IN RE ARBIB ESTATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re ARBIB Estate.
CHRISTINE ARBIB, Former Personal
Representative of the Estate of EUGENE ARBIB,
and JAMES HALVORSON, Personal
Representative Successor,
UNPUBLISHED
September 8, 2009
Respondents-Appellees,
v
CATHERINE J. ARBIB, CYNTHIA J. PIERSON,
CHARLES ALLAN ARBIB and STPEHANIE
ANN MCCALISTER f/k/a STEPHANIE ANN
ARBIB,
No. 282004
Mackinac Probate Court
LC No. 04-007221-DE
Petitioners-Appellants.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Davis and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners appeal as of right from an order of the probate court granting summary
disposition in favor of respondents according to MCR 2.116(C)(8).1 Petitioners’ sought specific
performance of an alleged contract between themselves and their father, decedent Eugene Arbib.
The court dismissed the claim because it did not comply with the requirements for contracts
involving promises to make a devise in a will according to MCL 700.2514. We affirm.
Petitioners argue on appeal that the probate court erred in applying MCL 700.2514 to
petitioners’ contract claim, because the statute applies only to contracts to make a will, and not
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Petitioners claim that the Eugene Arbib’s will should be set aside due to a lack of testamentary
capacity, fraud, or the undue influence of his wife in making the will remains to be decided in
probate court. This issue had initially been decided when the probate court granted respondents’
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), but that order was reversed by the
probate court on remand from the Court of Appeals because of additional evidence that had been
discovered.
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contracts to convey property. We disagree. A grant of summary disposition based upon a failure
to state a claim is reviewed de novo on appeal. Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597
NW2d 817 (1999).
Eugene Arbib owned a number of businesses on Mackinac Island that had been operated
by his family for three generations. One of the properties that he owned was a family residence
and attached to it was a building known as the Victorian Lodge, which had been used to house
employees of the family businesses. During Eugene’s lifetime he decided to sell the family
businesses to petitioners on five-year land contracts with the payments equal to what petitioners
were paying to rent those properties. Petitioners claim that Eugene made an agreement with
them that he would ensure that petitioners receive all of the family money used to operate the
businesses, the residence, and the Victorian Lodge if they agreed to purchase the businesses. In
2003, Eugene changed the terms of his will executed in 1996. Under the terms of the new will,
additionally monies, the residence on Mackinac Island, and a life estate in the Victorian Lodge
were bequeathed to his wife, Christine Arbib.
Summary disposition may be granted on the ground that the opposing party has failed to
state a claim on which relief can be granted. MCR 2.116(C)(8); Henry v Dow Chem Co, 473
Mich 63, 71; 701 NW2d 684 (2005). The pleadings alone are considered in testing the legal
sufficiency of a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp, 475 Mich 663, 672;
719 NW2d 1 (2006). All factual allegations in support of the claim are accepted as true and
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Maiden, supra at 119. Also, any
reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the facts are likewise accepted as
true. Detroit Int’l Bridge Co v Commodities Export Co, 279 Mich App 662, 670; 760 NW2d 565
(2008). The motion should be granted only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a
matter of law that no factual development could possibly justify recovery. Beaudrie v
Henderson, 465 Mich 124, 130; 631 NW2d 308 (2001).
Petitioners seek specific performance of the alleged oral agreement. They argue that
because they had fully performed their promise to buy the properties, the terms of the contract
must be fulfilled even if it was not in writing. See Guzorek v Williams, 300 Mich 633, 638-639;
2 NW2d 796 (1942). However, a party seeking specific performance must first to demonstrate
the existence of a valid, enforceable contract. Bowkus v Lange, 196 Mich App 455, 460; 494
NW2d 461 (1992).
Here, it is unclear that a contract was formed. Petitioners discussed an agreement, but its
formation is not apparent from the record. Petitioners were unanimous in expressing their
expectation that they would receive the promised properties and money based on conversations
that they referenced within the family. However, only Charles Arbib specifically recounted a
conversation about an exchange of the family’s business capital, island residence, and Victorian
Lodge for petitioners’ acquisition of the family businesses. Charles said that his father simply
said during a conversation on the topic that “everything is taken care of” and, “don’t worry about
capital, the capital is there.” From these very broad statements it is not possible to discern what
Eugene specifically promised to do. There is no information about what amount of money, or
what property, if any, was promised to the children. Eugene did not say what capitol he was
willing to provide, where it was coming from, or how and when he was going to provide it.
Even though all of Eugene’s children claimed to have an agreement with their father, because
this conversation only included Charles it is not clear to which children a promise was being
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made. The ambiguity of these statements could not be considered as forming a specific and
definite agreement that the courts should enforce. See Eerdmans v Maki, 226 Mich App 360,
364; 573 NW2d 329 (1997): “Mere discussions and negotiation cannot be a substitute for the
formal requirements of a contract.”
Even if definite contract terms could be ascertained, the contract would have been made
to transfer properties and money to the children upon their father’s death. Contracts to make a
devise in a will are governed by MCL 700.2514. In re VanConett Estate, 262 Mich App 660,
663; 687 NW2d 167 (2004). Pursuant to MCL 700.2514(1):
If executed after July 1, 1979, a contract to make a will or devise, not to
revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate may be established only by 1 or more of
the following:
(a) Provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract.
(b) An express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence
proving the terms of the contract.
(c) A writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract.
Petitioners stated that the agreement was to convey the properties, rather than to
bequeath, devise, or make a will, thereby rendering MCL 700.2514 inapplicable. However,
Charles testified that he believed that the agreement with his father related to the terms of his
will because that was the context of the conversation. Furthermore, petitioners testified that they
expected to receive a substantial amount of money and all the properties on Mackinac Island
upon Eugene’s death. Because MCL 700.2514 concerns contracts “to make a . . . .devise,” it
clearly applies to the circumstances of this case.
In the instant case, there was no writing from Eugene evidencing a contract with his
children, and there was no mention of any such contract in a will. See MCL 700.2514(1)(a).
Petitioners contend that Eugene’s 1996 will stated the material provisions of the contract.
However, the 1996 will could not have contained the contractual provisions upon which
petitioners rely, because the petitioners’ alleged contract regarding the property conveyances was
not formed until 1999. Further, the 1996 will is silent as to the children purchasing any property
from Eugene, but rather makes various devises of the properties to his children.
Petitioners also stated that, because they believed that there was a valid contract and they
fully performed their promises, they are entitled to specific performance of the contract or relief
in the form of promissory estoppel. As discussed above, proving a valid contract has eluded
petitioners and Eugene’s 1996 will was simply a statement of his wishes, as they existed at the
time of execution. In re VanConett Estate, supra at 663. Petitioners were required to prove
clearly and convincingly an actual express agreement, rather than a mere unexecuted intention.
In re Estate of Fritz, 159 Mich App 69, 75; 406 NW2d 475 (1987). In granting respondents’
motion to dismiss the contract claims for failure to state a claim, the probate court found that “to
attempt to boot-strap a series of events three years apart . . . and to incorporate them into some
kind of, uh, promissory estoppel or contract is simply beyond, uh, my comprehension and
belief.” Petitioners’ assertions that there was a contract, or that a contract was compliant with
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MCL 700.2514, are unsupported by allegations of fact. See Churella v Pioneer State Mut Ins Co
(On Remand), 258 Mich App 260, 272; 671 NW2d 125 (2003).
Petitioners also appeal the probate court’s decision to deny their motion to amend their
petition to elaborate on a claim for promissory estoppel. A trial court’s decision to grant or deny
leave to amend a pleading is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will only be reversed if it
results in an injustice. Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co, 273 Mich App 388, 401; 729 NW2d 277
(2006). A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it selects a reasonable and principled
outcome. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006).
Plaintiff sought to amend its complaint as provided for in MCR 2.116(I)(5), which
provides as follows:
If the grounds asserted are based on subrule (C)(8), (9), or (10), the court
shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings as provided by
MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before the court shows that amendment
would not be justified.
MCR 2.118(A)(2) states: “[A] party may amend a pleading only by leave of the court or by
written consent of the adverse party. Leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
Leave to amend the pleadings should be freely given to the nonprevailing party unless the
amendment would be futile or otherwise unjustified. Ormsby v Capital Welding, Inc, 471 Mich
45, 52-53; 684 NW2d 320 (2004). Motions to amend a complaint should ordinarily be granted,
and should be denied only for particularized reasons, such as: undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies in the pleadings, undue
prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of
amendment. Casey, supra at 401.
In the instant case, the probate court said that it was denying both of petitioners’ motions
to amend their pleadings because discovery was closing or closed, petitioners had the knowledge
to bring its promissory estoppel claim for over three years, and because any contract claim was
precluded by operation of MCL 700.2514.
Delay alone does not justify denying a motion to amend, but a court may deny a motion
to amend if the delay was in bad faith or if the opposing party suffered actual prejudice as a
result. Franchino v Franchino, 263 Mich App 172, 191; 687 NW2d 620 (2004). But regardless
whether allowing the amendment would have prejudiced respondents, the amendment qualified
as futile. “The sine qua non of promissory estoppel is a promise that is definite and clear.”
Merrero v McDonnell Douglas Capital Corp, 200 Mich App 438, 442; 505 NW2d 275 (1993).
Because petitioners failed to establish a definite and clear contract, they lacked the ability to
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prove a promissory estoppel claim. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying petitioners’ motion to amend.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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