ESTATE OF MIRA E ABAY V DAIMLERCHRYSLER INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARIA C. ABAY, Personal Representative of the
Estate of MIRA E. ABAY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 13, 2009
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee,
v
No. 283624
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-75016-ck
DAIMLERCHRYSLER INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/CrossPlaintiff/Third-Party-Appellant,
and
DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, a/k/a
CHRYSLER LLC,
Defendant,
and
JAMES E. TRENT and KELLY ROSE BROOKS,
Defendants/Cross-Defendants,
and
AUTO CLUB GROUP INSURANCE
COMPANY, d/b/a AAA MICHIGAN, and ALVIN
JEROME TAYLOR,
Third-Parties.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Talbot and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
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Defendant DaimlerChrysler Insurance Company (DCIC) appeals as of right the order
denying its motion for summary disposition and granting summary disposition in plaintiff’s favor
in this action for a declaratory judgment regarding coverage under a DCIC insurance policy. We
reverse.
This civil action arises from an automobile accident in which Mira E. Abay died from
fatal injuries she suffered when a vehicle driven by defendant Kelly Rose Brooks collided with a
vehicle driven by Abay. In the underlying action, plaintiff pleaded claims against Brooks and
Deborah Jean Lee, the owner of the vehicle Brooks was driving. Plaintiff filed this declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration regarding the responsibilities of various insurers.
Lee owned a vehicle that she insured through AAA. Lee loaned her car to defendant
Alvin Jerome Taylor, a friend with whom she lived. Taylor, who was uninsured, used the car
with Lee’s permission to drive to work. At lunch, Taylor ran an errand, and picked up Brooks on
the way. The two returned to Taylor’s place of employment. Brooks took Lee’s car and drove it
while intoxicated. Brooks was involved in the crash that led to Abay’s death.1
Plaintiff first filed the negligence action against Brooks, Lee, and Taylor. Plaintiff
accepted AAA’s settlement offer of the $100,000 policy limit with regard to plaintiff’s claims
against Lee. The court entered a default against Brooks.
Plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action against defendants DCIC,
DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Brooks, and Brooks’ father, James E. Trent (Trent). Brooks
allegedly lived with Trent at the time of the accident. Trent, as a DaimlerChrysler retiree, leased
a car from DaimlerChrysler,2 and that car was insured by an insurance policy issued by DCIC.
Plaintiff asserted that the insurance policy issued by DCIC covered Brooks because the language
of the policy provided liability coverage for any automobile used by a family member of an
insured and therefore extended to Brooks as a family member of her father.
DCIC moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s complaint.3 It argued that Brooks
was not insured under the DCIC policy. It noted that DaimlerChrysler is the named insured
under the policy and therefore the endorsement under which plaintiff sought to include Brooks,
1
A jury convicted Brooks of operating a motor vehicle was under the influence of intoxicants,
causing death, MCL 257.625(4), and manslaughter with a motor vehicle, MCL 750.321. The
trial court sentenced Brooks to a prison term of 86 months to 15 years.
2
The DaimlerChrysler Company Car Programs Terms, Instructions and Conditions Manual
provides with regard to cars leased under the Executive Lease Program that “all lease vehicles
must be titled” to DaimlerChrysler Corporation. However, the evidence in the record reveals
that the cars are titled to GELCO, which purchases the vehicles from DaimlerChrysler and then
leases them back to DaimlerChrysler. DaimlerChrysler then leases the cars to its retirees under
the DaimlerChrysler Company Car Program.
3
Although defendants DaimlerChrysler and Trent also moved for summary disposition, only
defendant DCIC is involved in this appeal and, therefore, use of the term defendant refers to
DCIC.
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as a family member of an individual insured, does not apply because “individual insured” refers
to the “named insured.”
Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion for summary disposition. She argued that the
policy is a “fronting policy,” and that its language is ambiguous and therefore must be construed
in favor of coverage. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary disposition arguing that Brooks was a
resident of her parents’ home at the time of the accident and, therefore, an insured under the
policy.
In response, DCIC and DaimlerChrysler conceded that the policy is a “fronting policy,”
but challenged plaintiff’s assertion that it is illegal or against public policy. Defendant further
asserted that there existed evidence indicating that Brooks was not living with her parents at the
time of the accident.
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted summary disposition in favor of
plaintiff. The trial court found that a plain reading of the insurance policy precluded coverage
because “under the terms of the policy ‘you’ only refers to the ‘named insured’ and that is
[DaimlerChrysler]. There is no mention in the policy of any individual.” The court concluded,
however, that “there is a patent ambiguity in the language of the policy which contains both an
‘individual named insured’ endorsement and a listed named insured business entity as the sole
‘named insured.” The court construed this ambiguity “liberally in favor of the insured and
strictly against the insurer” and concluded that “Endorsement No. 19 applies in this case and
extends liability coverage to non-owned autos operated by Trent or his resident family
members.” The court concluded:
Under the policy, a family member includes a blood relative of Trent who resides
in his household. The Court finds that after applying all of the relevant factors
that determine residence to the facts and evidence presented in this case,
Defendant Brooks was a resident of the Trent household at the time of the
accident. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to summary
disposition because on December 10, 2003, Brooks was operating a non-owned
automobile that was not available for her regular use and is a blood relative of
Trent and was a resident relative of his household at the time of the accident.
I
This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition. Brown v Brown, 478 Mich 545, 551; 739 NW2d 313 (2007). Also, the construction
of a contract, and whether contract language is ambiguous, are questions of law that this Court
reviews de novo. Coates v Bastian Bros, Inc, 276 Mich App 498; 503; 741 NW2d 539 (2007);
Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460 Mich 348, 353; 596 NW2d 190 (1999).
II
The rules of contract interpretation are applied to the construction of insurance contracts.
Citizens Ins Co v Pro-Seal Service Group, Inc, 477 Mich 75, 82; 730 NW2d 682 (2007). Where
the language of a contract is unambiguous, as determined by the plain and ordinary meanings of
the words used, it reflects the parties’ intent as a matter of law and must be construed as written.
-3-
Id. An ambiguity exists when the insurance contract is “capable of conflicting interpretations.”
Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 467; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). If the
contract is ambiguous, its meaning must be determined by the fact finder. Id. at 469. The courts
should not create an ambiguity where one does not exist. Henderson, supra. That the policy
does not define a certain term does not render the policy ambiguous; the words used must be
construed according to their plain meanings. Id.
The dispute at issue in this appeal involves the automobile insurance policy insuring
vehicles leased by Trent from his former employer, DaimlerChrysler. The policy is a business
auto coverage form. The policy provides in part, “Throughout this policy the words ‘you’ and
‘your’ refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations. The words ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’
refer to the Company providing this insurance.” The “named insured” shown on the declarations
page is “DaimlerChrysler Corporation and/or Chrysler Corporation and its U.S. Subsidiaries.”
Section II of the policy defines “Who is an insured.” The definition of “insureds”
includes: (a) “you” as defined by the policy; (b) with exceptions, “[a]nyone else while using
with your permission a covered ‘auto’ you own, hire or borrow . . . .”; and (c) persons liable for
the conduct of an insured. It appears from a reading of this provision that Trent falls within
option (b) because he leased a car from DaimlerChrysler and thereby used with
DaimlerChrysler’s permission a covered vehicle DaimlerChrysler owned, hired, or borrowed.
Thus, Trent was an insured under the policy.
Endorsement No. 19 of the policy, titled “individual named insured,” modifies the
business auto coverage form. It states:
If you are an individual, the policy is changed as follows:
A.
Changes in Liability Coverage
***
2.
Personal Auto Coverage
While any “auto” you own of the “private passenger type” is a
covered “auto” under Liability Coverage:
a.
The following is added to Who Is An Insured:
“Family members” are “insureds” for any covered “auto”
you own of the “private passenger type” and any other
“auto” described in Paragraph 2.b. of this endorsement.
b.
Any “auto” you don’t own is a covered “auto” while being
used by you or by any “family member” except:
(1)
Any “auto” owned by any “family members.”
(2)
Any “auto” furnished or available for your or any “family
member’s” regular use.
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(3)
Any “auto” used by you or by any of your “family
members” while working in a business of selling, servicing,
repairing or parking “autos.”
(4)
Any “auto” other than an “auto” of the “private passenger
type” used by you or any of your “family members” while working
in any other business or occupation.
The endorsement defines “family member” as “a person related to you by blood, marriage or
adoption who is a resident of your household . . . .”
Plaintiff argues that, pursuant to these provisions, Brooks is an insured because she is a
family member of an insured, Trent, and was using an automobile that was not owned by Trent
and did not fall within one of the exceptions to such coverage. Defendants argue, however, that
Brooks is not an insured under this endorsement because her father, Trent, was not the “named
insured” and therefore she was not a family member of a “named insured.”
Defendants are correct that the policy references to “you” are references to the named
insured, which is stated as DaimlerChrysler. The endorsement specifically states that the
changes provided within it apply “If you are an individual.” The term “you” as used in the
policy refers to the named insured: DaimlerChrysler. Thus, because the “you” in this policy is
not an individual, the endorsement does not apply.
The trial court went beyond the plain language of the policy and noted the entangled
relationship between DaimlerChrysler and DCIC and the fact that the policy refers to no
individual insureds. It found “a patent ambiguity in the language of the policy which contains
both an ‘individual named insured’ endorsement and a listed named insured business entity as
the sole ‘named insured.’” The court appears to have been troubled because of its interpretation
of the policy as failing to provide any coverage to any individual. As a result of this it looked
outside the policy language. However, the court failed to consider the fact that the policy defines
who is insured, and that definition appears to include Trent himself or persons while using with
DaimlerChrysler’s permission a covered auto owned, hired or borrowed by DCC. The policy
language describes unambiguously who is insured under the policy. The policy does not extend
to Trent or his family members when such persons use an automobile not owned by
DaimlerChrysler, as provided in the endorsement.4 Therefore, coverage does not extend to
Brooks under the circumstances of this case. This interpretation is based on the clear language
of the policy. The court was required to apply the policy as written. It erred in creating an
ambiguity where none exists and looking outside the policy language in determining its meaning.
The parties dispute the applicability of Michigan Twp Participating Plan v Pavolich, 232
Mich App 378, 384; 591 NW2d 325 (1998). Defendant argues that it is controlling, and plaintiff
argues that it is factually distinguishable because the present case involves a privately leased
4
It is important to emphasize that Brooks was not driving one of her father’s vehicles that he
leased under the DaimlerChrysler Company Car program.
-5-
vehicle. This distinction is not relevant, however, to the present case. What is relevant is the
legal analysis provided by the Court with regard to the language of the insurance policy at issue.
Pavolich was employed as a police officer with the Village of Lake Linden (“Village”).
He stopped to question a suspect and when he reached into the suspect's vehicle, the suspect
attempted to drive away with Pavolich caught on the vehicle. The suspect's insurance company
paid the policy limits under his insurance policy and Pavolich made a claim for underinsurance
benefits under the Village's contract with Michigan Township Participating Plan. This
underinsurance plan identified the Village as the named insured and indicated that damages
would be paid to an “insured,” which was defined as:
a. You or any family member.
b. Any other person occupying “your covered auto.”
c. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of “bodily
injury” to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in a. or b.
above. [Id. at 381.]
The policy also indicated that “you” and “your” meant the person or organization identified as
the named insured. See id. Pavolich argued that he as an employee of the Village, the named
insured, was covered under the Village's policy as “you” and “your” were ambiguously defined
and a plain interpretation of the policy language rendered portions of the policy meaningless as it
meant that no one was entitled to underinsurance benefits as the Village had no family members
and could not sustain bodily injury.
In rendering its decision, this Court noted that no reported decision of the Court had
addressed the issue presented before it. See Pavolich, supra at 380-381. The Court cited the
following portion of its decision in Royce v Citizens Insurance Company, 219 Mich App 537,
542-543; 557 NW2d 144 91996), for guidance in reviewing and interpreting insurance policies:
When determining what the parties' agreement is, the trial court should
read the contract as a whole and give meaning to all terms contained within the
policy. The trial court shall give the language contained within the policy its
ordinary and plain meaning so that technical and strained constructions are
avoided. A policy is ambiguous when, after reading the entire document, its
language can be reasonably understood in different ways. If the trial court
determines that the policy is ambiguous, the policy will be construed against the
insurer and in favor of coverage. However, if the contract is unambiguous, the
trial court must enforce it as written.
Based upon these contract principles, the Pavolich court held that a plain and ordinary reading of
the policy before it barred coverage for employees of the Village as the policy language “you”
specifically referred only to the Village and not to its employees. Id. at 328.
The Pavolich court found that the policy before it was a sloppy and inartfully drafted
standard form not tailored to the Village's needs, and it contained surplusage as it provided
coverage to the Village and its family members when the Village could not have family members
-6-
or sustain bodily injury. Id. at 383. The Court also noted that this portion of the policy was
rendered meaningless if the plain interpretation was used. Id. at 388. Nevertheless, the Court
held that surplusage did not equate to ambiguity and in reviewing the word “you,” along with the
rest of the policy language taken in its entirety, the court found that
there is only one interpretation that can be made when looking at the language as
written. Any casual reader, giving ordinary and plain meanings to the language as
written, would realize that the insured “YOU” does not refer to individual
employees, but refers only to the village itself. Where the policy language
describes unambiguously who is insured under the policy, there is no basis for
finding an ambiguity. Because the policy is clear as written, we are bound by the
specific language, and will not construe the policy to cover defendant simply to
avoid a finding that there is surplus language in the contract. [Id. at 388-389.]
In making this decision, the court reviewed, discussed and relied upon the majority view of
jurisdictions that a policy like the one before it was “not ambiguous and should be construed as
written, even if certain provisions are rendered meaningless by a plain reading of the language.”
Id. at 384-388.
Plaintiff argues that the policy should be declared contrary to public policy if
Endorsement No. 19 does not apply. However,
The no-fault act does not require residual liability insurance covering all
vehicles a person may drive. Residual liability insurance is required for residual
tort liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the vehicle in
respect to which a policy is required to be maintained and in effect. An insurer is
not required by the no-fault act to provide portable coverage when the owner
drives another insured vehicle. * * * Residual liability coverage, to be sure, must
be in force with respect to the vehicle for which it is purchased and without regard
to whether the owner or some other driver uses it. It does not follow that the act
requires residual liability coverage when the owner uses a vehicle owned by
someone else. [State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Ruuska, 412 Mich 321, 342-343,
344; 314 NW2d 184 (1982) (Emphasis added).]
Because residual liability coverage for another vehicle is optional, “the extent of an insurer’s
obligation is governed by the terms of the insurance policy.” Geller v Farmers Ins Exchange,
253 Mich App 664, 667; 659 NW2d 646 (2002) [Emphasis added].
III
Given our conclusion that the DCIC insurance policy does not extend to Trent or his
family members when such persons use an automobile not owned by DaimlerChrysler, we need
not address plaintiff’s argument that she was a resident of the household where her parents
resided at the time of the accident.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant. Jurisdiction is not retained. Defendant DCIC, being the prevailing party, may tax
-7-
costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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