NORTHVILLE EDUC ASSN MEA NEA V NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NORTHVILLE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
MEA/NEA, and PAULA MINNI,
UNPUBLISHED
August 20, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 287076
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 08-104754-CL
NORTHVILLE PUBLIC SCHOOLS and
NORTHVILLE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Markey and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right the trial court’s order vacating an arbitration award and
remanding the matter to the arbitrator. We affirm.
Plaintiff Paula Minni is a tenured teacher at defendant Northville Public Schools
(Northville), and she is represented by plaintiff Northville Education Association, the teachers’
union and collective bargaining agent. Pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement,
Northville employs two methods for evaluating its teachers: a standard “check list” approach
and, optionally for tenured teachers with no outstanding concerns, a more desirable and flexible
“goal based” approach. Minni had previously qualified for, and elected, goal based evaluations.
In 2002 she received notice that she was again eligible for goal-based evaluation, and she
submitted to the school principal the necessary paperwork to request such an evaluation. Her
next evaluation was scheduled for the 2005-2006 school year. She went on maternity leave in
the spring of 2005, and she remained on maternity leave until the end of the 2004-2005 school
year. She was not notified during that time of her eligibility for a goal-based evaluation. As a
consequence, she did not fill out the paperwork necessary for teachers to opt into a goal-based
evaluation. Minni returned from maternity leave, and she was given the standard check list
evaluation in the 2005-2006 school year.
She received a copy of that evaluation on May 11, 2006. That evaluation listed several
areas as “below district standards,” and so an individualized development plan (IDP) was
established for the following school year. In November of 2006, Minni met with her school
principal and lodged a formal objection to the use of the check list evaluation for the 2005-2006
school year. Minni’s position was (and is) that the school failed to provide her with required
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advance notice that she had been eligible to elect a goal based evaluation. She commenced a
grievance on January 7, 2007.
The arbitrator concluded that under the circumstances, the school had not been obligated
to provide Minni with notification because she “was not in active employment when other
eligible teachers were notified of their eligibility to participate in the goal-setting model of
evaluation” and Minni’s previous experience with that kind of evaluation meant she “was not
ignorant of the process.” Furthermore, the arbitrator disagreed with the school’s contention that
the matter was not arbitrable because it had not been timely raised; however, the arbitrator noted
that the school had relied on Minni’s participation in the check list evaluation and, because
Minni waited fifteen months before making a claim regarding the matter, she was “now estopped
from making a very late claim.” The arbitrator therefore denied the grievance.
The trial court found that the arbitrator had added a term to the contract and therefore
exceeded his authority, and furthermore estoppel was inapplicable because the terms of the
contract did not permit such equitable considerations. The trial court vacated the award and
ordered a new arbitration proceeding to “apply the principles of contract law.”
A trial court’s decision whether to vacate an arbitration award is reviewed de novo. City
of Ann Arbor v AFSCME Local 369, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (May 28, 2009),
slip op at 11. The courts generally may not even inquire into whether the arbitrator made any
sort of mistake, as long as the arbitrator did not stray from the confines of whatever authority he
or she was granted by the parties’ contract. Id. The courts’ review of an arbitrator’s decision is
narrowly limited to determining “whether the award was beyond the contractual authority of the
arbitrator,” id., or whether the arbitrator contravened controlling legal principles and correction
of the legal error would lead to a substantially different award. Saveski v Tiseo Architects, Inc,
261 Mich App 553, 554-555; 682 NW2d 542 (2004).
The specific provision of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement that plaintiffs
contend was violated provides:
By the end of the year preceding the evaluation, the administrator will
notify the teacher, in writing, of his/her eligibility to participate in the goal-setting
model. Teachers who are denied the opportunity to participate in the goal-setting
model will be provided the reason(s) in a conference with the administrator.
Furthermore, “[t]he arbitrator will be without power or authority to add to, subtract from,
disregard, alter or modify any of the terms of this Agreement, nor will he/she make any decisions
which require the commission of an act prohibited by law.”
It is undisputed that, by the end of the year preceding the evaluation at issue, Minni was
not provided with any notification, written or otherwise, of her eligibility to participate in goal
based evaluation. Minni was still considered a teacher employed by defendants at that time. The
plain language of the contract simply does not provide for any exceptions or exemptions.
Therefore, the arbitrator “added to” the terms of the contract by permitting an exception to the
notification requirement for teachers who are not “active” at the time. The arbitrator exceeded
his contractual authority by “creat[ing] an exception that does not exist in the collective
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bargaining agreement.” See Lenawee Co Sheriff v Police Officers Labor Council, 239 Mich App
111, 120; 607 NW2d 742 (1999). The trial court correctly so found.
Our Supreme Court has explained that “duress, waiver, estoppel, fraud, or
unconscionability” are “[e]xamples of traditional defenses” to provisions of an unambiguous
contract. Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 470 n 23; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). There is no
inherent reason why the arbitrator could not have appropriately found that Minni “estopped from
making a very late claim.” However, equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting or
denying a fact, if that party (1) induced the opposing party to rely on the existence or
nonexistence of some fact and (2) that opposing party would now be prejudiced if the first party
was permitted to assert a contrary factual situation. See Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 335; 597
NW2d 15 (1999). The arbitrator’s award does not suggest that Minni’s delay caused defendants
to suffer any prejudice. More importantly, the arbitrator’s award would preclude Minni’s entire
claim, which is really an application of laches. The doctrine of laches, where appropriate,
precludes a party from obtaining particular relief. Twp of Yankee Springs v Fox, 264 Mich App
604, 611-612; 692 NW2d 728 (2004).
Under either doctrine, however, mere unexcused delay in asserting a right is insufficient
unless that delay can be proven to have caused prejudice to the party against whom the right is
asserted. Van, supra at 335; Twp of Yankee Springs, supra at 611-612. The trial court correctly
found that such equitable defenses to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are
theoretically available to defendants. However, the arbitrator contravened controlling legal
principles by applying what appears to be the wrong doctrine and, either way, without any
findings regarding a required element. See Saveski, supra at 554-555. We agree with the trial
court’s resolution: the arbitration award must be vacated, and the matter remanded to the
arbitrator for reconsideration in light of the proper law.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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