ROSE CARLSON V OPTIMA OIL ENTERPRISES INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROSE CARLSON,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
Nos. 279603; 285853
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000571-CD
OPTIMA OIL ENTERPRISES, INC., and ALI
DAMSAZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Meter, P.J., and Murray and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 279603, defendants appeal as of right the trial court’s July 11, 2007, order
awarding plaintiff attorney fees, costs, and interest pursuant to the Whistleblowers’ Protection
Act (WPA), MCL 15.361 et seq. In particular, defendants dispute the validity and the amount of
the attorney fee award. In Docket No. 285853, defendants appeal on leave granted the trial
court’s denial of their motion for a directed verdict of plaintiff’s WPA claim. This Court
consolidated the separate appeals for a decision. We affirm.
Plaintiff was terminated from her job after she cooperated with the Michigan Department
of Agriculture’s investigation of the gas station she managed on behalf of defendants. Plaintiff
filed a complaint alleging that she was terminated in violation of the WPA and the Elliott-Larsen
Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found
that defendants violated the WPA, but not the ELCRA. The jury awarded plaintiff $36,537 for
past economic loss, $75,000 for future economic loss, and $18,200 for her past noneconomic
loss, resulting in a total award of $129,737.
I
Defendants argue that plaintiff was not entitled to an attorney fee award because she lost
her ELCRA claims and there was insufficient evidence to support the WPA claim upon which
she was successful. Alternatively, defendants assert that the attorney fee award was excessive
and unreasonable because it amounts to almost one-half the verdict amount and because the
majority of plaintiff’s attorney’s time spent on the case was in connection with the ELCRA
claims, which were rejected by the jury.
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Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable unless expressly authorized by statute, court
rule, judicial exception or contract. Haliw v Sterling Hts, 471 Mich 700, 707; 691 NW2d 753
(2005). The WPA provides that attorney fees may be awarded to a successful plaintiff. MCL
15.364 states that, in addition to other remedies, “[a] court may also award the complainant all or
a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees, if the
court determines that the award is appropriate.” In other words, in awarding costs and attorney
fees under the WPA, the trial court is merely required to determine that “the award is
appropriate.”
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to award attorney
fees and its determination of the reasonableness of the fees requested. Windemere Commons I
Ass’n v O’Brien, 269 Mich App 681, 682; 713 NW2d 814 (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs
when the trial court chooses a decision falling outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes. Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). The
factual findings underlying an award of attorney fees are reviewed for clear error, Solution
Source, Inc v LPR Assoc Ltd Partnership, 252 Mich App 368, 381; 652 NW2d 474 (2002), and
underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo, Hines v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 265
Mich App 432, 438; 695 NW2d 84 (2005). “A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court . . . is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made.” Solution Source, supra at 381-382.
When assessing the reasonableness of attorney fees, the trial court should consider the
following nonexclusive list of factors: “‘(1) the professional standing and experience of the
attorney; (2) the skill, time, and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results
achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client.’” Wood v Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins Exch, 413
Mich 573, 588; 321 NW2d 653 (1982), quoting Crawley v Schick, 48 Mich App 728, 737; 211
NW2d 217 (1973) (citations omitted).1 In this case, the trial court not only stated on the record
1
In Univ Rehabilitation Alliance, Inc v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co, 279 Mich App 691, 700-701
n 3; 760 NW2d 574 (2008), this Court addressed the limited applicability of the Michigan
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519; 751 NW2d 472 (2008), in
determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee:
We acknowledge that our Supreme Court has recently held in a plurality opinion
that a trial court, when determining a reasonable attorney fee as part of caseevaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O), must first determine a “baseline” fee
by multiplying the reasonable hourly rate–the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar legal services–by the reasonable number of hours necessitated
by case-evaluation rejection. [Smith, supra at 522] (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.).
This “baseline” reasonable fee may then be adjusted upward or downward
according to the factors in Wood and MRPC 1.5(a). Smith does not affect our
analysis in this case of the question whether the trial court abused its discretion
when determining a reasonable attorney fee under MCL 500.3148(1). First, Smith
addressed MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), which explicitly requires that the reasonable(continued…)
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that it considered the Wood factors, its comments clearly indicate that it considered these factors
while exercising its discretion to determine a reasonable amount of fees:
First of all, with regard to the hourly rate I am going to find given the
complexity of the case, counsel’s qualifications and other matters that the hourly
rate of two fifty is, is appropriate and is reasonable.
I have spent some time reviewing the hours proposed to be charged by
counsel with an eye toward reasonableness and I am going to award attorney fees
in this matter in the total amount of sixty thousand eight hundred and forty-one
dollars and eighty eight cents. Frankly, that is calculated on the rate requested by
counsel but I have found that not all of the hours as, as billed were reasonably
expended for purposes of this motion at least.
Since the trial court made adequate findings of fact regarding the Wood factors, it cannot be said
that the court abused its discretion when determining the appropriate amount of a reasonable
attorney fee award.
Defendants nevertheless contend that the trial court’s award was unreasonably
disproportionate to the amount of actual success plaintiff achieved at trial since plaintiff did not
recover on her ELCRA claims. While a trial court may reduce an award of attorney fees on the
basis of a plaintiff’s limited success, it is not required to do so. Schellenberg v Rochester
Michigan Lodge No 2225, of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 228 Mich App 20, 45-47;
577 NW2d 163 (1998). Here, the trial court did indeed reduce the attorney fees award by
approximately $10,000. Since the majority of plaintiff’s case was either dedicated to the WPA
claim, or involved facts and witnesses that overlapped in support of the WPA claim, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by not further reducing plaintiff’s award of attorney fees based
on her limited success at trial.
Further, contrary to defendants’ assertion, there is no requirement that a court must
decrease an attorney fee award based on the amount of the jury verdict. Instead, the
consideration is whether the attorney fees are reasonable. Wood, supra. Illustratively, in Grow v
WA Thomas Co, 236 Mich App 696, 701-702, 715; 601 NW2d 426 (1999), another employment
case (although not pursuant to the WPA), this Court upheld an award of attorney fees in the
amount of approximately $43,000 where the jury verdict was approximately $80,000—thus
demonstrating that it is not necessarily an abuse of discretion to award attorney fees in an amount
that equates to approximately 50% of the jury verdict.
Given that attorney fees may be awarded to a successful plaintiff pursuant to the WPA,
MCL 15.364, and the trial court sufficiently applied the Wood factors in reviewing plaintiff’s
(…continued)
attorney-fee portion of actual costs be based on a reasonable hourly or daily rate
as determined by the trial court. . . .
Furthermore, as plaintiff points out, defendants did not call into question the trial court’s
selection of $250 as a reasonable hourly rate.
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request for attorney fees, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
plaintiff $60,841.88 in attorney fees.2
II
Defendants also argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a directed
verdict on plaintiff’s WPA claim. We disagree.
Preliminarily, we reject plaintiff’s assertion that defendants sought a directed verdict only
as to that part of her WPA claim pertaining to her reporting violations to the Department of
Agriculture, but not as to her participation in the investigation itself. Plaintiff reads the record
too narrowly. Although defense counsel’s argument in support of the motion mentioned the
reporting aspect only, it is clear that counsel sought the dismissal of the WPA claim in its
entirety. It is equally clear that plaintiff’s counsel understood that to be the case in arguing
against the motion at trial. Thus, defendants have preserved their challenge to the WPA claim in
full.
This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict.
The trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party; a directed verdict is proper only when no factual question exists upon
which reasonable minds may differ. [Dykema Gossett, PLLC v Ajluni, 273 Mich
App 1, 11; 730 NW2d 29 (2006), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other
grounds 480 Mich 913 (2007).]
When the evidence could lead reasonable jurors to disagree, the court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the jury. Moore v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 279 Mich App 195, 202; 755
NW2d 686 (2008). Directed verdicts are viewed with disfavor. Berryman v K Mart Corp, 193
Mich App 88, 91; 483 NW2d 642 (1992).
The WPA is a remedial statute and “is to be liberally construed to favor the persons the
Legislature intended to benefit.” O’Neill v Home IV Care, Inc, 249 Mich App 606, 614; 643
NW2d 600 (2002). “[T]he WPA was enacted to remove barriers to an employee who seeks to
report violations of the law, thereby protecting the integrity of the law and the public at large.”
Id., citing Hopkins v City of Midland, 158 Mich App 361, 374; 404 NW2d 744 (1987). MCL
15.362 prohibits an employer from treating an employee adversely because the employee
“reports or is about to report . . . a violation or a suspected violation of a law or regulation or rule
. . . unless the employee knows that the report is false, or . . . is requested by a public body to
participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry held by that public body, or a court action.”
“To establish a prima facie case under [the WPA], a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff was
2
In their statement of the questions presented, defendants challenge the trial court’s award of
“attorney fees, costs and interest,” but defendants’ argument is limited to the award of attorney
fees. Any challenge to the award of costs and interest is therefore abandoned. Prince v
MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999).
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engaged in protected activity as defined by the act, (2) the plaintiff was discharged or
discriminated against, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
discharge or adverse employment action.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183-184;
665 NW2d 468 (2003) (footnote omitted). If a plaintiff is successful in establishing a prima
facie case under the WPA, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish a legitimate business
reason for the adverse employment action. Roulston v Tendercare (Michigan), Inc, 239 Mich
App 270, 280-281; 608 NW2d 525 (2000). Once the defendant produces such evidence, the
plaintiff has the burden to establish that the employer’s proffered reasons were a mere pretext for
the adverse employment action. Id. at 281.
Defendants argue that they were entitled to a directed verdict because there was
insufficient evidence to find that plaintiff engaged in an activity protected under the WPA, or
that a causal connection existed between the protected activity and her discharge. We disagree.
The evidence at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, established that she
telephoned the health department and participated in the Department of Agriculture’s inspection
of defendants’ gas station. When the Department of Agriculture’s agent arrived at the station,
plaintiff informed him about the ongoing rodent problems, pointed out the gasoline smell, and
showed him the black mold and standing water in the basement. According to plaintiff, she
“described to him [the agent] in detail everything that was going on.” When the agent left the
station for a short time to clean up and prepare his report, he directed plaintiff not to allow
anyone to move the products that were damaged or defiled by the rodents. Later, when the agent
spoke with defendant Ali Damsaz, the agent indicated that plaintiff “had pointed out what was
going on” at the station. Damsaz telephoned plaintiff about the investigation the same afternoon.
He was angry and screaming at her, asking why she had telephoned the agent and told him about
the health and safety problems. Damsaz accused plaintiff of being fat, lazy, and bad for the
store, and terminated her employment.
The evidence was sufficient to establish a factual question upon which reasonable minds
could differ as to whether plaintiff’s participation in the health and safety investigation at
defendants’ gas station constituted a protected activity, and whether her discharge was causally
connected to the activity. Thus, defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict on plaintiff’s
WPA claim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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