PEOPLE OF MI V MELVIN ROBERT MATSEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285484
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-218561-FH
MELVIN ROBERT MATSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Servitto and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of breaking and entering an office building while intending to
commit larceny, MCL 750.110. The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual
offender, MCL 769.12, to 30 months to 20 years in prison. Defendant appeals as of right. We
affirm, and decide this appeal without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant first contends that the trial court injected error requiring reversal by instructing
the jury regarding the elements of guilt under an aiding and abetting theory. This Court reviews
de novo any legal issues inherent in claims of instructional error. People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105,
113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). However, we review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s
determination that a jury instruction applies to the facts of a case. People v Dobek, 274 Mich
App 58, 82; 732 NW2d 546 (2007).
The testimony of several police offers revealed that after the triggering of an alarm at a
Troy financial planning business office, they detected that someone had removed a screen from
one office window and thrown a landscaping boulder into the office through the window. After
speaking with the business owner, the police ascertained that someone had moved several LCD
monitors inside the office. One officer testified that he lifted a fingerprint from the metal portion
of the removed screen, and another officer, a fingerprint comparison expert, opined that the print
on the screen matched the fingerprint of defendant’s right index finger contained in a fingerprint
database. A detective recounted that he interviewed defendant several months after the Troy
break in, and that defendant denied spending time in Troy. A Farmington Hills police officer
described that in a 2000 interview about break ins in that city, defendant suggested that a man
named Willis had solicited him to participate in burglaries. The trial evidence reasonably
supported a finding that defendant committed the Troy break in by himself. But the additional
facts that the police found none of his fingerprints inside the office building and defendant’s
suggestion that someone else had committed the Troy break in reasonably gave rise to the
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alternate theory that another person might at least have participated in the Troy break in. The
trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by reading the jury aiding and abetting instructions.
Defendant also maintains that the evidence of his lone fingerprint did not suffice to prove
his identity as the perpetrator of the break in. We review de novo sufficiency of the evidence
challenges, viewing the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to
determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73
(1999). Defendant does not challenge that the trial evidence otherwise adequately established a
breaking and entering.
Fingerprint evidence alone may establish identity if “‘the fingerprints corresponding to
those of the accused . . . [are] found in the place where the crime was committed under such
circumstances that they could only have been impressed at the time when the crime was
committed.’” People v Ware, 12 Mich App 512, 515; 163 NW2d 250 (1968), quoting 28 ALR
2d 1154. Here, the police found defendant’s fingerprint on the lone screen removed from the one
office building window that someone smashed by throwing a large rock through the window into
the office. Testimony by the business owner revealed that defendant did not work for the
company, was not a business client, and did not work for a window washing company or a
landscaping company that had serviced the building. According to the Troy detective who
interviewed defendant, he offered no legitimate purpose for the presence of his fingerprint on the
window screen. Because defendant’s fingerprint was “found in the place where the crime was
committed under such circumstances that [it] could only have been impressed at the time when
the crime was committed,” id., a rational jury reasonably could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt on the basis of the fingerprint evidence that defendant committed the breaking and
entering.
Defendant lastly suggests that his counsel’s failure to timely object to the MRE 404(b)
evidence admitted at trial denied him the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant submits that
the trial court improperly admitted the other acts evidence under MRE 404(b) because the other
acts and the charged crime were not sufficiently similar, under the analysis in People v
Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), and People v Sabin (After Remand), 463
Mich 43; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
To warrant the admission of evidence under MRE 404(b)(1), “the prosecutor must offer
the other acts evidence under something other than a character to conduct or propensity theory,”
“the evidence must be relevant under MRE 402 . . . to an issue of fact of consequence at trial,”
and as contemplated by MRE 403, any danger of unfair prejudice inherent in the admission of
the evidence must not substantially outweigh its probative value. Sabin, supra at 55-56. “[T]he
trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105.” Id. at 56.
The prosecutor offered evidence of defendant’s 2000 Farmington Hills break ins “to
establish the identity of . . . Defendant as the perpetrator of the [2007] crime [in Troy], and to
establish the scheme, plan, or system the Defendant has i[n] committing the crime of breaking
and entering,” proper purposes under MRE 404(b)(1). Regarding the relevance of the proffered
evidence, “evidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged act
occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to
support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.” Sabin,
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supra at 63. “‘To establish the existence of a common design or plan, the common features must
indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus
revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.’” Id. at 65-66, quoting People v Ewoldt, 7 Cal Rptr
4th 380; 867 P2d 757 (1994). “‘Unlike evidence of uncharged acts used to prove identity, the
plan need not be unusual or distinctive; it need only exist to support the inference that the
defendant employed that plan in committing the charged offense.’” Sabin, supra at 66, quoting
Ewoldt, supra at 403.
A Farmington Hills police officer recounted that in 2000 he had helped investigate “a
rash of business break-ins, where rocks were being thrown through glass windows and laptop
computers were being taken.” The officer testified that his surveillance team responded to a
business alarm one specific evening, that other officers in his team spotted defendant walking
down the highway in the proximity of the break in and detained him, and eventually defendant
disclosed the location of his vehicle, which contained a “landscaping rock” and “shards of
broken glass inside the vehicle.” Like the 2000 break ins, defendant committed the 2007 Troy
break in by locating a landscaping rock, gaining entry into an office by heaving the rock through
a window, and entering the office to remove electronic equipment. Notwithstanding that the
2000 and 2007 break ins do not reflect a distinctive or unusual plan or scheme, their several
similarities permitted the jury to logically infer that defendant employed a common plan, scheme
or system in committing the crimes. The other acts evidence had high probative value toward
establishing defendant’s employment of a plan, scheme or system in breaking and entering, and
we detect no danger of unfair prejudice that could substantially outweigh this significant
probative value. MRE 403; People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75-76; 537 NW2d 909, mod 450 Mich
1212 (1995). We conclude that the trial court properly admitting the other acts evidence.
Moreover, the trial court cautioned the jury with respect to the extent of its permissible
consideration of the other acts evidence:
You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the defendant
committed crimes for which he is not on trial. If you believe this evidence, you
must be very careful only to consider it for certain purposes. You may only think
about whether this evidence tends to show the defendant used a plan, system or
characteristic scheme that he had used before, and whether the defendant
committed the crime that he is charged with.
You must not consider this evidence for any other purpose. For example,
you must not decide that it shows the defendant is a bad person or that he is likely
to commit crimes. You must not convict the defendant here because you think he
is guilty of other bad conduct.
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Because the trial court correctly admitted the other acts evidence, defense counsel was not
ineffective for failing to lodge a meritless objection to its admissibility. People v Petri, 279
Mich App 407, 415; 760 NW2d 882 (2008).
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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