TRACEY REDMANN V JOHN LEETE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRACEY REDMANN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 30, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 284381
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 07-000611-NO
JOHN LEETE, a/k/a PHILLIP LEETE, and
DARYLENE LEETE,
Defendants,
and
LONGFELLOW STREET, LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the February 20, 2008, order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). Plaintiff alleges the trial court erred in
granting summary disposition to defendant, Longfellow Street, LLC, because there exists a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether it breached the statutory duty to keep the rental
property fit for its intended use. We affirm.
Plaintiff rented a house from Longfellow Street in August 2004. In April 2005, plaintiff
began to notice an increasing number of spiders in the house, and she was allegedly bitten by a
spider. Plaintiff reported the problem to defendant’s agent, defendant Phillip Leete, but
defendants denied responsibility for eradicating the problem. In June 2005, plaintiff allegedly
was bitten by a spider and became ill as a result. Defendants were again informed of the spider
infestation. In July 2005, plaintiff moved out of the home.
“This Court reviews a trial court’s summary disposition decision de novo.” Schaendorf v
Consumers Energy Co, 275 Mich App 507, 509; 739 NW2d 402 (2007). “This Court must
review the record in the same manner as the trial court to determine whether the movant was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hines v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 265 Mich App
432, 437; 695 NW2d 84 (2005). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a motion for summary disposition
should be granted if the “proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any
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material facts.” Joyce v Rubin, 249 Mich App 231, 234; 642 NW2d 360 (2002). In deciding a
motion brought under subrule (C)(10), a court considers all the evidence, affidavits, pleadings,
and admissions in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ritchie Gamester v City of
Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).
Plaintiff argues that Longfellow Street had a duty under MCL 554.139 to eliminate the
spider infestation from the premises. MCL 554.139(1)(a) provides a covenant that premises “are
fit for the use intended by the parties.” In Allison v AEW Capital Mgmt, 481 Mich 419, 429; 751
NW2d 8 (2008), the Michigan Supreme Court considered whether a parking lot covered with an
accumulation of “one to two inches of snow” was unfit for its intended use, pursuant to MCL
554.139(1)(a). The Court reasoned that the intended use of the parking lot “was [not] anything
other than basic parking and reasonable access to such parking.” Id. at 430. The plaintiff argued
that it was unfit because the lot was covered in snow and because the plaintiff slipped and fell.
Id. The Court held that under the facts presented in the record, there could not be reasonable
differences of opinion regarding the fact that tenants were able to enter and exit the parking lot.
Id. Ultimately, the Court held that the “plaintiff has not established that tenants were unable to
use the parking lot for its intended purpose, and his claim fails as a matter of law.” Id. The
Court stated “that statute does not require a lessor to maintain a lot in an ideal condition or in the
most accessible manner possible, but merely renders it fit for use as a parking lot.” Id.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiff, assuming that a spider infestation
was present, plaintiff cannot prevail on this statutory claim as a matter of law. Similar to the ice
and snow in Allison, supra at 430, the presence of spiders on the premises appeared to be
seasonal. Additionally, plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact with regard
to whether the house was unfit for living. The record indicates plaintiff was still able to sleep,
eat, and live on the premises as provided for in lease. She did so for eleven months. Though a
spider infestation may not be an “ideal condition,” plaintiff failed to establish that it rendered the
premises unfit as a dwelling house. Id. at 431.
MCL 554.139(1)(b) warrants that the lessor must maintain the premises “in reasonable
repair.” Plaintiff maintains that the trial court incorrectly focused on determining whether there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a defect that permitted the
infestation of spiders. This argument ignores current precedent. “The plain meaning of
‘reasonable repair’ as used in MCL 554.139(1)(b) requires repair of a defect in the premises.”
Allison, supra at 434, citing Teufel v Watkins, 267 Mich App 425, 429 n 1; 705 NW2d 164
(2005), overruled in part on other grounds Allison, supra at 438-439. “‘Defect’ is defined as ‘a
fault or shortcoming; imperfection.’ Damage to the property would constitute an imperfection in
the property that would require mending. Therefore, repairing a defect equates to keeping the
premises in a good condition as a result of restoring and mending damage to the property.”
Allison, supra at 434. Plaintiff does not identify any defect in the premises that defendant could
have “mended” to eliminate the spiders. Id. Because plaintiff has not established there was any
damage to the premises caused by the spiders or contributing to the presence of the spiders,
plaintiff has failed to establish there was a genuine issue of material fact that defendant breached
the duty to keep the premises reasonably repaired as required by MCL 554.169(1)(b).
Plaintiff also contends that the provisions of the lease required defendant to eradicate the
spiders. “A lease is a conveyance by the owner of an estate of a portion of the interest therein to
another for a term less than his own for a valuable consideration. A lease gives the tenant the
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possession of the property leased and the exclusive use or occupation of it for all purposes not
prohibited by the terms of the lease.” De Bruyn Produce Co v Romero, 202 Mich App 92, 98;
508 NW2d 150 (1993). “This Court must examine the language of the contract [i.e. lease
agreement] and accord the words their ordinary and plain meanings, if such meanings are
apparent. If the contractual language is unambiguous, courts must interpret and enforce the
contract as written.” Phillips v Homer (In re Smith Trust), 274 Mich App 283, 285; 731 NW2d
810 (2007). A term in a contract may be afforded its commonly used meaning. Id. A contract
must be read as a whole. Roberts v Titan Ins Co (On Reconsideration), 282 Mich App 339, 358;
764 NW2d 304 (2009).
When the contract is read as a whole, the maintenance and habitability clauses required
Longfellow Street, after being notified by plaintiff that the habitability of their rented property
was adversely affected, to repair the property as needed to return the premises to habitability.
The lease does not define “repair” or “habitability.” “Dictionary definitions may be used to
ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of terms undefined in an agreement.” Coates v Bastian
Bros, Inc, 276 Mich App 498, 504; 741 NW2d 539 (2007). “Repair” is defined as “to restore to
a good or sound condition after decay or damage; mend.” Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (2000), p 1119. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed) defines “habitability” as “[t]he
condition of a building in which inhabitants can live free of serious defects that might harm
health and safety.” On this record, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
property was decayed, damaged or suffered from a serious defect contributing to the presence of
spiders, the trial court’s decision to defendant’s motion for summary disposition is affirmed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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