FIRST INDUSTRIAL LP V DEPT OF TREASURY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST INDUSTRIAL, L.P.,
UNPUBLISHED
August 18, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282742
Court of Claims
LC No. 06-000004-MT
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Cavanagh and K.F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case brought under Michigan’s former Single Business Tax Act (SBTA),1 plaintiff
appeals as of right following a ruling in favor of defendant on its motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Before the subject transaction, plaintiff was a 99% limited
partner in First Industrial Financing Partnership, LP (FIFP). This case surrounds the transfer of
Michigan assets from FIFP to plaintiff. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
Plaintiff first argues that the court erred in concluding that the transfer of assets did not
entitle plaintiff to a carryover business loss deduction. We agree. We review a motion for
summary disposition de novo, Collins v Comerica Bank, 468 Mich 628, 631; 664 NW2d 713
(2003), testing the factual sufficiency of the complaint by considering the pleadings, affidavits,
depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The
parties to a civil action may submit stipulated facts to the court, and if the stipulated facts are
sufficient to allow the court to render judgment in the action, the court shall do so. MCR
2.116(A)(1), (2). When the parties submit stipulated facts, we do not deal with factual findings,
but with the application of the law, and our review of the decision is solely for errors of law. In
re Butterfield Estate, 405 Mich 702, 715; 275 NW2d 262 (1979); Federal Land Bank of St Paul
v Bay Park Place, Inc, 162 Mich App 1, 6; 412 NW2d 222 (1987). We review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d
1
The SBTA was repealed on business activity in Michigan after December 31, 2007. MCL
208.151.
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164 (1999). When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts presume that
the Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning and further construction is neither
permitted nor required. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300
(2000).
The SBTA allowed taxpayers to deduct available business losses from their tax base.
MCL 208.23b(h). Revenue Administrative Bulletin (RAB) 1992-3 addresses the issue of when a
transferee is entitled to a SBT business loss carryover:
E. Transfers of property through certain tax-free events described in subparagraphs (1) through (8) of this section receive the following tax treatment for
SBT purposes: transferor is not required to recapture CAD on such property;
transferee is not entitled to a CAD on such property; transferee holds the property
as if such property was in the hands of the transferor, therefore, the transferee
must recapture CAD depending on the acquisition date of the property by the
transferor; and transferee is entitled to an SBT business loss carryover for any
unused business loss of the transferor when transferor completely discontinues
operations and is no longer a taxpayer under the Single Business Tax Act
(SBTA). [RAB 1992-3(3)(E) (emphasis added).]
This issue pertains to whether plaintiff was entitled to a business loss deduction (BLD)
under the SBTA for losses incurred by FIFP before FIFP discontinued operations in Michigan.
The focus of the parties’ argument is on the phrase “completely discontinues operations” from
RAB 1992-3(3)(E). RAB 1992-3 represents an interpretation of MCL 208.23b(h) by the agency
formally charged with carrying out its provisions. Although MCL 205.3(f) grants defendant the
authority to issue “bulletins that explain the current department interpretations of current state
tax laws,” they are not rules promulgated in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act,
MCL 24.201 et seq. See MCL 205.3(b). Thus, RABs do not have the force of law. Catalina
Marketing Sales Corp v Dep’t of Treasury, 470 Mich 13, 21; 678 NW2d 619 (2004).
MCL 208.23b(h) provided as follows:
Deduct any available business loss. As used in this subdivision, “business
loss” means a negative amount after allocation or apportionment as provided in
chapter 3 and after adjustments as provided in section 23 and subdivisions (a) to
(g) without regard to the deduction under this subdivision. The business loss shall
be carried forward to the year next following the loss year as an offset to the
allocated or apportioned tax base including the adjustments provided in
subdivisions (a) to (g), then successively to the next 9 taxable years following the
loss year or until the loss is used up, whichever occurs first, but for not more than
10 taxable years after the loss year.
“The SBTA employs a value-added measure of business activity, but its intended effect is
to impose a tax on the privilege of conducting business activity within Michigan . . . .” ANR
Pipeline Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 266 Mich App 190, 198; 699 NW2d 707 (2005). The SBTA
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defined the term “taxpayer” as “a person liable for a tax, interest or penalty under this act.”
MCL 208.10(2). Under the SBTA, a person was liable for tax, interest, or penalties if the person
had business activities within Michigan. MCL 208.31(1). MCL 208.3(2) defined “business
activity” in relevant part as:
a transfer of legal or equitable title to or rental of property, whether real, personal,
or mixed, tangible or intangible, or the performance of services, or a combination
thereof, made or engaged in, or caused to be made or engaged in, within this state,
whether in intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce, with the object of gain,
benefit, or advantage, whether direct or indirect, to the taxpayer or to others . . . .
In defining a “business loss” as “a negative amount after allocation or apportionment” that “shall
be carried forward . . . as an offset to the allocated or apportioned tax base,” MCL 208.23b(h)
(emphasis added), the Legislature clearly tied the BLD to business activity in Michigan. See
MCL 208.41 (“A taxpayer whose business activities are taxable both within and without this
state, shall apportion his tax base as provided in this chapter.”).
Thus, in keeping with the recognized purposes of the SBTA and its plain language, a
transferee should be able to take advantage of the transferor’s BLD when the latter ceases
operations in Michigan and is no longer liable for the SBT. In keeping with this understanding,
as used in RAB 1992-3(3)(E), “completely discontinues operations” should be read to refer only
to Michigan operations.
It is conceivable that the Legislature intended to allow a transferee a business loss
deduction only from a transferor that completely discontinued operations both inside and outside
of Michigan such that a taxpayer could not essentially “sell” or transfer its business loss
deductions to a high-earning sister company, and then proceed with business as usual after the
losses have been dissolved. It is a well established rule of construction that a tax exemption must
be construed strictly in favor of the government. Elias Bros Restaurants, Inc v Dep’t of
Treasury, 452 Mich 144, 150; 549 NW2d 837 (1996). However, the plain language of the
statutory BLD does not provide for allowing a transferee to claim a BLD only if the transferor
discontinues operations worldwide. Construing RAB 1992-3(3)(E) as defendant contends
provides for such an outcome, but RABs do not carry the force of law and cannot be understood
to override Legislative intent as expressed in the applicable statutes. Catalina Marketing, supra;
DiBenedetto, supra. In sum, the court erred in concluding that plaintiff is not entitled to a BLD
carryover.
Alternatively, plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a CAD for the disputed tax years under
RAB 1992-3. We disagree. As an alternative to year-over-year capital asset depreciation, the
SBTA allowed taxpayers to claim a capital acquisition deduction (CAD) in the year an asset is
acquired for the full purchase price. MCL 208.23; Caterpillar, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 440
Mich 400, 409; 488 NW2d 182 (1992). “This consumption-type element of the CAD and SBT
thereby provides a cash-flow advantage to the purchaser/user of capital assets.” Caterpillar,
supra at 410.
RAB 1992-3(3)(E)(4) provides as follows:
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(4) Property distributed by a partnership to a partner(s) in a partial or
complete liquidation of the partner(s) interest and the property is used in a
business activity of an organization in which the partner(s) own a controlling
interest (i.e., partners having at least 80% ownership in original partnership must
have at least 80% ownership in new entity).
Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to a CAD because it does not meet the above
definition, or any others listed in RAB 1992-3, as the transfer of assets from FIFP was a nonliquidating distribution for federal tax purposes pursuant to IRC Section 732(a)(1). The
enumerated list in RAB 1992-3 does not contain a non-liquidating distribution as one of the taxfree events that receive special tax treatment under the SBTA.
Defendant acknowledges that there was a non-liquidating distribution, but argues that the
non-liquidating distribution was merely a return of plaintiff’s capital investment in FIFP.
Defendant presented the affidavit of defendant’s auditor, John Clancy, which outlined the
transactions between plaintiff and FIFP. Clancy stated that FIFP purchased property in 1994 and
1995, for which it claimed CAD and a resulting business loss deduction. In 1998, the subject
property was transferred to plaintiff in a tax-free distribution. Plaintiff claimed a business loss
deduction of $135,099,663 for the same property in 1998. Clancy stated, “During the audit, my
review of [plaintiff’s] single business tax returns and other documents did not disclose that
[plaintiff] ever paid or accrued a cost for the assets that [FIFP] transferred to [plaintiff].”
Plaintiff also presented the affidavit of Scott Musil, who was employed with First
Industrial Realty Trust, Inc., a 50% owner of plaintiff’s partnership. Musil stated that FIFP
distributed a majority of its assets to plaintiff for $312.9 million as a return of capital to plaintiff.
If a limited partner could purchase a substantial interest in a partnership (99% or more in
this case), have the partnership obtain any and all tax benefits from the assets purchased with the
limited partner’s contribution, and then have those assets transferred back to the limited partner
for a second opportunity to obtain the same tax benefits from the tax-depleted assets, the
purposes of the SBT in general and the CAD specifically would be subverted.
Moreover, exemptions from tax are not favored, must be construed strictly in favor of the
government, and the party asserting the exemption bears the burden of proof. See Elias Bros,
supra. The CAD statute was created to “allow[] the taxpayer’s tax base to be reduced by the
amount expended during the tax year to acquire capital assets.” Caterpillar, supra at 409. Here,
plaintiff did not prove that it expended any amount of money during the tax year to acquire the
assets, but instead merely provided evidence that it acquired the assets through a non-liquidating
distribution. Therefore, either plaintiff owned the assets in full through its partnership interest
prior to the non-liquidating distribution, or it did not prove that it paid any additional money for
the assets, and therefore the incremental investment is zero. In either situation, plaintiff is not
entitled to a substantive CAD.
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We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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