PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID LERONE WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 16, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284158
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 07-002286-FH
DAVID LERONE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams
of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL
750.81d(1). For those respective convictions, he was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender,
MCL 769.12, to concurrent terms of 30 months to 40 years in prison and 30 months to 15 years
in prison. Defendant was not credited for any time served because he was being held in jail on a
parole detainer. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
A confidential informant told police officers that a drug dealer named Country or Big
Country would be in the area of 18th and Griswold in Port Huron on August 9, 2007, with a large
quantity of crack cocaine. Based on this information, the St. Clair County Drug Task Force had
that particular area placed under surveillance on the night in question. A green Monte Carlo was
seen pulling into an alley on Griswold. The car lights were turned off, but the car was left
running. A white male approached the car on the passenger side, leaned in through the window
for about fifteen seconds, and then left. Marked and unmarked police cars followed the Monte
Carlo. When the car was at a red light, a marked police car, with lights flashing, pulled up
behind the Monte Carlo, and an unmarked police car pulled up alongside and slightly in front of
the Monte Carlo, blocking its movement forward. Defendant, a passenger in the Monte Carlo,
jumped out of the car and began running down the street. He was apprehended following a
chase, but no drugs or money were found on his person. The police, however, discovered
cocaine bagged for individual sale near a fence that defendant had tried to climb, and money was
found along his running route. There were no other people in the area when defendant was
fleeing from the police.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by
the non-testifying informant that were elicited during police testimony. Defendant claims that
these statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. This argument was not
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preserved below. Under People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764, 774; 597 NW2d 130
(1999), an unpreserved or forfeited claim of error, whether nonconstitutional or constitutional in
nature, is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. The Carines Court set forth the
plain-error test, stating:
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be
met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3)
and the plain error affected substantial rights. The third requirement generally
requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings. “It is the defendant rather than the Government who
bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.” Finally, once a
defendant satisfies these three requirements, an appellate court must exercise its
discretion in deciding whether to reverse. Reversal is warranted only when the
plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant
or when an error “‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings' independent of the defendant's innocence.” [Id. at 763
(citations omitted; alteration in original).]
In People v Chambers, 277 Mich App 1, 10-11; 742 NW2d 610 (2007), this Court,
addressing a Confrontation Clause issue relative to statements made by a confidential informant
that were admitted through the testimony of a detective, provided the following analytical
framework:
A defendant has the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
or her. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; Crawford v Washington, 541
US 36, 42; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004). The Confrontation Clause
prohibits the admission of all out-of-court testimonial statements unless the
declarant was unavailable at trial and the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. Id. at 68. A statement by a confidential informant to the
authorities generally constitutes a testimonial statement. United States v Cromer,
389 F3d 662, 675 (CA 6, 2004). However, the Confrontation Clause does not bar
the use of out-of-court testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing
the truth of the matter asserted. People v McPherson, 263 Mich App 124, 133;
687 NW2d 370 (2004), citing Crawford, supra at 59 n 9. Thus, a statement
offered to show the effect of the out-of-court statement on the hearer does not
violate the Confrontation Clause. People v Lee, 391 Mich 618, 642-643; 218
NW2d 655 (1974). Specifically, a statement offered to show why police officers
acted as they did is not hearsay. People v Jackson, 113 Mich App 620, 624; 318
NW2d 495 (1982).
Here, a portion of the challenged testimony was certainly offered to explain why the
police organized the surveillance at 18th and Griswold in Port Huron, which is permissible. See
Chambers, supra at 11 (testimony was not offered to establish the truth of the informant’s tip;
rather, it was properly offered to establish and explain why the detective organized a surveillance
of the defendant’s home). Assuming that the challenged testimony went beyond simply
explaining the basis for the surveillance and encroached on defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause by being too detailed and used to prove the truth of certain matters
asserted, defendant fails to show that the presumed error affected the outcome of the
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proceedings. Moreover, defendant fails to show that any presumed error resulted in the
conviction of an actually innocent person or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings independent of defendant's innocence.
The untainted evidence against defendant reflected that he was seen stopping in a car, a
Monte Carlo, in an alley that was under surveillance for potential drug activity. A person was
seen coming up to the car, leaning in through the passenger side window for about fifteen
seconds, and then walking away. Officers testified that these events and circumstances are
consistent with a drug transaction. The lights of the car were then turned on and it was driven
away. At a stop light, the Monte Carlo, in which defendant was sitting in the passenger seat, was
blocked in by an unmarked police car on one side and a marked police car behind it. Defendant
jumped out of the car and fled. Crack cocaine, which was packaged individually and clearly
meant for sale,1 was found in the area where defendant had tried to jump a fence; money,
including a $100 bill,2 was found in the area where defendant had been running. The bag of
cocaine and the money appeared clean and new, like they had not been exposed to the elements.
The police were able to apprehend defendant after the foot chase. Although the police officers
did not observe defendant throwing the bag of drugs or the money away, there was testimony
that it was common for criminals to “throw away” drugs and money as they are being chased in
order to claim that the contraband did not belong to them. Moreover, given the circumstances, it
is reasonable to infer that defendant disposed of the drugs and money while in flight; indeed, any
other conclusion would be tenuous. The untainted evidence was more than sufficient for a jury
to find defendant guilty of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of cocaine; he was
effectively caught in the act of committing the crime.3 Accordingly, any assumed Confrontation
Clause violation did not affect defendant’s substantial rights, nor was he actually innocent or the
integrity of proceedings compromised.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel due to trial
counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the statements made by the informant that were
elicited during police testimony. Assuming a Confrontation Clause violation and that counsel’s
performance was deficient for failure to object, defendant has failed to show the existence of a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). In other words,
defendant has failed to establish the requisite prejudice. Id. The evidence recited by us above in
determining that defendant’s substantial rights were not affected under the plain-error test serves
as a sufficient basis to find a lack of prejudice under the analysis governing review of an
ineffective assistance claim. Id.
1
Police found 21.3 grams of rock cocaine that was individually packaged in 43 small baggies,
which were all contained in a large plastic bag.
2
A total of $280 was discovered.
3
It is beyond dispute that the challenged testimony had no bearing whatsoever on the resisting
and obstructing charge.
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Defendant next claims that the trial court erred by denying defendant jail credit for the
166 days he spent in jail between the time of his arrest and sentencing for the instant convictions.
We disagree.
While individuals convicted of a crime are generally entitled to credit for jail time served
prior to sentencing, MCL 769.11b,4 defendant was not so entitled because he was in jail during
that time due to his parole detainer status. People v Filip, 278 Mich App 635, 640-643; 754
NW2d 660 (2008); People v Seiders, 262 Mich App 702, 705-708; 686 NW2d 821 (2004). As
explained in Filip, supra at 641-642:
MCL 791.238(1) provides that a parolee remains legally in the custody of
the Department of Corrections, and that “[p]ending a hearing upon any charge of
parole violation, the prisoner shall remain incarcerated.” This provision
unambiguously declares that parole violators cannot avoid confinement pending
resolution of the violation proceedings. Such a period of incarceration thus
constitutes part of the original sentence and in that sense is credited against it.
Moreover, “denied,” as used in MCL 769.11b, implies the exercise of discretion,
not the recognition of outright ineligibility. For that reason, MCL 769.11b simply
does not apply to parole detainees. Therefore, the trial court erred in setting bond
for Filip in the first instance. Simply put, the erroneously granted possibility of
posting bond did not secure Filip any rights under MCL 769.11b. In sum, contrary
to the trial court's ruling, Seiders governs and must be applied.
Filip argues that because a parolee has necessarily served his or her
minimum sentence, the parolee could never get credit for jail incarceration
stemming from a new violation. We disagree. MCL 791.238(2) specifically
dictates that a parole violator “is liable, when arrested, to serve out the unexpired
portion of his or her maximum imprisonment.” And any remaining portion of the
original sentence must be served before a sentence for a second offense may
begin. Thus, just because a parolee has served his or her minimum sentence, it
does not follow that the credit must therefore be applied against his or her new
sentence when he or she remains liable to continue serving out the maximum
sentence. Moreover, if a defendant is not required to serve additional time on the
previous sentence because of the parole violation, then the time served is
4
MCL 769.11b provides:
Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within this state
and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or
unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, the trial court in
imposing sentence shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such
time served in jail prior to sentencing.
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essentially forfeited. [Citations omitted; see also People v Johnson, __ Mich App
__; __ NW2d __, issued April 14, 2009 (Docket No. 279163).]
Defendant also argues that denial of jail credit for parole detainees violates state and
federal constitutional provisions with respect to due process, double jeopardy, and equal
protection. US Const, Am V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §§ 2, 15, and 17. In People v Stewart,
203 Mich App 432, 434; 513 NW2d 147 (1994), this Court rejected the defendant’s similar
constitutional arguments in regard to due process and equal protection. This Court stated that
“[p]arole detainees can be treated differently than nondetainees because they are different than
nondetainees: they owe a debt to society they have not yet fully paid.” Id. at 434.
The United States and Michigan Constitutions protect a defendant from multiple
punishments for the same offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Ream,
481 Mich 223, 227; 750 NW2d 536 (2008). The “same offense” language under the multiplepunishments strand of double jeopardy is not implicated if each offense requires proof of a fact
that the other does not. Id. at 227-228. Here, double jeopardy protection was not infringed,
where distinct offenses were involved, i.e., the prior offense that gave rise to the parole detainer
and the current drug and resisting offenses. By not providing jail credit for defendant relative to
the sentences on the instant offenses, defendant was not being punished multiple times on the
instant offenses, given that the jail time served by defendant related to a distinct and earlier
offense. Credit against the instant sentences is not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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