retroactively, while prospective applications of
decisions is typically reserved only for “exigent circumstances.” Trentadue v Buckler Lawn
Sprinkler, 479 Mich 378, 400; 738 NW2d 664 (2007). However, a more flexible approach is
deemed to be necessary when “injustice might result from full retroactivity.” Gladych v New
Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 606; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). When evaluating whether a
decision should be accorded full retroactive effect, the threshold question is whether the decision
“clearly establishes a new principle of law,” Trentadue, supra at 400-401; Rowland v Washtenaw
Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 220; 731 NW2d 41 (2007), or whether the decision serves merely
to clarify, extend, or interpret existing law, Bolt v Lansing, 238 Mich App 37, 44-45; 604 NW2d
745 (1999). In contrast, prospective application is deemed to be appropriate when the decision
overrules “clear and uncontradicted case law,” Rowland, supra at 221, quoting Devillers v Auto
Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 487; 702 NW2d 539 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), or
“decides an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed,” Holmes v
Michigan Capital Medical Ctr, 242 Mich App 703, 713; 620 NW2d 319 (2000). If this is the
case, this Court must consider “(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of
reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice.”
Trentadue, supra at 400-401 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In light of this precedent, Bailey would be entitled to retroactive application. As
discussed in Michigan Ed Employees Mut Ins Co v Morris, 460 Mich 180; 596 NW2d 142
(1999):
It can hardly by considered “unexpected” or “indefensible” that this Court would
reverse a Court of Appeals decision that was contrary to the clear and
unambiguous language of the statute . . . . [Id. at 195; see also Zanni v Medaphis
Physician Services Corp, 240 Mich App 472, 478; 612 NW2d 845 (2000).]
While Bailey serves to effectuate the intent of the Legislature and is, therefore, subject to
retroactive application, from a practical perspective we must also recognize that courts and other
litigants have relied on prior case law involving the erroneous interpretation of these statutes.
Consequently, while it is appropriate to give retroactive application to Bailey, such application
must be subject to limitations in order to minimize the “the effect of this decision on the
administration of justice.” Gladych, supra at 606.
To resolve this issue, we must address SIF’s argument regarding the effect of res judicata.
SIF contends that retroactive application of Bailey would result in a violation of the doctrine of
res judicata. Clearly, Bailey has determined that the prior decision by this Court in Robinson was
in error based on the misinterpretation of the relevant statutory language. GM argues that our
Supreme Court has previously determined limitations on the application of the doctrine of res
judicata, finding the doctrine does not serve to bar a redetermination of an employee’s workers
compensation benefits “because the amount of an employee’s award is never final.” Pike v City
of Wyoming, 431 Mich 589, 601-602; 433 NW2d 768 (1988). In addition, in Riley v Northland
Geriatric Ctr, 431 Mich 632, 642; 433 NW2d 787 (1988) (citation omitted), the Court noted the
unfairness of adopting a position contrary to the law based on res judicata, stating, in relevant
part:
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Were this Court to give preclusive effect to a prior adjudication . . . it would
perpetuate, in the name of a judicial doctrine, a judicial error in construing a
statute that thwarts legislative intent.
In these decisions, the determination that the applicability of res judicata is limited relies on the
inherent modifiability of workers compensation decisions premised on the potential for future
changes in a claimant’s condition.
In contrast, as discussed in Askew v Ann Arbor Pub Schools, 431 Mich 714, 728-729; 433
NW2d 800 (1988), citing MCL 418.863, “the Workers' Disability Compensation Act specifies
that a claim of appeal may be taken from either the decision of the hearing referee or the appeal
board. At the expiration of an appeal period, the decision is final and may be enforced in circuit
court.” (Footnotes and internal citations omitted). This is consistent with the recognized
purpose of res judicata to obtain finality in litigation. Minicuci v Scientific Data Mgt, Inc, 243
Mich App 28, 33; 620 NW2d 657 (2000) (citation omitted). As recognized by the United States
Supreme Court in Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc v Moitie, 452 US 394, 398; 101 S Ct 2474; 69 L
Ed 2d 103 (1981):
“Nor are the res judicata consequences of a final . . . judgment on the merits
altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal
principle subsequently overruled in another case.” [Citations omitted.]
To permit GM to prevail in this appeal premised solely on the fortuitous fact that our Supreme
Court has issued a determination contrary to the original ruling of this Court pertaining to the
liability of SIF based on the failure to comply with the notice provision of MCL 418.925(1),
would serve to eviscerate the doctrine of res judicata and open up the potential for unlimited relitigation of cases which have been concluded.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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