PATRICIA PAQUETTE V STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INS CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA PAQUETTE, Guardian and
Conservator of RICHARD PAQUETTE, a Legally
Incapacitated Person,
UNPUBLISHED
July 21, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INSURANCE
COMPANY,
No. 279909
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2004-002787-NO
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ARVILLA WOODS, SHANNE SMITH, and
MARISSA GIBBONS,
Defendants.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Fort Hood and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, appeals as of right from a jury
verdict in favor of plaintiff. We affirm.
Plaintiff, Patricia Paquette, on behalf of her son, Richard Paquette a legally incapacitated
person, filed a complaint to recover attendant care costs and other benefits not paid to family
members for providing services to Richard. Richard was catastrophically injured in a motor
vehicle accident on March 16, 1985, and had suffered a severe traumatic brain injury. Defendant
was the insurer at the time of the accident. Plaintiff alleged that defendant concealed the
entitlement to personal injury protection benefits, but defendant asserted that plaintiff’s request
was untimely and all benefits were paid.
I. Application of MCL 500.3145
Defendant first alleges that plaintiff’s recovery was limited by the one-year-back
limitation period contained in MCL 500.3145(1). We disagree. Summary disposition decisions
are reviewed de novo on appeal. Joliet v Pitoniak, 475 Mich 30, 35; 715 NW2d 60 (2006).
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Issues of statutory construction present questions of law that are reviewed de novo. Cruz v State
Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 466 Mich 588, 594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002). The goal of statutory
construction is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature by examining the most
reliable evidence of its intent – the words of the statute. Neal v Wilkes, 470 Mich 661, 665; 685
NW2d 648 (2004). If the statutory language is clear or unambiguous, appellate courts presume
that the Legislature intended the plainly expressed meaning, and judicial construction is neither
permitted nor required. DiBenedetto v West Shore Hosp, 461 Mich 394, 402; 605 NW2d 300
(2000). Application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. Centennial Healthcare Mgt
Corp v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services, 254 Mich App 275, 284; 657 NW2d 746 (2002).
MCL 500.3145 governs the time for commencement of an action to recover insurance
benefits and provides in relevant part:
(1) An action for recovery of personal protection insurance benefits payable under
this chapter for accidental bodily injury may not be commenced later than 1 year
after the date of the accident causing the injury unless written notice of injury as
provided herein has been given to the insurer within 1 year after the accident or
unless the insurer has previously made a payment of personal protection insurance
benefits for the injury. If the notice has been given or a payment has been made,
the action may be commenced at any time within 1 year after the most recent
allowable expense, work loss or survivor’s loss has been incurred. However, the
claimant may not recover benefits for any portion of the loss incurred more than 1
year before the date on which the action was commenced. The notice of injury
required by this subsection may be given to the insurer or any of its authorized
agents by a person claiming to be entitled to benefits therefor, or by someone in
his behalf. The notice shall give the name and address of the claimant and
indicate in ordinary language the name of the person injured and the time, place
and nature of his injury.
Defendant alleges that a claim pursuant to MCL 500.3145(1) is barred because: (1) there is no
fraud exception to the one-year back limitation on recovery; (2) even if a fraud exception existed,
plaintiff voluntarily withdrew her fraud claim; and (3) even if an equitable estoppel exception
existed, the elements of the claim were not established.
In Devillers v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 473 Mich 562, 564-565; 702 NW2d 539 (2005), the
plaintiff’s son suffered a traumatic brain injury when he was involved in an automobile accident
at the age of sixteen. Insurance coverage was available through the no-fault automobile
insurance policy issued to his parents. After discharge from the hospital, the plaintiff cared for
her son, and benefits were paid to her. However, after the defendant received a physician’s
prescription indicating that the son could function without close supervision, the defendant
discontinued home health care payments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a complaint for
payment for services rendered, and the defendant sought to limit the benefits to the one-year
period prior to the filing of the complaint, citing MCL 500.3145(1). Id.
The Supreme Court accepted the bypass application for leave to appeal to determine if
Lewis v DAIIE, 426 Mich 93; 393 NW2d 167 (1986), should be overruled. Devillers, supra at
564. In Lewis, the Court “adopted a judicial tolling doctrine under which the one-year statutory
period is tolled from the time a specific claim for benefits is filed to the date the insurer formally
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denies liability.” Id. The Supreme Court overruled Lewis by concluding that the decision was
contrary to the plain language of the statute. Id. at 586. However, in doing so, the Court
acknowledged that the courts possess equitable power and that power may be invoked under
“unusual circumstances” such as instances of fraud or mutual mistake. In the absence of
allegations of unusual circumstances, there was no basis to invoke the Court’s equitable powers.
Id. at 590-591.
In Cooper v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 481 Mich 399, 402; 751 NW2d 443 (2008), the sister
plaintiffs sustained severe brain injuries when they were passengers in a vehicle driven by their
mother in January 1987. After being discharged from the hospital in October 1987, both
plaintiffs required 24-hour attendant care. However, in the fall of 1989, only one of the plaintiffs
required continuous nursing care. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs’ mother was working
at a rate of $50 per day. The defendant’s claim representative suggested that she quit her job to
stay home and provide care at a rate of $50 per day. In September 1991, the rate was increased,
by agreement, to $75 per day. In 1998, the rate was changed to $6.50 per hour and in October
2000, it was changed to $10 per hour. By December 2003, the defendant had paid more than
$5.6 million in PIP benefits pursuant to the no-fault act. Id.
In 2003, the plaintiffs filed suit, alleging that the defendant failed to pay all of the PIP
benefits to which they were entitled and for underpayment of benefits. When it was learned that
the minority tolling provision would not apply to the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145, the plaintiffs
amended their complaint to assert a new cause of action. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that
the claim representative fraudulently induced the mother to accept unreasonably low
compensation for her in-home attendant care services by telling her that if she did not quit her
job she would be personally responsible for payment of nursing care, she had a parental
obligation to provide the care, her child would be institutionalized if she did not quit her job, the
rate was non-negotiable, and other improper statements designed to induce them to accept the
defendant’s terms and payments. Id. at 403-404.
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs could maintain a cause of action for
fraud notwithstanding the provisions of MCL 500.3145(1):
The one-year-back rule of [MCL 500.3145(1)] limits recovery of PIP benefits to
those incurred one year before the date on which the no-fault action was
commenced. PIP benefits include “all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably
necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care,
recovery, or rehabilitation.” MCL 500.3107(1)(a).
Plaintiffs argue that by alleging in their amended complaint that defendant
fraudulently induced [the plaintiffs’ mother] to accept an unreasonably low
compensation rate for her in-home attendant-care services, plaintiffs brought a
common-law fraud claim that is distinct from a no-fault claim for benefits, and
that such claim therefore is not subject to the one-year-back rule of MCL
500.3145(1). A fraud action is not subject to the one-year-back rule of MCL
500.3145(1) because the one-year-back rule applies only to actions brought under
the no-fault act, and a fraud action is a distinct and independent action brought
under the common law. A fraud action is not an “action for recovery of [PIP]
benefits payable under [the no-fault act] for accidental bodily injury.” Rather, in
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the context of an insurance contract, a fraud action is an action for recovery of
damages payable under the common law for losses incurred as a result of the
insurer’s fraudulent conduct. There is a distinction between claiming that an
insurer has refused to pay no-fault benefits to its insureds and claiming that the
insurer has defrauded its insureds. A fraud action is conceptually distinct from a
no-fault action because: (1) a fraud action requires an insured to prove several
elements that are different from those required in a no-fault action; (2) a fraud
action accrues at a different time than a no-fault action; and (3) a fraud action
permits an insured to recover a wide range of damages that are not available in a
no-fault action.
***
A fraud claim is clearly distinct from a no-fault claim. First, a fraud claim
requires proof of additional elements, such as deceit, misrepresentation, or
concealment of material facts, and the substance of such claim is the insurer’s
wrongful conduct. Unlike a no-fault claim, a fraud claim does not arise from an
insurer’s mere omission to perform a contractual or statutory obligation, such as
its failure to pay all the PIP benefits to which its insureds are entitled. Rather, it
arises from the insurer’s breach of its separate and independent duty not to
deceive the insureds, which duty is imposed by law as a function of the
relationship of the parties. Second, unlike an action for no-fault benefits, which
arises when the insurer fails to pay benefits, an action for fraud arises when the
fraud is perpetrated. Hearn v Rickenbacker, 428 Mich 32, 39; 400 NW2d 90
(1987). Finally, under a no-fault cause of action, the insureds can only recover
no-fault benefits, whereas under a fraud cause of action, the insureds may recover
damages for any loss sustained as a result of the fraudulent conduct, which may
include the equivalent of no-fault benefits, reasonable attorney fees, damages for
emotional distress, and even exemplary damages. See Phillips v Butterball Farms
Co, Inc (After Second Remand), 448 Mich 239, 250-251; 531 NW2d 144 (1995);
Veselenak v Smith, 414 Mich 567, 574; 327 NW2d 261 (1982); Phinney v
Permutter, 222 Mich App 513, 527; 564 NW2d 532 (1997); Clemens v Lesnek,
200 Mich App 456, 463-464; 505 NW2d 283 (1993). [Cooper, supra at 406-409
(footnotes omitted).]
Accordingly, defendant’s contention that a fraud claim may not be maintained where the
underlying misconduct arises from a no-fault action is simply without merit. The Devillers
Court held that unusual circumstances, including fraud and mutual mistake, would allow a court
to invoke its equitable powers to allow a cause of action to proceed, Devillers, supra at 590-591,
and the Cooper Court expressly held that a fraud action could be maintained. Cooper, supra at
407-408.
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Defendant asserts that even if a fraud action could be maintained, reversal is required
because plaintiff dismissed the fraud claim prior to trial.1 We disagree. Review of the Devillers
decision reveals that when a defendant challenged a complaint based on the limitations period
contained in MCL 500.3145(1), the plaintiff could invoke the court’s equitable powers by raising
allegations of fraud, mutual mistake, and other circumstances. Devillers, supra at 590-591. In
the present case, when defendant raised the one-year back rule found in MCL 500.3145(1),
plaintiff raised equitable estoppel as a defense to the limitations period. This course of action
demonstrates that when faced with the issue of the limitations period, plaintiff invoked the
court’s equitable powers by relying on estoppel to preclude defendant from benefiting from its
misconduct.2 Accordingly, defendant’s assertion is without merit.
Defendant further asserts that plaintiff failed to establish equitable estoppel. We
disagree. Equitable estoppel arises where a party, by representations, admissions or silence,
intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe certain facts with the other party
justifiably relying upon those facts and prejudice arises when the representing party is allowed to
deny the existence of the facts. Casey v Auto Owners Ins Co, 273 Mich App 388, 399; 729
NW2d 277 (2006). Equitable estoppel is not a cause of action but is utilized as a defense. Id.
Although equitable estoppel may only be available as a defense, promissory estoppel may be
used as a cause of action for damages. Hoye v Westfield Ins Co, 194 Mich App 696, 705; 487
NW2d 838 (1992). The equitable estoppel doctrine is based on the principle that loss must be
borne by the one whose erroneous conduct, by commission or omission, caused an injury.
American Trust Co v Bergstein, 246 Mich 527, 530; 224 NW 327 (1929).
The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) a party induces another party to believe facts
through representations, admissions, or silence intentionally or negligently; (2) the other party
justifiably relies and operates on the belief; and (3) the other party is prejudiced if the first party
is permitted to deny the existence of the facts. AFSCME Int’l Union v Bank One, 267 Mich App
281, 293; 705 NW2d 355 (2005). To apply equitable estoppel in the insurance context, the
insured must establish that the insurer induced a belief through acts, representations, or silence
regarding coverage or the lack thereof, the insured justifiably relied on this belief, and the
insured was prejudiced as a result of the reliance. See City of Grosse Pointe Park v Michigan
Muni Liability & Prop Pool, 473 Mich 188, 204; 702 NW2d 106 (2005). The application of a
legal doctrine presents a question of law. James v Alberts, 464 Mich 12, 14-15; 626 NW2d 158
(2001). When the doctrine of estoppel is applied in the context of a deprivation of legal rights,
the application presents a mixed question of law and fact, and the jury must draw the conclusions
from the evidence. State Bank of Standish v Curry, 442 Mich 76, 84 n 6; 500 NW2d 104 (1993);
Maxwell v Bay City Bridge Co, 41 Mich 453, 467-468; 2 NW 639 (1879).
1
Plaintiff’s case proceeded to trial before the Cooper decision was released.
2
Moreover, we note that MCR 2.118(C) provides that the parties may seek to amend the
pleadings to conform to the evidence when issues are expressly or impliedly tried, and
amendment of the evidence to conform to the pleadings may be made by motion even after
judgment.
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Defendant contends that a claim for equitable estoppel fails because a no-fault insurer has
no obligation as a matter of law to advise a claimant regarding the benefits available. Regardless
of the provisions of the no-fault act, the testimony at trial revealed that defendant did have such
an obligation. Specifically, the claims representative for defendant, Arvilla Woods, testified that,
irrespective of whether the insured was represented by counsel or not, the family of an insured
should be paid for providing services, and there was no record evidence in the claims file that she
notified plaintiff’s family or counsel of the entitlement to benefits for services rendered. Thus,
the lack of a statutory obligation is irrelevant where Woods testified that defendant’s policies and
procedures involved providing family members with notice of the benefits available and making
payment for those benefits when the family rendered services. Therefore, this challenge to the
equitable estoppel claim is without merit.
Defendant also contends that the misrepresentation requirement of the claim of equitable
estoppel cannot be satisfied because plaintiff was not entitled to recover the benefits requested.
Defendant merely makes a conclusion and fails to set forth the reasons why plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits. An appellant’s failure to properly address the merits of an assertion of error
with citation to authority constitutes abandonment of the issue. Woods v SLB Prop Mgt, LLC,
277 Mich App 622, 626-627; 750 NW2d 228 (2008). An appellant may not simply announce a
position or assert an error and leave it to the appellate courts to discover and rationalize the basis
for the claims and then search for authority to sustain or reject the position. Goolsby v Detroit,
419 Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984). Therefore, this claim of error does not provide
defendant with relief.3
II. Jury Panel
Defendant asserts that the summary exclusion of defendant’s policyholders from the jury
venire constituted legal error and an abuse of discretion. We disagree. A trial court’s factual
findings regarding juror qualifications are reviewed for clear error. People v Miller, 482 Mich
540, 544; 759 NW2d 850 (2008). Clear error occurs when the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Application of the law to the
facts is reviewed de novo. Centennial, supra.
Jurors may be challenged for cause where the person “has a financial interest other than
that of a taxpayer in the outcome of the action.” MCR 2.511(D)(11). Where the court concludes
that a person is not qualified to serve as a juror, or is exempt from service, or claims an
exemption, the court shall discharge the person from further attendance. MCL 600.1337.
However, an error committed when determining juror qualifications does not lead to automatic
reversal. MCL 600.1354 provides, in relevant part:
(1) Failure to comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be grounds for a
continuance nor shall it affect the validity of a jury verdict unless the party
requesting the continuance or claiming invalidity has made timely objection and
3
In light of our holding, we need not address the application of plaintiff’s alternative theory of
recovery to MCL 500.3145(1).
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unless the party demonstrates actual prejudice to his cause and unless the
noncompliance is substantial. …
A trial court’s decision to excuse a juror for health reasons during a trial without consulting
counsel and without making a record of the juror conversation does not satisfy the actual
prejudice and substantial noncompliance provision of MCL 600.1354(1). Haberkorn v Chrysler
Corp, 210 Mich App 354, 363; 533 NW2d 373 (1995). However, a juror’s representation that
she was never convicted of a felony when, in fact, she had been convicted of an offense
involving her hire of an assassin to kill a drug informant, satisfied the actual prejudice
requirement. Froede v Holland Ladder & Mfg Co, 207 Mich App 127, 135; 523 NW2d 849
(1994). In the present case, defendant fails to allege or demonstrate actual prejudice as a result
of the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, this claim of error does not provide defendant with
appellate relief.4
III. Admission of Evidence
Defendant next asserts that the trial court erred by admitting plaintiff’s exhibits 41 and
42, admitting the testimony of plaintiff’s expert, Steven Prater, and admitting deposition excerpts
from other unrelated cases. We disagree. The trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 76; 684 NW2d
296 (2004). A court necessarily abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is
inadmissible as a matter of law. Id. Reversal on the basis of the erroneous admission of
evidence is unwarranted unless a substantial right of a party is affected, and it affirmatively
appears that the failure to grant relief is inconsistent with substantial justice. Id. An abuse of
discretion standard acknowledges that “there will be circumstances in which there is no single
correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled outcome.”
Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (internal quotation
omitted). Accordingly, if the trial court selects one of multiple principled outcomes, an abuse of
4
Case law provides that jurors who are members of a mutual insurance company should be
disqualified as jurors in an action to which the insurance company is a party and liable to be
assessed. See Fedorinchik v Stewart, 289 Mich 436, 439; 286 NW 673 (1939) (“Members of a
mutual insurance company liable to be assessed to pay losses incurred by the company, are
disqualified from serving as jurors in an action to which it is a party; or in which it is
interested.”); Martin v Farmers Mut Fire Ins Co, 139 Mich 148, 151; 102 NW 656 (1905) (“The
fact that these jurors were members of this mutual fire-insurance company, liable to be assessed
and to pay if this case went against the company, disqualified them from sitting.”). On appeal,
defendant acknowledges the case law cited by plaintiff, but asserts that it is inapplicable because
it pre-dates the creation of the Michigan Court Rules. Furthermore, defendant concludes that
defendant is not an assessing mutual insurance company and that any benefits would be paid by
the Michigan Catastrophic Claims Association (MCCA) for claims in excess of $250,000;
therefore, the underlying rational of the case law cited by plaintiff was not invoked. However,
defendant makes blanket assertions. There was no evidence submitted in the lower court
regarding defendant’s insurance status and there was no evidence that the claims were, in fact,
paid by the MCCA. In light of defendant’s failure to lay a foundation to support its position, this
claim of error cannot be examined. See Goolsby, supra.
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discretion has not occurred, and it is appropriate for the reviewing court to defer to the trial
court’s judgment. Id. In Michigan, this is the default abuse of discretion standard. Id.
Defendant objected to the admission of plaintiff’s exhibits 41 and 42 during trial.
Because the issue was raised, addressed, and decided in the lower court, the issue is preserved
for appellate review. Persinger v Holst, 248 Mich App 499, 510; 639 NW2d 594 (2001).
However, the exhibits were not submitted with the record on appeal. Defendant, as the
appellant, had the duty to provide the full record on appeal. Band v Livonia Assoc, 176 Mich
App 95, 103-104; 439 NW2d 285 (1989). This Court does not consider any alleged evidence or
testimony proffered by the parties for which there is no evidentiary support. Id. In light of the
fact that these documents were not submitted with the record on appeal or attached to the brief
on appeal, this issue cannot be reviewed.
Defendant contends that it was erroneous to admit the testimony of plaintiff’s insurance
expert, Steven Prater, because it was irrelevant, and the probative value of the testimony was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We disagree. Relevant evidence is evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the determination more or
less probable, and evidence is admissible if relevant. MRE 401; MRE 402. Relevant evidence
may be excluded when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. …” MRE 403. Evidence may be relevant and material when it supports or challenges
a party’s theory of the case. See Smith v Michigan Employment Security Comm, 410 Mich 231,
266; 301 NW2d 285 (1981).
Defendant contends that the admission of Prater’s testimony was improper when the only
issue in the case was whether defendant failed to pay attendant care benefits that were properly
due and owing. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to admit this
evidence constituted an abuse of discretion. Although defendant opined that the only issue in the
case involved a failure to pay, plaintiff asserted that defendant had a duty to advise of entitlement
to insurance payments for services rendered by family members, but defendant deliberately
failed to apprise the family of benefits. Plaintiff further asserted that defendant was estopped
from limiting the amount of damages recoverable in light of its deliberate misconduct. The
contested evidence was relevant and material to plaintiff’s theory of the case. Smith, supra.
Defendant also contends that it was erroneous to allow the testimony of other claims
adjusters to testify regarding defendant’s claims handling practices because the evidence was
irrelevant, the probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and there was
no statistical analysis to demonstrate a continuous pattern or scheme. We conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony. Maldonado, supra. Plaintiff’s
theory of the case was that defendant had a policy of failing to apprise family members of an
entitlement to be paid for services rendered. The testimony of other agents established that the
failure to pay plaintiff for services was not an isolated event. Thus, this evidence was offered to
substantiate plaintiff’s theory of the case. Smith, supra. The probative value of this testimony
was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Further, the evidence was offered to
counter defendant’s theory of the case. Defendant’s theory was that it had paid all benefits to
which plaintiff was entitled, plaintiff’s attorney made claims for benefits that were paid, and
plaintiff failed to file suit against Richard’s estate to recover unpaid benefits for services
rendered. The testimony of the other claims representatives countered defendant’s assertion that
it paid all benefits to which plaintiff was entitled; specifically it challenged the assertion that
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attendant care costs were paid for family services. Although defendant asserts that plaintiff did
not provide statistical analysis to demonstrate a common plan or scheme, defendant failed to cite
any authority that statistical analysis was required to support admission. An appellant’s failure
to properly address the merits of an assertion of error with citation to authority constitutes
abandonment of the issue. Woods, supra.
IV. Ex Parte Communications with the Jury
Defendant alleges that reversible error occurred when the trial court engaged in ex parte
communications with the jury. We disagree. The question of the propriety of an ex parte
communication is subject to de novo review. See People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 557;
609 NW2d 581 (2000). Application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo, Centennial,
supra, but the clear error standard applies to the trial court’s factual findings, Herald Co v
Eastern Michigan Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 467; 719 NW2d 19 (2006).
Review of the record reveals that the jury was instructed, and the parties did not object to
the instructions. The jury was sent to deliberate at 9:45 a.m. On the record, there was no
statement regarding the presence of counsel during deliberations. The next day, court resumed.
The trial court indicated that it needed to make a record of the jury notes that had been received
the prior day. Specifically, the jury was provided calculators in response to a request, but the
jury was denied the request for additional charts and told to use the charts provided or to perform
their own calculations. The fourth note from the jury requested clarification regarding what the
term “harm” meant on the verdict form. The trial court answered in a written note, “Harm would
mean nonpayment of attendant care that they find was owed.” Counsel for defendant objected to
the instruction to the jury, stating that it was an incorrect statement of the law. Counsel further
indicated that he was present from 1:15 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., and then returned at 4:00 p.m.
However, his co-counsel was available by telephone for the entire afternoon. Defendant moved
for a mistrial based on the failure to provide notice.
The trial court denied the request. First, the court noted that it was unaware of the
presence of counsel. Second, the court stated that “unique circumstances” had occurred that day,
but did not expand on those circumstances on the record. The trial judge then stated that the
court officer gave notice to defense counsel who indicated that he “had no problem at that time.”
Because the instructions to the jury were benign and did not provide any sort of opinion
regarding the merits of the case, the trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, concluding that
reversible error had not occurred where proper notice was given through the court officer. At
that time, counsel for defendant acknowledged receiving notice from the court officer, but stated
that he was unaware of the nature of the question.
On appeal, defendant submits that MCR 6.414 provides that the court must provide
notice to the parties. However, ultimately counsel acknowledged that he received notice.
Despite the notice, there is no indication that counsel conveyed to the court officer that the
content of the notes should be revealed contemporaneously and on the record. A party may not
harbor error as an appellate parachute by assenting to action at trial and raising the issue on
appeal. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 679; 692 NW2d 708 (2005).
Furthermore, the civil rules of procedure, MCR 2.516(B)(4) govern instructions to the
jury and provide that while the jury is deliberating, the court may further instruct in the presence
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of or after reasonable notice to the parties. A party may assign error to the giving of an
instruction after deliberations commence by specifically stating the matter to which the party
objects and the grounds for the objection. MCR 2.516(C). A party’s failure to object when
informed of the communication is evidence that the communication was not prejudicial. Meyer v
City of Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 565-566; 619 NW2d 182 (2000). Additionally, a party
must provide evidence of prejudice by the court’s answer to the jury question. Id. A trial court
does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial based on the court’s answer to a
jury question when a party fails to demonstrate prejudice. Id.
Review of the record in the present case reveals that counsel for defendant acknowledged
notice of the jury note through the court officer. However, there is no evidence that counsel
made inquiry regarding the content of the note or requested an opportunity to address the note on
the record. An objection did not occur until the next day when the court made a record. Defense
counsel fails to dispute the trial court’s factual finding that it provided reasonable notice to the
parties, MCR 2.516(B)(4), and we cannot conclude that the trial court’s factual finding was
clearly erroneous. Herald, supra. Moreover, defendant fails to provide evidence of prejudice by
briefing the propriety of the answer to the question, Meyer, supra, and fails to identify evidence
of prejudice wherein the jury question addressed plaintiff’s alternate theory of recovery.
Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
V. No-Fault Interest
Defendant contends that the penalty interest provision can only be applied thirty days
after the verdict was rendered. We disagree. The issue of the application of a statutory interest
provision presents a question of law subject to de novo review. Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co,
457 Mich 341, 344; 578 NW2d 274 (1998). However, the issue of reasonableness “is generally a
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.” Payne v Farm Bureau Ins, 263 Mich App
521, 523 n 1; 688 NW2d 327 (2004).
MCL 500.3142(2) provides in relevant part: “Personal protection insurance benefits are
overdue if not paid within 30 days after an insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and of
the amount of loss sustained. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire claim, the
amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof is
received by the insurer.”
The purpose of no-fault interest is to provide a penalty for the insurer’s misconduct; it is
not intended as compensation for the insured for damages. Regents of the Univ of Michigan v
State Farm Mutual Ins Co, 250 Mich App 719, 735; 650 NW2d 129 (2002). To recover this
interest, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant acted arbitrarily or unreasonably
delayed the payment of benefits. Id. Rather, the statute only requires the insured to present the
insurer with reasonable proof of loss. Id. If the insurer does not pay the claim within 30 days
after receiving the proof, the insurer is liable to pay the interest. Id. When a hospital sought to
recover no-fault benefits for care administered to an uninsured patient, the defendant insurance
carrier did not have notice of the amount of the loss until the complaint was filed. Id. at 735-736.
Consequently, the penalty interest could only be calculated from the date of notice of the amount
of the loss, which was the date of the filing of the lawsuit. Id. at 736.
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In the present case, plaintiff testified that the family provided attendant care services for
Richard, and defendant’s case manager was aware of the provision of services, but failed to pay.
The issue of the reasonableness of defendant’s payment of benefits and knowledge was properly
submitted to the trier of fact. Payne, supra. Moreover, the plain language of the statute provides
that benefits are overdue if not paid within 30 days after reasonable proof of the fact and of the
amount of the loss. The plain language does not provide that a jury verdict’s determination of
reasonableness is required to invoke the penalty interest provision. Neal, supra. Therefore, this
claimed error does not provide defendant with relief. Payne, supra.
VI. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Lastly, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) when plaintiff offered the only evidence in support of
attendant care expenses. We disagree. The trial court’s decision on a motion for JNOV is
reviewed de novo. Sniecinski v BCBSM, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003). When
reviewing the denial of a JNOV motion, the appellate court views the evidence and all legitimate
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine if a party
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The motion should be granted only when there
is insufficient evidence presented to create a jury-triable issue. Amerisure Ins Co v Auto-Owners
Ins Co, 262 Mich App 10, 18-19; 684 NW2d 391 (2004). When reasonable jurors could
honestly reach different conclusions regarding the evidence, the jury verdict must stand. Zantel
Marketing Agency v Whitesell Corp, 265 Mich App 559, 568; 696 NW2d 735 (2005).
In Kallabat v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 256 Mich App 146, 150; 662 NW2d 97
(2003), the defendant asserted that it was entitled to JNOV because the plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence that medical bills evidencing treatment by two doctors was both reasonable in
amount and reasonably necessary to the plaintiff’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. This Court
rejected the challenge, stating:
Whether expenses are reasonable and reasonably necessary is generally a
question of fact to be resolved by the jury. In determining damages for allowable
expenses, the jury must not be allowed to speculate concerning the cost of a
particular procedure or service, and a trial court should grant a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict if the jury was permitted to engage in such
speculation.
At its core, defendant’s claim is that a plaintiff in an action under MCL
500.3107 must offer direct evidence from the treating physician that the expenses
incurred were both reasonable and reasonably necessary in order for the plaintiff
to prevail. We find no such requirement within the language of the statute, and
we cannot find, and defendant does not cite, any binding precedent in this regard.
Rather, as with any civil case, the jury is entitled to consider all the evidence
introduced by the plaintiff to decide whether the plaintiff has proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the expenses were reasonable and necessary.
Thus, direct and circumstantial evidence, and permissible inferences therefrom,
may be considered by the jury to determine whether there is sufficient proof that
the expenses were both reasonable and necessary. [Id. at 151-152 (Citations
omitted, emphasis in original).]
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Accordingly, whether the expenses for services rendered by plaintiff and her daughters to
Richard were reasonable and necessary was an issue for the trier of fact. Although defendant
contends that there was merely a subjective assessment by plaintiff that the services were
required, Dr. Ancell performed an investigation and concluded that the lift was in fact a twoperson job. While defendant raised the possibility that equipment was available to perform a lift
with one person, Dr. Ancell opined that the type of equipment used was based in part on the
person’s stature, and Richard was over six feet tall and weighed over 200 pounds. Therefore, he
concluded that two people were necessary to lift Richard. Therefore, the jury was not asked to
merely accept plaintiff’s subjective testimony. Moreover, when plaintiff inquired about her
daughter being paid for lifts because she was unable to perform them alone, the nursing company
provided notice to Woods that it would require a minimum two-hour payment for the service and
questioned whether defendant could pay the daughter directly. Ultimately, Woods conducted an
investigation and authorized payment. Therefore, the attendant care costs with regard to lifts was
not merely based on plaintiff’s assessment.
With regard to the statement of the issue, defendant raises the issue of attendant care and
does not indicate that case management services were also duplicative. Therefore, the issue of
case management services was abandoned. Woods, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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