PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY KEITH WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 6, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282100
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-212089-FH
ANTHONY KEITH WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the
police lacked probable cause to conduct the traffic stop that led to the discovery of the cocaine.
The trial court agreed, granted defendant’s motion, and dismissed the charge. The prosecution
appeals as of right, asserting that defendant’s failure to use his turn signal before changing lanes
provided probable cause for the traffic stop. We reverse. This appeal has been decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On November 21, 2006, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Police Officer Harshberger noticed
a car on Telegraph Road with a license plate from another state. He was unable to run a check
on the plate because a frame surrounding the plate partially obscured the name of the issuing
state. When he moved his marked patrol vehicle closer, the car turned right onto Franklin Road
in a manner that led the officer to believe that the driver was attempting to evade him. The
officer positioned his vehicle at the next intersection and shortly thereafter saw the car resume
travel on Telegraph Road. Officer Harshberger began following the car, but still could not see
the state on the license plate. He initiated a traffic stop for further investigation. Defendant
stopped his car and ultimately consented to a search of the vehicle during which two baggies of
cocaine were found.
Officer Harshberger’s vehicle was equipped with an in-car video recording system. The
preliminary examination was adjourned to allow the prosecutor to present the video recording of
the stop. Defense counsel protested the bindover by alleging that the officer did not have a valid
basis for the stop because the issuing state on the license plate was clearly visible. The district
judge went to the parking lot and examined the license plate on the vehicle that was allegedly
unchanged since the time of the stop. The district court bound defendant over on the possession
with the intent to deliver charge, concluding that the videotape was inconclusive regarding any
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obstruction and the court’s viewing of the license plate in broad daylight did not mirror the
conditions as observed by Officer Harshberger.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence by challenging the stop in circuit court, and an
evidentiary hearing was held. After the prosecutor played the tape of the incident at the
evidentiary hearing for the first time, the prosecutor replayed a portion of the tape and directed
the officer’s attention to the vehicle as it changed lanes before turning onto Franklin Road. The
prosecutor inquired if the turn signal was used. As the tape was replayed, the officer responded,
“No.” On cross-examination, the officer agreed that he had testified at the preliminary
examination that the reason for pulling over the vehicle was that he could not read the state on
the license plate, and that he did not mention that any other traffic citation played a role in his
decision.
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor asserted three bases for the stop and noted that
one of the bases was “the fact that the Defendant committed a civil infraction when he changed
lanes without a signal, as you saw on Telegraph.” As a second basis, the prosecutor noted the
violation of MCL 257.225, because the license plate frame partially obscured the registration
information. Third, the prosecutor argued that the officer had a reasonable belief that criminal
activity was afoot because of defendant’s apparent attempts to evade the police. The trial court
rejected each of these proposed grounds, but only the court’s rejection of the first ground is
challenged on appeal. With respect to that first ground, the trial court concluded that the
prosecutor’s argument was without merit, reasoning:
The officer candidly and honestly testified he stopped the vehicle based
upon the license plate frame. It is improper to attempt to justify the stop for any
other reason. Simply stated, the officer admittedly did not have a reasonable
suspicion that Defendant had made an improper lane change and the Court cannot
place thoughts into the officer’s mind.
On appeal, the prosecution argues that the undisputed evidence established that Officer
Harshberger had a lawful basis to stop defendant’s vehicle for failing to use a turn signal when
changing lanes and that the officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.
A lower court’s factual findings following a suppression hearing are reviewed for clear
error, but the trial court’s ultimate ruling is reviewed de novo. People v John Lavell Williams,
472 Mich 308, 313; 696 NW2d 636 (2005). “In order to effectuate a valid traffic stop, a police
officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a vehicle or one of its occupants is
subject to seizure for a violation of law.” People v Matthew Jevon Williams, 236 Mich App 610,
612; 601 NW2d 138 (1999). A traffic stop is permissible when an officer has probable cause to
believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring. People v Marcus Davis, 250 Mich
App 357, 362; 649 NW2d 94 (2002). Therefore, upon “reasonable grounds shown, a police
officer may stop and inspect a motor vehicle for an equipment violation.” Matthew Jevon
Williams, supra. Additionally, “[a] police officer who witnesses a civil infraction may stop and
temporarily detain the person, for the purpose of issuing a written citation.” People v Chapo,
283 Mich App 360, 366; ___ NW2d ___ (2009). An actual violation of the vehicle code need
not be proven. Rather, the officer’s reasonable impression that a violation may have occurred is
the dispositive question. People v Fisher, 463 Mich 881, 882; 617 NW2d 37 (2000) (Corrigan,
J.).
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A traffic violation or civil infraction provides sufficient cause to justify the stop of a
vehicle. People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411, 420 n 8; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). However, the
constitution requires an individualized, articulable suspicion to conduct a stop in the absence of a
traffic or equipment violation. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439, 450; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). A
stop may not be utilized as a pretext to search for evidence of another offense. People v Haney,
192 Mich App 207, 209; 480 NW2d 322 (1991). When police lack reasonable suspicion to
support a stop, the stop is a mere pretext, and evidence derived from the search made incident to
the stop or arrest is suppressed. Id. at 209-210. The constitutional reasonableness of a stop does
not depend upon the actual motivations of the police officer involved. Whren v United States,
517 US 806, 813; 116 S Ct 1769; 135 L Ed 2d 89 (1996); People v Oliver, 464 Mich 184, 200;
627 NW2d 297 (2001).
In the present case, the police officer conducted a traffic stop because, in his view from
the patrol car at 10:30 p.m., the license plate was obstructed.1 However, the officer also noted
that when he was attempting to view the plate, the vehicle “abruptly” changed lanes off of
Telegraph Road. This abrupt turn as recorded on the videotape demonstrated that a civil
infraction occurred because defendant turned his vehicle off the roadway without using his turn
signal, MCL 257.648. The circuit court held that the officer could not utilize another civil
infraction as a basis for the stop when he originally relied on a potential license plate infraction.
“The fact that the officer did not cite that as a basis for the stop is immaterial.”2 It is undisputed
that defendant committed a different civil infraction while the police officer was in the process of
investigating another potential civil infraction. The fact that the officer’s actual motivation
involved investigation of the potentially improper plate does not impact the reasonableness of the
stop particularly in light of the other civil infraction. Whren, supra. Therefore, the police officer
properly stopped the automobile for violation of a civil infraction, MCL 257.648, as preserved
on the videotape. Consequently, defendant was not unlawfully detained when asked for his
consent to search, and consent was not challenged by the defense. Williams, supra at 317-318.
Reversed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
1
We note that, in district court, the judge did not make any finding regarding the officer’s
credibility. Similarly, the circuit court did not render an opinion regarding the officer’s view of
the vehicle. Review of the videotape reveals that the rear lights on defendant’s vehicle preclude
the viewer from seeing the plate itself or from determining any obstruction.
2
People v Roderick, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued March
21, 2006 (Docket No. 258931). Although this unpublished decision is not binding precedent,
MCR 7.215(1), this conclusion is applicable and persuasive, and we adopt it.
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