PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT K BURKOWSKI
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 30, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Nos. 282011
Macomb Circuit Court
LC Nos. 07-002435-FC
ROBERT K. BURKOWSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); MCL 750.157a, solicitation of murder, MCL 750.157b(2),
and witness intimidation, MCL 750.122(7)(c). Defendant was sentenced as a third-offense
habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to serve life in prison for conspiracy to commit first-degree
murder, 552 to 900 months’ imprisonment for solicitation of murder, and 240 to 360 months’
imprisonment for witness intimidation. We affirm.
Defendant’s conviction in the instant case arose following his incarceration in the
Macomb County jail awaiting trial for a shooting involving Curt Campagna, the ex-husband of
the woman with whom defendant was romantically involved.1 At trial evidence was presented
that defendant approached multiple fellow inmates in an attempt to have Campagna killed to
prevent his testimony at trial. One of the inmates defendant attempted to hire, Christopher
Spilos, eventually cooperated with police, leading to the charges involved in this appeal.
Following his release from jail, Spilos met with a friend of defendant, Vincent Varacalli,2 who
was supposed to assist him in carrying out the killing.3
1
See People v Burkowski, Court of Appeals Docket No. 282013.
2
Varacalli was a codefendant, but agreed to testify against defendant.
3
Before trial in this case, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL
750.83, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, carrying a concealed weapon, MCL
750.227, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, second offense, MCL
750.227b, in the prosecution stemming from the shooting. (Court of Appeals Docket No.
282013.)
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Defendant first argues on appeal that he is entitled to have his convictions overturned
based on several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. “[T]he test for prosecutorial misconduct
is whether a defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58,
63; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate
review, a defendant must have timely and specifically objected below, unless objection could not
have cured the error. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 234-235; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).
Defendant objected to a question by the prosecutor related to defendant’s prior conviction, but
failed to object to the other instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct asserted in this appeal.
Defendant first claims prosecutorial misconduct occurred when the prosecutor violated an
agreement to refrain from referring to defendant’s prior conviction. Defendant asserts that an
off-the-record agreement existed between the parties and the trial court that defendant’s prior
conviction would not be referenced during the proceedings.
On cross-examination, defendant stated that he never previously engaged in any violent
behavior and his only prior convictions were for drunk driving and drug possession. The
prosecutor then questioned defendant about the prior shooting. In spite of the agreement not to
reference the conviction, the prosecutor did infer that defendant had been convicted in the prior
case when he asked about the jury’s verdict. Defense counsel immediately objected to the
inquiry precluding defendant’s response to the question and the trial court sustained the objection
and instructed the jury as follows: “Ladies and gentlemen, I’m ordering the testimony stricken.
You’re not to consider it for any purpose whatsoever.”
Although an agreement existed to refrain from introducing defendant’s prior conviction,
the prosecutor’s question was clearly in response to defendant’s false testimony regarding the
absence of any violent behavior in his past and misrepresentation regarding the nature of his
prior convictions. Consequently, the prosecutor’s question did not comprise an intentional
violation of the agreement but rather an attempt to address defendant’s mischaracterization of his
criminal past, and did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct that denied a fair and impartial
trial. Dobek, supra at 63. Further, even if the prosecutor’s inquiry constituted misconduct,
defendant was not prejudiced because the trial court provided a comprehensive limiting
instruction by directing the jurors to disregard the complained of exchange for any purpose.
“Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and instructions are presumed to cure most
errors.” People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 279; 662 NW2d 836 (2003).
As further evidence of an alleged pattern of prosecutorial misconduct, defendant cites to
an inquiry by the prosecutor during cross-examination that defendant was physically abusive to
his girlfriend. The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to this inquiry. Again, this
inquiry appears to have been in response to defendant’s assertion regarding the absence of any
violent behavior in his past. Subsequent instructions to the jury were sufficient to cure any
possible prejudice. Id.
Defendant also asserts that a remark made by the prosecutor, which defendant
characterizes as sarcastic, could be construed as improperly implying special knowledge or
personal opinion regarding defendant’s guilt. Even if the prosecutor’s remark is construed as an
opinion regarding defendant’s credibility or suggests special knowledge of facts not before the
jury, People v Ignofo, 315 Mich 626, 631-636; 24 NW2d 514 (1946), any possible prejudicial
impact stemming from the remark was not so great that it could not have been cured by an
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appropriate instruction had an objection been raised. People v Williams, 265 Mich App 68, 7071; 692 NW2d 722 (2005). Further, the court instructed the jurors before the presentation of
proofs that they “should not think something is true just because one of the lawyers ask a
question that assumes or suggests that it is true.” Again, we assume the jury followed their
instructions. See Abraham, supra at 279.
Defendant also contends that prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the questioning of
a witness, Daniel Bizovi. Bizovi testified that defendant approached him while both were
incarcerated and propositioned him to kill Campagna. Bizovi indicated that defendant proposed
paying Bizovi with money collected on his mother’s life insurance policy. Defendant’s
argument does not focus on Bizovi’s testimony that defendant approached him to kill Campagna,
but on the portion of his testimony that related to collecting insurance proceeds on defendant’s
mother.
MRE 404(b) permits the introduction of other bad acts so long as it does not “risk
impermissible inferences of character to conduct.” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 576;
629 NW2d 411 (2001) (internal citations omitted). Defendant had notice of the prosecutor’s
intent to question Bizovi pursuant to MRE 404(b) because the prosecutor’s timely notice
specifically stated that Bizovi would be called to testify regarding “[d]efendant’s attempts to
solicit [him] to complete the murder of [Campagna], and others, if Mr. Spilos did not complete
the task.” This is a proper purpose under 404(b), and is relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent
to kill Campagna. See People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993),
amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Indeed, the fact that defendant was trying to arrange an
alternative in case Spilos was unsuccessful in completing the task serves to establish defendant’s
intent and knowledge of the plan, despite his denial of any involvement. The challenged
testimony was also admissible independent of MRE 404(b) because it was connected to the
charged crimes in such a way that its admission is required in order to give the jury the
“complete story” of these crimes. People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 741-742; 556 NW2d 851
(1996). In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that evidence regarding possible crimes and
improper acts for which defendant was not on trial could only be considered for certain limited
purposes and must not be used to determine that defendant is a bad person likely to commit
crimes. People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
Defendant also contends that the prosecutor mischaracterized Bizovi’s testimony during
closing argument. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor wrongly claimed defendant
interjected the testimony in an attempt to confuse the jury. Defendant further argues that in
characterizing the testimony as a defense tactic, the prosecutor was improperly inserting his own
opinion into the case. Defendant’s assertions are based on the following statement made in the
prosecutor’s rebuttal closing:
There is no agreement to commit first-degree murder between [defendant and
Spilos] and we’re not arguing that there is. There had to be an agreement between
the defendant and Vincent Varacalli, whose [sic] already plead guilty to one
count. That’s the agreement we’re worried about. Bizovi, all these guys, let’s
just throw as much at you as I can and hope you get confused. That’s the theory I
hear from defense.
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Defense counsel’s closing argument focused on the “interesting cast of characters that
have all testified.” Defense counsel particularly attacked the credibility of Spilos, Varacalli, and
Bizovi, and argued that no agreement to murder Campagna existed between defendant and any
of the three witnesses. It is in this context that the prosecutor commented referencing Bizovi and
“all these guys.” It is clear that the jury would have understood the prosecutor’s reference as
characterizing defense counsel’s closing argument. In other words, the prosecutor was indicating
that defense counsel was accusing the prosecutor of trying to confuse the jury with a plethora of
testimony about alleged agreements to murder Campagna. Such an argument was properly
responsive to defendant’s closing. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660-661; 608 NW2d 123
(1999). Accordingly, defendant’s assertion that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his
closing argument is without merit.
Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial when the trial court denied his
motion for a mistrial. Defendant’s motion for mistrial was solely based on the alleged
misconduct that occurred when the prosecutor referred to defendant’s prior conviction when
cross-examining defendant. Given the trial court’s curative instructions to the jury and our
determination that the question did not constitute misconduct, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial, People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 265-266; 666
NW2d 231 (2003).
Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
Although defendant’s question presented asserts insufficient evidence with respect to all three
convictions, his argument on appeal is solely centered on the conspiracy charge. “A party may
not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for
the claim.” People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 604 n 4; 617 NW2d 339 (2000). Accordingly,
we only review the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to defendant’s conspiracy
conviction.
Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we determine that a
rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crimes were proven beyond
reasonable doubt. See People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001). To
sustain a conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, the prosecutor must prove that
the conspirators deliberated and planned the crime with the intent to kill the victim.
Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from all of the facts and circumstances. People v
Hammond, 187 Mich App 105, 107-108; 466 NW2d 335 (1991). At trial, the evidence
established that defendant and Varacalli were in contact and acted in concert to bring about the
death of Campagna. Defendant engaged the services of Spilos and secured the assistance of
Varacalli to execute the plan. Varacalli agreed to provide assistance, and in fact met with Spilos
and drove him to Campagna’s home.
Defendant argues that because Spilos’ testimony regarding the amount he was to be paid
was inconsistent, the conspiracy charge could not succeed. However, the amount that Spilos was
to be paid has no bearing on the charge of conspiracy. Spilos was not part of the conspiracy
because he never intended to carry out the murder. Similarly, the fact that Spilos lied to
defendant about why he did not try to contact Varacalli when Spilos was initially released from
jail has no impact on the conspiracy charge because Spilos was not a member of the conspiracy.
Accordingly, the felony information was amended to exclude Spilos as a co-conspirator.
Defendant cites amendment of the felony information as support for his argument that there was
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a lack of substance to this charge. In point of fact, the amendment was necessary because
Spilos’ lack of intent to follow through on the murder precluded his being charged as a
conspirator. Id.
Defendant also implies that there was insufficient evidence to support the conspiracy
conviction because Varacalli testified that he did not believe Spilos would go through with the
murder. This is a mischaracterization of Varacalli’s testimony. Although defendant cites several
transcript passages, these citations are either taken out of context or omit testimony that gives the
quoted passage a different meaning. For example, while Varacalli did state that he thought
Spilos was merely going to physically assault Campagna, he clarified that he changed his
opinion after meeting with Spilos. Hence, while initially Varacalli may have harbored some
level of skepticism regarding Spilos’ intent, all doubt was erased once he met and conversed with
Spilos.
Finally, defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Because this
issue was not properly preserved below, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record.
People Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 48; 687 NW2d 342 (2004).
Defendant first contends counsel was ineffective for failing to seek an interlocutory
appeal of the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial. Because the trial court did not err in
denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial, defendant cannot establish that a different result
would have been obtained had defense counsel sought an interlocutory appeal and, therefore,
was not denied effective assistance of counsel. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645
NW2d 294 (2001). Defendant also asserts that counsel was ineffective for errors relating to
Bizovi’s testimony. While Bizovi’s testimony was admittedly prejudicial to defendant, only
unfairly prejudicial evidence should be excluded. MRE 403; People v McGhee (After Remand),
268 Mich App 600, 609; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Defendant argues that the suggestion he was
involved with a plot to have his mother killed for money is, per se, unfairly prejudicial.
However, defendant has failed to provide any supporting authority for this blanket assertion. “A
party may not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize
the basis for the claim.” Mackle, supra at 604 n 4. In addition, the testimony was properly
admitted pursuant to MRE 404(b). Similarly, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to raise a
futile objection to the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument. People v Fike, 228 Mich App 178,
182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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