PEOPLE OF MI V COREY LAROD DAVIS JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 3, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284826
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-029579-FH-3
COREY LAROD DAVIS, JR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Whitbeck and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury convictions of felonious assault, MCL 750.82,
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to prison terms
of two years for felony-firearm, 23 months to four years for felonious assault, and 23 months to
five years for carrying a concealed weapon. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues on appeal that his constitutional right to counsel was violated when the
trial court denied his request for substitute counsel without inquiring into the reasons underlying
his request. We disagree.
The right to counsel is guaranteed in both the United States Constitution and the
Michigan Constitution, US Const amends XI, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. A court must
balance the defendant’s right to counsel of his choice against the public’s interest in an efficient
judicial process. An indigent defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel, on its own, is insufficient
to warrant the appointment of new counsel. See People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 456;
669 NW2d 818 (2003). A defendant must show both good cause and that a change in counsel
would not unreasonably interrupt the judicial process. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174,
193; 712 NW2d 506 (2005). “Good cause exists where a legitimate difference of opinion
develops between a defendant and his appointed counsel with regard to a fundamental trial
tactic.” Id.
Defendant stated at trial that he has asked his appointed counsel to withdraw, but
defendant failed to assert any reasons why a new attorney should be appointed to represent him.
Admittedly, the trial court erred when it failed to inquire into the reasons underlying defendant’s
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request for substitute counsel. See Benitez v United States, 521 F3d 625, 632 (CA 6, 2008).1
However, “[a] judge's failure to explore a defendant's claim that his assigned lawyer should be
replaced does not necessarily require that a conviction following such error be set aside.” People
v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Defendant failed to meet his burden in
showing good cause both at trial and on appeal; thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by denying defendant’s request for substitute counsel.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed Grace
Gordon, the mother of Gerald Gordon, to give a victim’s impact statement and to allow
references to Gerald and Grace Gordon to be included in the Presentence Investigation Report
(PSIR). We disagree.
MCL 780.764 and 780.765 grant individuals who suffer direct or threatened harm as a
result of a convicted individual’s crime the right to submit an impact statement both at the
sentencing hearing and for inclusion in the PSIR; however, the right is not limited exclusively to
the defendant’s direct victims. Instead, “a sentencing court is afforded broad discretion in the
sources and types of information to be considered when imposing a sentence.” People v Albert,
207 Mich App 73, 74-75; 523 NW2d 825 (1994). Moreover, this broad discretion does not
infringe on a convicted individual’s due process rights, as the evidence was not taken into
consideration in determining the defendant’s guilt. See Williams v New York, 337 US 241, 246247; 69 S Ct 1079; 93 L Ed 1337 (1949).
Although the direct victim of defendant’s crimes was Hosie Bady, Jr., the law does not
limit victim’s impact statements to direct victims. Moreover, defendant is, albeit indirectly, tied
to Gerald Gordon’s death. Defendant was involved in the fight that quickly escalated into Gerald
Gordon’s fatal shooting. Not only did defendant join the fight, he, too, pulled out a gun and
waived it around. Although defendant’s friend actually shot and killed Gerald Gordon,
defendant was still deeply involved in the incident that led to Gerald Gordon’s death. We hold
that it was within the trial court’s discretion, and, therefore, not plain error, to allow Grace
Gordon to give a statement at defendant’s sentencing and for the court to allow references to
Gerald and Grace Gordon in the PSIR.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
Benitez concerned privately retained counsel, but the case explicitly states that the court’s duty
to inquire does not change under such circumstances. Benitez, supra at 634 (citing Cottenham v
Jamrog, 248 F App’x 625, 636 (CA 6, 2007)).
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