PEOPLE OF MI V BENJAMIN RUSSELL PLATT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 14, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283749
Kalamazoo Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-000607-FC
BENJAMIN RUSSELL PLATT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Davis, P.J., and Murphy and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant Benjamin Russell Platt was convicted of two counts of
felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); perjury, MCL 767a.9(1)(b); and first-degree home invasion,
MCL 750.110a(2). Defendant was acquitted of one additional count of felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b). Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to
life imprisonment for the two counts of felony murder, 240 months to 30 years’ imprisonment
for the perjury conviction and 175 months to 30 years’ imprisonment for the home invasion
conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his
statement. Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Michigan
Constitution prohibit the government from compelling a defendant to testify against himself. US
Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. To admit a statement into evidence obtained from
defendant during a custodial interrogation, the defendant must have voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 564; 675
NW2d 863 (2003). A defendant’s waiver of his constitutional rights must be made “without
intimidation, coercion, or deception … and must be the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.” Id. at 564 (citations omitted).
Defendant first argues that he invoked his right to remain silent and that the police
officers failed to stop questioning him after this invocation of his rights. “[A] suspect is free at
any time to exercise his right to remain silent, and all interrogation must cease if such right is
asserted.” People v Catey, 135 Mich App 714, 722; 356 NW2d 241 (1984), citing Miranda v
Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). The police are required to cease
questioning only if a suspect unequivocally invokes his right to remain silent. Catey, supra.
When a defendant does not unequivocally invoke his right to remain silent, police officers are
permitted to continue the interview. People v Adams, 245 Mich App 226, 234-235; 627 NW2d
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623 (2001). The continuation of the interview is proper when the police honor a defendant’s
request to limit the interview to certain topics. Id.
During the police interview, defendant stated “this conversation is over.” Defendant
contends that this was an invocation of his right to remain silent. We disagree. A review of the
context of the comment indicates that defendant did not indicate to the detectives that he no
longer wished to speak with them. Rather, defendant’s comment was an equivocal statement that
he was not going to change his story, and there was no point in any further questioning on that
subject matter. Because the statement did not unequivocally indicated that defendant wanted to
remain silent, the police were not required to cease the interview. Catey, supra at 722.
Additionally, defendant continued to speak to the detectives after he made the statement, which
is especially notable in light of defendant’s testimony that he has had multiple contacts with
police, was read his Miranda rights on several previous occasions and was aware of how to
invoke those rights. Because the statement was equivocal and not intended to terminate the
interview, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress the statement on that
ground.
Additionally, defendant contends his statement to the detectives was involuntary because
of the length of the interrogation, the implied threats to imprison defendant’s mother and the
threats of incarceration and promises of leniency. To determine if a statement was voluntary:
the trial court should consider, among other things, the following factors: the age
of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his
previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the
questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the
statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a
magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured,
intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the
accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused
was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.
[People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988).]
“The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not necessarily conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made.” Id.
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a valid
waiver was made. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 634; 614 NW2d 152 (2000).
In the present case, a review of the Cipriano factors reveals that defendant: 1) was 27
years old, 2) had obtained a general education diploma, 3) was literate, 4) had multiple contacts
with police in the past, 5) was interviewed for approximately seven hours before he made the
first admission, 6) was informed of his constitutional rights and understood them, 7) was not
injured, ill or intoxicated at the time of the interview, 8) was provided with food, beverages and
bathroom breaks during the interview, and 9) was not physically abused or threatened with
physical abuse. All of these factors weigh in favor of a finding that the statement was voluntary.
Contrary to defendant’s claims, the fourteen-hour interrogation did not in and of itself render his
statement involuntary because defendant confessed after seven hours of questioning and was
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provided with food, beverages and breaks when needed. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, this one factor does not outweigh the others. Cipriano, supra at 334.
Further, contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is no evidence in the record to support
defendant’s contention that he was coerced into admitting his participation in this crime by the
detective’s threats to imprison his mother. A review of the entire record and the interrogation
recording does not indicate such a threat was ever made. Thus, defendant failed to establish a
factual predicate to support his claim that such a threat was made and that defendant was coerced
by it. See People v Geno, 261 Mich App 624, 629; 683 NW2d 687 (2004) (“Giving proper
deference to the trial court’s credibility determination, there were no promises or threats made,
and thus the factual predicate for defendant’s argument is unsupported. Therefore, defendant’s
argument here fails.”); People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 123; 575 NW2d 84 (1997) (This
Court held that there was nothing in the record to support the defendant’s claim that threats or
promises were directed towards the defendant’s girlfriend and, thus, the defendant’s testimony
alone was “insufficient to establish that defendant’s confession was coerced by threats or
promises regarding his girlfriend”).
Defendant’s arguments that he was coerced by police threats and promises are also
meritless. While a review of the record indicates the detectives and defendant discussed the
possibility of reduced charges, there is no evidence in the record to support that such a promise
of leniency was made or that defendant was threatened with incarceration. To the contrary,
defendant was told that it was the prosecutor who could make a deal, not the police. Because of
defendant’s age, education, extensive contact with police, knowledge of his rights, the length of
the interview, defendant’s good health, the detectives’ professionalism during the interview as
noted by the trial court, the lack of threats or promises and defendant’s lack of intoxication all
indicate defendant voluntarily provided the statement to the detectives. Akins, supra at 656. The
trial court did not clearly err in denying the motion to suppress. People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463
Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).
Affirmed.
/s/ Alton T. Davis
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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