IN RE BECKWITH MINORS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of HEATHER BECKWITH and
DANIELLE BECKWITH, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
July 14, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 289575
Kent Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 07-052469-NA
KAREN BECKWITH,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
WILLIAM BECKWITH,
Respondent.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and Fort Hood, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant Karen Beckwith (hereinafter “respondent”) appeals as of right
from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to the minor children pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341,
356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Contrary to what respondent argues, the conditions that led to the adjudication were not limited
to respondent Beckwith’s sexual abuse of respondent’s oldest child. The trial court’s exercise of
jurisdiction was also based on respondent’s history of exposing the children to domestic
violence. The evidence indicated that the children had been exposed to significant domestic
violence, and that both respondent and the children experienced the effects of post-traumatic
stress disorder. Despite participating in counseling to address this issue, respondent continued to
lack insight in understanding how her children were affected by the violence they witnessed or
her role in such incidents, or how to avoid or respond to dangerous situations in the future. In
addition, respondent continued to engage in the same patterns of behavior that made her
vulnerable to abusive relationships, and she continued to place her own needs ahead of those of
-1-
the children. Respondent’s failure to successfully complete the most important component of her
parent-agency agreement, that being individual counseling, was evidence of her inability to
provide proper care and custody of the children, see In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d
216 (2003), and it was reasonably likely that they would be harmed if returned to respondent’s
home.
Further, considering the trauma the children experienced while in respondent’s custody
and the significant progress they had made after their removal because of the stability and
consistency they were receiving, which respondent was unable to provide, the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 356-357. Thus, the trial court did not err in
terminating respondent’s parental rights to the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
