PEOPLE OF MI V HECTOR BERDECIA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 8, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286070
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-002601-FH
HECTOR BERDECIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: M. J. Kelly, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury convictions of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle, MCL 750.227, and
possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced him to terms of two to five years in prison on the felon in possession and concealed
weapon convictions, and to a two-year term on the felony-firearm conviction. Because we
conclude that there were no errors warranting relief, we affirm. We have decided this appeal
without oral argument under MCR 7.214(E).
Police officers stopped defendant, who was driving a vehicle with two passengers, for a
traffic violation. During the stop, the officers discovered that defendant’s front passenger
possessed marijuana and cocaine. An officer testified that he approached from the passenger’s
side of the car and noted that defendant had his left hand pressing down on the control panel on
the driver’s side door. Further, when asked to lower the window, defendant did not use his left
hand to activate the control, but rather reached over with his right hand to lower the window.
The officer characterized this as “odd.” This officer testified that, when he went to assist the
officer who was removing defendant from the vehicle, he noticed that the control panel was
detached from the door and that a handgun was protruding from under the control panel. The
officer testified that the magazine protruded by about one and one-half inches.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that drugs were
found on the passenger; defendant maintains that it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than
probative. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion. People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 353; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). A trial court abuses
its discretion when it selects an outcome that is outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes. Id.
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In order to prove that defendant possessed the handgun, the prosecution had to show that
defendant knew about the handgun stashed in the compartment under the control panel. See
People v Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). The trial court determined that
defendant’s knowledge was “circumstantially established by the fact that there were also drugs in
the car because the two go together so often” and defendant was “transporting a guy who had
possession of drugs.”
At trial the officer testified that he smelled marijuana when the passenger lowered his
window and that he observed the passenger with what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette
behind his ear. The officer also testified that the passenger was found to have cocaine.
Likewise, the officer testified that drug dealers often carry guns for protection and that he had
seen control panels that were removed so that the compartment could be used to conceal drugs.
Thus, the evidence concerning the drugs tended to provide context within which the jury could
evaluate whether defendant knew about the compartment with the gun in it. See People v Sholl,
453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996) (explaining that evidence of other crimes may be
admitted when the other criminal acts explain the circumstances of the charged crime).
Likewise, the evidence suggests that defendant may have known that his passenger was using
marijuana and possessed cocaine and this in turn permitted an inference that defendant knew
about the dislodged control panel and the compartment under it. Hence, this evidence was
relevant. MRE 401. Further, the trial court expressed concern that a generic reference to the fact
that the passenger was arrested on other matters might be more prejudicial because the jury
would be left to speculate about the nature of the offense and defendant’s potential involvement;
this factor was especially relevant given that the jury was going to hear that the vehicle had been
used in a homicide. Finally, we note that the references to the drugs were minimal and not
particularly prejudicial. Based on this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision
to admit this evidence was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Yost, 278
Mich App at 353.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during the closing
argument. Because defendant failed to object, this Court will review the claim for plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763; 597 NW2d
130 (1999).
In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the case did not involve whether the
jury “believe[s] the officer.” Although the prosecutor intimated that the jury had to believe the
officer’s testimony, when read in context, we conclude that the prosecutor was merely
commenting on the fact that defendant was not contesting the veracity of the officer’s testimony.
Indeed, defendant’s sole argument was that the officer’s testimony did not establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant knew about the handgun in the compartment below the control
panel. In any event, during voir dire, the trial court made it clear that there would probably be
only one witness—a police officer—and instructed the jury that it would have to determine
whether the officer was credible and, if credible, whether the officer’s testimony established the
elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court clarified that the jury could
convict based on this officer’s testimony alone, but did not have to. In addition, after the
evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that it had to decide what the evidence meant and its
importance, including “whether you believe what the witness said.” The trial court also
explained that the attorney’s statements were not evidence. Finally, the jury was given a list of
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criteria to consider when evaluating the officer’s credibility. A jury is presumed to follow the
instructions given to it by the court. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229
(1998). Thus, it is unlikely that the prosecutor’s misstatement affected the jury’s assessment of
the officer’s testimony and, for that reason, we cannot conclude that any error on the part of the
prosecutor was outcome determinative. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.
The prosecutor also noted that the officer’s testimony was uncontested and that the issue
was whether this testimony was “enough to prove the charges in this case beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Defendant maintains the evidence was in fact contested by stipulations that there was no
videorecording of the stop, which defendant maintains would have highlighted whether the gun
was visible, and that there was no fingerprinting of the gun. Presumably, if the gun was not
visible it would be some indication that defendant may not have been aware of it. However, the
stipulations were not evidence that the gun was hidden or that the discovery of prints other than
defendant’s prints would have exonerated defendant. The officer’s pertinent testimony on this
point was not contested; rather, defendant contested the inferences that could be drawn from the
officer’s testimony. Thus, the prosecutor’s argument that the evidence was uncontested was
accurate. A prosecutor may comment that evidence against the defendant is “uncontroverted” or
“undisputed.” People v Fields, 450 Mich 94, 115-116; 538 NW2d 356 (1995).
There were no errors warranting relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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