PEOPLE OF MI V AKO MBILI GILMORE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 11, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285080
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 06-001329-FC
AKO MBILI GILMORE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction and sentence for felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b), and conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the shooting death of Allen Redd, on September 11,
2006, in a garage located at 1318 Ohio Street in Lansing. The prosecution’s theory at trial was
that defendant and Lance Jones conspired to rob Redd of money and drugs at gunpoint and that
Redd was killed during that robbery.1 The defense claimed that while defendant admittedly was
present at the time of Redd’s murder, he was not a participant in any plan or attempt to rob Redd,
but instead merely tried, unsuccessfully, to intervene in an altercation between Jones and Redd.
Testimony and evidence presented at defendant’s trial established: that defendant
worked as a drug runner or “mule” selling drugs for Redd and that he sold heroin to Jones; that
there was an unusually large amount of telephone contact between defendant and Redd and
between defendant and Jones in the days leading up to Redd’s murder; that there was no
telephone contact between Jones and Redd in the six months preceding Redd’s murder; that the
home at 1318 Ohio Street (“1318”), where Redd was murdered, was owned by Jones’s
stepfather; that Jones borrowed the key to 1318 shortly before Redd’s murder; that Jones also
borrowed a .22 caliber Ruger rifle, which was the murder weapon, from his stepfather two days
before the murder; that other actions were taken in apparent preparation for the meeting with
Redd, including hanging tarps in the garage of 1318 where the meeting was to occur and
purchasing fireworks that were then used in an attempt to camouflage the noise generated by the
1
Jones was tried separately and, on August 28, 2007, was convicted of murder, conspiracy to
commit armed robbery and felony firearm.
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shooting; that Jones had taken defendant to the garage on at least two previous occasions; that on
the day of Redd’s murder two men fitting defendant’s and Redd’s descriptions were seen
scuffling outside the garage, in the vicinity where two buttons from defendant’s shirt were found,
and that one of the men forced the other back into the garage; that Redd was shot and killed
inside the garage; that Redd’s blood was on the shirt, pants and shoes defendant was wearing at
the time of Redd’s murder and that the blood spatter on his clothes indicated defendant was in
close proximity to Redd at the time he was shot; that money was taken from Redd’s pockets; and
that, after Redd was shot, men fitting defendant’s and Jones’s descriptions sped away from 1318
in Jones’s mother’s 1992 Oldsmobile Cutlass.
On appeal, defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish his guilt
of the predicate felony of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. We disagree.
When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this Court must view the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational
trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494 (2005); People v McGhee, 268
Mich App 600, 622; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Conflicting evidence must be resolved in favor of
the prosecution. People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 524; 640 NW2d 314 (2001). And, we
“must draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.”
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). Further, “[c]ircumstantial evidence
and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of a crime.” Id.
MCL 750.157a provides that any person who conspires together with one or more
persons to commit an offense prohibited by law or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is
guilty of conspiracy. Conspiracy requires proof of both the intent to combine with others and the
intent to accomplish the illegal objective. People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629; 628 NW2d 540
(2001). Thus, to establish defendant’s guilt of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, the
prosecutor was required to prove that defendant intended to combine with Jones to rob Redd
while armed and that defendant intended that the armed robbery occur. Id.
There was no dispute that defendant was present when Redd was shot; the only question
was whether he was “merely” present or whether he was an active participant in a planned armed
robbery of Redd, and ultimately, in Redd’s murder. From our review of the record, we conclude
that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the predicate felony of conspiracy to
commit armed robbery. We note specifically: (1) the absence of any phone contact between
Jones and Redd in the six months preceding Redd’s murder and the substantial increase in the
amount of phone contact between Jones and defendant and defendant and Redd in the days
leading up to the murder; (2) testimony that defendant and Redd “scuffled” outside the garage, as
substantiated by the two buttons from defendant’s shirt on the ground in that vicinity, with one of
them pulling or forcing the other into the garage; and (3) testimony that defendant and Jones left
the scene together, in Jones’s mother’s car and the absence of any testimony placing any vehicle
driven by defendant in the vicinity, suggesting that they also arrived at the scene together.
Drawing all reasonable inferences and making credibility choices in support of the jury verdict,
as this Court is required to do, the evidence presented was sufficient to permit a rational jury to
infer that defendant arranged for Redd to come to 1318 on September 11, 2006, for the purposes
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of combining with Jones to rob Redd of heroin and/or money at gunpoint, and that defendant
further participated in the crime by forcing Redd into the garage, where Jones then shot him.
Defendant next asserts that evidence that prosecution witness Charles Smith perjured
himself at Jones’s trial, discovered after defendant’s trial was completed, warrants a new trial,
and that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding otherwise. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial for an
abuse of discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 644 NW2d 174 (2003). A trial court
abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision resulting in an outcome that falls outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d
231 (2003); People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 217; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). As our Supreme
Court has explained:
For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a
defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was
newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the
party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the
evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on
retrial. [Cress, supra at 692 (internal quotations and citation omitted).]
Jones was tried separately and was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery,
felony murder and felony firearm. Charles Smith testified at Jones’s trial that he knew defendant
as a result of purchasing heroin from him and he knew Jones from “seeing him around different
people who use” and that he “met him again in jail.” Smith testified further that, while he and
Jones were both in jail, Jones confessed in detail to Redd’s murder, telling Smith that defendant
and Jones planned to rob Redd of heroin and money, but “pretty much everything went wrong”;
that Redd did not want to “give everything up” and that Jones shot Redd after Redd and
defendant started fighting.
On November 7, 2007, Arthur Garrett, who had been housed with defendant for a short
time in December 2006, and then with Smith thereafter, executed an affidavit in which he
averred that Smith repeatedly told Garrett that he did not know anything about Jones’s case and
that he was being untruthful about Jones having confessed in order to try to get out of jail. Jones
moved for a new trial on the basis of Garrett’s affidavit. That motion was denied following a
May 15, 2008 evidentiary hearing, at which Garrett and others testified.
At defendant’s trial, Smith testified that he knew defendant “[t]hrough dealing drugs and
stuff, heroin”; that he would meet up with defendant “[o]nce, twice, three times a week or so,”
depending on how much money he had, to buy heroin for his personal use; that Smith called
defendant on his cell phone to arrange drug buys; and that the last time Smith bought heroin
from defendant was near the end of August 2006. Cellular telephone records showing that Smith
called defendant 22 times in a six-month period ending on August 29, 2006 corroborated this
testimony. Smith testified further that, he knew Jones as a fellow drug user and purchaser of
heroin from defendant, an assertion that defendant did not dispute. Additionally, Smith testified
that on one occasion, late in August 2006, Smith, his brother, defendant and another person were
riding in a van together and Smith overheard defendant telling someone “he was coming into,
you know, quite a bit of heroin, about 200 grams or so.”
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In July 2008, defendant also moved for a new trial based on Garrett’s affidavit, arguing
that Smith’s perjury was material to the outcome of defendant’s trial. An evidentiary hearing
was held on this motion on November 6, 2008. At this hearing, Garrett reiterated that Smith told
him that he was giving false information to detectives so he could get out of jail. The trial court
denied defendant’s motion, noting the evidence implicating defendant in Redd’s murder,
including eyewitness testimony, phone records and blood spatter evidence, and concluding it was
not probable that a new trial would result in a different outcome.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that introduction of
evidence that Smith perjured himself would not make a different result probable on retrial. We
disagree.
Michigan Courts have held that “[t]he discovery that testimony introduced at trial was
perjured may be grounds for a new trial.” People v Mechura, 205 Mich App 481, 483; 517
NW2d 797 (1994), citing People v Barbara, 400 Mich 352, 363; 255 NW2d 171 (1977). As
with other newly discovered evidence, however, “[i]n order to merit a new trial on the basis of
such a discovery, a defendant must show that the evidence (1) is newly discovered, (2) is not
merely cumulative, (3) would probably have caused a different result, and was not discoverable
and producible at trial with reasonable diligence.” Id.
The only uncorroborated testimony offered by Smith at defendant’s trial was that he
overheard defendant tell someone that he was “coming into” a large quantity of heroin. Absent
this testimony, there remained substantial evidence implicating defendant in planning an armed
robbery of Redd, including the unusual amount of phone contact between Jones and defendant
and Jones and Redd in the days leading up to the murder, the absence of any phone contact
between Redd and Jones in the six months preceding the murder, eyewitness testimony about the
“scuffle” outside the garage and about seeing defendant and Jones leave the scene together, the
buttons from defendant’s shirt found outside the garage, and the amount and pattern of Redd’s
blood on defendant’s clothing. Even were the jury to disbelieve Smith’s testimony about
overhearing defendant’s purported statement, there remained sufficient evidence to convict
defendant of the crime. Nothing in Garrett’s affidavit or testimony directly corroborated
defendant’s version of events or undermined the prosecution’s version of events.2 Defendant’s
assertion that there is significant and credible evidence that a prosecution witness perjured
himself at trial about central issues in the case significantly overstates the importance of Smith’s
testimony, as well as the impact of Garrett’s affidavit on that testimony. Considering the brief
and limited nature of Smith’s uncorroborated testimony against defendant, and considering the
2
This is in stark contrast to the nature of the newly discovered evidence at issue in the cases
relied on by defendant. In People v Mechura, 205 Mich App 481, 483; 517 NW2d 797 (1994),
the newly discovered evidence directly corroborated the defendant’s assertion that he shot the
victim in self-defense. In People v Terry Burton, 74 Mich App 215; 253 NW2d 710 (1977), the
newly discovered evidence directly corroborated the defendant’s assertion that he was not
involved in the robbery in any way. And, in People v LoPesto, 9 Mich App 318; 156 NW2d 586
(1967), the newly discovered evidence called into question the credibility of evidence this Court
deemed of “real importance” on a crucial issue to the outcome of the trial.
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other evidence against defendant as described above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.
Defendant argues further that the trial court abridged his Sixth Amendment right to have
a jury determine facts relevant to his guilt by concluding that it was not probable that a jury
would reach a different conclusion on retrial. Essentially, defendant asserts that the trial court’s
analysis – and by implication, any “harmless error” analysis – invaded the province of the jury as
the exclusive finder of fact. As noted by the prosecutor, the case law primarily relied on by
defendant in support of this argument addresses constitutionally deficient jury instructions.3
However, defendant does not assert that his jury instructions were constitutionally deficient. Nor
does defendant offer any authority that a trial court is not permitted to evaluate newly discovered
evidence in the manner undertaken here. Indeed, Cress, supra, requires the very analysis
undertaken by the trial court in response to a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence. Absent instruction from the Supreme Court otherwise, this Court remains bound to
apply the test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence set forth in Cress.
See, e.g., People v Metamora Water Service, Inc, 276 Mich App 376, 387-388; 741 NW2d 61
(2007) (“It is the duty of the Supreme Court to overrule or modify case law if and when it
becomes obsolete, and the Court of Appeals and the lower courts are bound by the precedent
established by the Supreme Court until it takes such action.”). Thus, defendant’s argument that
the trial court improperly invaded the province of the jury lacks merit.
Defendant next argues, in the alternative, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to examine Jones’s court file, which would have resulted in the discovery of Garrett’s affidavit,
prior to defendant’s trial. We agree with the trial court that, as discussed above, defendant has
not established a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different
had defense counsel become aware of Garrett’s affidavit.
The question whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel “is a
mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A judge first must find the facts, and then must
decide whether those facts constitute a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel.” People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 124; 748 NW2d 859 (2008),
quoting People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). When considering the
trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective, this Court reviews the
trial court’s factual findings for clear error and reviews de novo questions of constitutional law.
Id.
As our Supreme Court recently explained in Dendel, supra at 124-125, quoting People v
Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001):
A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground that trial counsel was
ineffective bears a heavy burden. To justify reversal under either the federal or
state constitutions, a convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test articulated
3
Defendant also refers in passing to Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 498; 120 S Ct 234;
147 L Ed 2d 435(2000), and its progeny, which address judicial fact-finding during sentencing.
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by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104
S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). See People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment.” Strickland, supra at 687. In so doing, the defendant must
overcome a strong presumption that counsel’s performance constituted sound trial
strategy. Id. at 690. “Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, the
defendant must show the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.
“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Id.
See also, People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000); People v Pickens, 446
Mich 298, 302-303, 308-327; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702,
714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). “A defendant is entitled to have his counsel prepare, investigate,
and present all substantial defenses.” People v Robert Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465
NW2d 569 (1990). “A substantial defense is one that might have made a difference in the
outcome of the trial.” Id. “Failure to make a reasonable investigation can constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 626; 709 NW2d 595 (2005).
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel’s failure to “take 20 minutes to look at” Jones’s
court file, without more, constituted a failure to make a reasonable investigation under the
“prevailing professional norms.” Defendant does not indicate that he asked his counsel to review
Jones’s file, or that counsel had any indication that something of value to the defense was
contained in the file. Rather, defendant asserts that his counsel was required, in the ordinary
course of preparing a defense and in order to be deemed to have exercised reasonable diligence
under prevailing professional norms, to examine Jones’s court file. However, defendant cites no
authority for the proposition that the failure to examine a co-defendant’s court file, without some
prior indication that information favorable to the defendant is contained in that file, renders
counsel’s investigation unreasonable. He presented no testimony or affidavits to the effect that,
under the circumstances presented here, examination of a co-defendant’s file is required by an
objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, defendant has failed to establish that his counsel’s
failure to examine Jones’s court file constitutes deficient performance.
Even were this Court to assume that counsel was required to examine Jones’s file as part
of a reasonable investigation, however, we further conclude that defendant cannot establish that
he was prejudiced by that failure. Defendant asserts that had his counsel discovered Garrett’s
affidavit in Jones’s court file, and used it, or called Garrett to testify at trial, to impeach Smith’s
testimony against defendant, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
have been different. However, as discussed above, Smith’s testimony against defendant was
limited to the details of their relationship as drug dealer and buyer, which was corroborated by
cell phone records, to testimony that Smith knew Jones as a fellow user and fellow buyer from
defendant, which was not disputed, and to testimony that Smith overheard defendant comment
that he was “coming into” a large quantity of heroin. Thus, it is only this last statement that may
have been impacted by testimony that Smith told Garrett that he was lying about having
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information concerning Redd’s murder. Considering the other evidence presented implicating
defendant in the plan to rob Redd and establishing his participation in the events leading to
Redd’s murder, defendant has not established a reasonable probability that the outcome of his
trial would have been different had his counsel presented testimony by Garrett (either in person
or by way of affidavit) that Smith told him he was “making up” his testimony about the case.
Therefore, defendant has not met his burden of showing prejudice resulting from the alleged
deficient performance, and consequently, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks
merit
Defendant next argues that the prosecution violated his due process rights to disclosure of
exculpatory evidence as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v Maryland,
373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), when it failed to disclose the existence of
Garrett’s affidavit before trial. As this Court has explained,
In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove: (1) that the
state possessed evidence favorable to the defendant; (2) that the defendant did not
possess the evidence nor could the defendant have obtained it with any reasonable
diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. [People v Cox,
268 Mich App 440, 448; 709 NW2d 152 (2005).]
There is no dispute that the prosecution possessed Garrett’s affidavit before defendant’s
trial, or that it had value for impeachment purposes. Both the United States Supreme Court and
this Court have held that a prosecutor is required to turn over impeachment evidence favorable to
the defendant. See, e.g., United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 678; 105 S Ct 3375; 87 L Ed 2d
481 (1975); People v Banks, 249 Mich App 247, 254; 642 NW2d 351 (2002). As this Court has
explained:
A criminal defendant has a due process right of access to certain
information possessed by the prosecution. Brady, [supra]. This due process
requirement of disclosure applies to evidence that might lead a jury to entertain a
reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt. Giglio v United States, 405 US 150,
154; 92 S Ct 763; 31 L Ed 2d 104 (1972). Impeachment evidence as well as
exculpatory evidence falls within the Brady rule because, if disclosed and used
effectively, such evidence “may make the difference between conviction and
acquittal.” Bagley, [supra at] 676. [People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 280281; 591 NW2d 267 (1998).]
Thus, because impeachment evidence is considered exculpatory evidence under Brady, certainly
the prudent course of action for the prosecution to take upon receipt of Garrett’s affidavit would
have been to notify defense counsel of the existence of that affidavit or to provide him with a
copy of it. That said, however, the prosecution’s failure to do so only warrants relief if there is a
reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the trial. As this Court explained in Lester,
supra at 281-282:
The failure to disclose impeachment evidence does not require automatic
reversal, even where, . . . the prosecution’s case depends largely on the credibility
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of a particular witness. The court still must find the evidence material.
Undisclosed evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome. Accordingly, undisclosed evidence will be
deemed material only if it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such
a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. . . .
In general, impeachment evidence has been found to be material where the
witness at issue supplied the only evidence linking the defendant to the crime or
where the likely effect on the witness’[s] credibility would have undermined a
critical element of the prosecutor’s case. In contrast, a new trial is generally not
required where the testimony of the witness is corroborated by other testimony or
where the suppressed impeachment evidence merely furnishes an additional basis
on which to impeach a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be
questionable. [Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]
Defendant asserts that Smith’s testimony was the only evidence linking defendant to any
plan to rob Redd. However, this assertion greatly overstates the import of Smith’s testimony,
which was almost completely corroborated by other evidence. Further, as discussed above,
considering the evidence against defendant, including the cellular telephone records, and the
evidence and eyewitness testimony substantiating defendant’s role in the events leading up to
Redd’s murder, defendant cannot establish that the likely effect of Garrett’s affidavit on Smith’s
credibility would have undermined a critical element of the prosecutor’s case, Lester, supra, or
that its disclosure would have, with reasonable probability, resulted in a different outcome at
trial, Cox, supra. Therefore, no relief is warranted.
In his supplemental brief on appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by introducing evidence that Jones possessed an AR-15 assault rifle after the events
in question, and by noting for the jury, in his opening statement and closing argument, that Jones
“jimmied” open the lock on a gun safe to access the .22 Ruger rifle used to kill Redd. We
disagree.
A defendant preserves the issue of prosecutorial misconduct by making a timely,
contemporaneous objection and request for a curative instruction. People v Callon, 256 Mich
App 312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). Defendant did not object to these asserted instances of
prosecutorial misconduct below, therefore they are unpreserved. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich
App 434, 448; 669 NW2d 818 (2003); Callon, supra at 329. To avoid forfeiture of review of an
unpreserved allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must demonstrate a plain error
that affected his substantial rights. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 645; 672 NW2d
860 (2003), citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). That is,
“appellate review is precluded unless a curative instruction could not have eliminated possible
prejudice or failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” People v
Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
“The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and
impartial trial (i.e., whether prejudice resulted).” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 272;
662 NW2d 836 (2003). Where a claim of misconduct is predicated on the admission of
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evidence, relief is not available unless the defendant shows that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). An error is
not outcome determinative unless it undermined the reliability of the verdict in light of the
untainted evidence. People v Whittaker, 465 Mich 422, 427; 635 NW2d 687 (2001). While a
prosecutor may not knowingly offer inadmissible evidence, People v Giacalone, 399 Mich 642,
645; 250 NW2d 492 (1977), he is entitled to prove his case “by whatever admissible evidence he
chooses.” People v Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 429; 656 NW2d 866 (2002). Further,
“prosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on good-faith efforts to admit evidence. The
prosecutor is entitled to attempt to introduce evidence that he legitimately believes will be
accepted by the court, as long as that attempt does not prejudice the defendant.” Noble, supra at
660-661 (citations omitted).
Defendant has not established that the admission of cursory evidence that Jones
possessed an AR-15 rifle following Redd’s murder prejudiced him in any way. Defendant
acknowledges that it was established at trial that this rifle had no connection to the offenses of
which defendant was charged or to defendant, and at no point did the prosecutor argue or imply
otherwise. Evidence that Jones possessed the weapon shortly after Redd’s murder was presented
simply as part of the circumstances surrounding the investigation. Thus, there is no indication
that introduction of this evidence was undertaken in bad faith, for the purpose of prejudicing the
defendant. And, evidence that Jones possessed the rifle, having no connection to defendant or to
the crimes at issue, cannot be said to have prejudiced defendant’s defense. Therefore, defendant
has not established prosecutorial conduct warranting relief predicated on the introduction of
testimony relating to the AR-15 rifle.
Regarding comments by the prosecutor discussing Jones’s acquisition of the .22 Ruger
rifle used in Redd’s murder from his stepfather, these comments accurately described the
testimony of Jones’s stepfather, who testified that Jones asked to borrow the gun two days prior
to Redd’s murder and that he told Jones that he could borrow the gun, but he did not know where
the key to the gun safe was, so Jones “jimmied” open the lock. Prosecutors are afforded great
latitude during argument, and they may argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
arise from the evidence in relationship to the theory of the case. Ackerman, supra at 450; People
v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 381-382 n 6; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Here, the prosecutor’s theory
was that Jones and defendant conspired to rob Redd of his heroin and money at gunpoint, and
that when Redd resisted, Jones shot him. The prosecutor’s comments pointed to evidence tying
Jones to the murder weapon and substantiated the existence of a plan between defendant and
Jones, at least two days before the crime, to rob Redd at gunpoint. The prosecutor’s accurate
comment on this evidence did not in any way deprive defendant of a fair trial, and defendant’s
assertion of prosecutorial misconduct lacks merit.
Defendant also argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right of due process to a
jury drawn from a venire representative of a fair cross-section of the community in which the
case was tried, by the exclusion of African-Americans from his jury venire. We disagree.
“A criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community.” People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 472; 552 NW2d 493
(1996). To establish a prima facie violation of this fair cross-section requirement, defendant has
the burden of proving the following:
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(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries
are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. [People v Smith, 463 Mich
199, 215; 615 NW2d 1 (2000), quoting Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357, 364; 99 S
Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979).]
Underrepresentation of a distinctive group may be measured by measuring the disparity between
the number of group members in the jury array and the number of group members in the
community. Hubbard, supra at 474. However, the requirement that a defendant be tried by a
fair cross section of his community does not guarantee that any particular jury “actually chosen
must mirror the community . . . ” Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 538; 95 S Ct 692; 42 L Ed 2d
690 (1975); People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 532-533; 575 NW2d 16 (1997); Hubbard,
supra at 472. Rather, “the Sixth Amendment guarantees an opportunity for a representative jury
by requiring that jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn
must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to
constitute a fair cross section of the community.” Hubbard, supra at 472-473.
Here, defendant is a member of a distinctive group, and he has offered some evidence, by
way of census data, that the group of which he is a member was underrepresented in his jury
venire. However, defendant has offered no evidence that African-Americans generally are
underrepresented in Ingham County Circuit Court jury venires, or that such underrepresentation
is the result of systematic exclusion. As this Court explained in People v Flowers, 222 Mich
App 732, 736-737; 565 NW2d 12 (1997).
While a criminal defendant is entitled to an impartial jury drawn from a
fair cross section of the community, he is not entitled to a petit jury that exactly
mirrors the community. In order to show a prima facie violation of the fair-crosssection requirement, a defendant must show, among other things, that the
underrepresentation of the distinctive group, in this case African-Americans, was
due to systematic exclusion. Furthermore, it is well settled that systematic
exclusion cannot be shown by one or two incidents of a particular venire being
disproportionate. Here, defendant’s bald assertion that systematic exclusion must
have occurred because no African-Americans were in the array is not sufficient to
support his challenge. [Citations omitted.]
See also, People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 526; 616 NW2d 710 (2000) (Evidence
establishing that African-Americans were underrepresented in the defendant’s particular array is
not sufficient, alone, to establish a prima facie case of systematic exclusion); Howard, supra at
533 (“Merely showing one case of alleged underrepresentation does not rise to a ‘general’
underrepresentation that is required for establishing a prima facie case.”). Here, as in Williams,
supra at 527, to establish his claim, “[d]efendant has the burden of demonstrating a problem
inherent within the selection process that results in systematic exclusion.” Defendant has not
presented any such evidence of systematic exclusion, and his failure to do so renders his claim
meritless.
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Further, with respect to defendant’s request for a remand in order to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on this matter, no affidavit or offer of proof regarding the Ingham County
jury selection process or regarding the composition and selection of the jury array in this
particular case has been submitted. Therefore, defendant has failed to establish a need for an
evidentiary hearing. See MCR 7.211(C)(1)(a)(ii).
Finally, defendant asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel by his
trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s comments regarding Jones’s acquisition of the
Ruger rifle from the gun safe, to introduction of evidence pertaining to the AR-15 rifle and to the
absence of African-Amercans among the veniremen. We disagree.
Defendant did not raise these supplemental claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in
his motion for a new trial or at the hearing on that motion. Accordingly, they are unpreserved.
People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 368; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). This Court’s review of an
unpreserved ineffective assistance of counsel claim is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.
Id.
As noted above, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant is
required to establish that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that this was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair trial.” Toma,
supra at 302. To establish prejudice a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Id. at 302-303.
Moreover, “this Court neither substitutes its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of
trial strategy, nor makes an assessment of counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.”
People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004). And, counsel’s failure to
advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel. People v Goodin, 257 Mich App 425, 433; 668 NW2d 392 (2003); People v Snider,
239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant bases his supplemental claims of ineffective assistance on his counsel’s failure
to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct and to the make-up of the jury
venire discussed above. However, defendant’s assertions of prosecutorial misconduct and his
complaint about the jury venire lack merit. Accordingly, defendant’s counsel was not ineffective
for failing to address these alleged errors. Goodin, supra at 433; Snider, supra at 425.
Additionally, as regards the introduction of evidence relating to the AR-15 rifle,
generally, the decision whether to object to evidence is a matter of trial strategy. Matuszak,
supra at 58. The failure to object to evidence can constitute ineffective assistance of counsel
only where the evidence was inadmissible and its introduction was so prejudicial that it could
have affected the outcome of the case. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 685-686; 550 NW2d
568 (1996). Here, evidence that Jones possessed the rifle, regardless whether it was connected to
the crime, was consistent with, and helpful to defendant’s assertion that Jones was a coldblooded killer, who acted alone in robbing and murdering Redd. Therefore, counsel’s decision
not to object to it may well have been a strategic decision, which should not be second-guessed
by this Court. Matuszak, supra. Moreover, even assuming that evidence relating to the AR-15
rifle was inadmissible, as discussed above, and that the failure to object to its admission was not
a reasonable strategic decision by defense counsel, defendant has not established that its
admission was “so prejudicial that it could have affected the outcome of the case.” Ullah, supra
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at 685-686. Therefore, defendant has not established that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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