PEOPLE OF MI V BERNARD WILLIAM KADE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 7, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285402
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-215779-FH
BERNARD WILLIAM KADE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted his guilty-plea convictions of third-degree fleeing
and alluding, MCL 257.602a(3)(a), and driving while license suspended, second offense, MCL
257.904(3)(b). Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 30 to 120
months’ imprisonment for the fleeing and alluding conviction and 144 days in jail for the driving
while license suspended conviction. We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant argues that, because he was unaware that he was going to be sentenced as an
habitual offender when he entered his pleas, the plea was not valid and should be vacated.
Defendant entered his plea on July 31, 2007, at his arraignment, and the prosecution filed the
habitual offender enhancement on August 2, 2007, as permitted by MCL 769.13(1) and (3).
When a motion to withdraw a plea is made following sentencing, the decision to grant the
motion rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
clear abuse of discretion that resulted in a miscarriage of justice. People v Boatman, 273 Mich
App 405, 406-407; 730 NW2d 251 (2007). The procedures governing the acceptance of a guilty
plea are set forth in MCR 6.302. MCR 6.302(A) states that the trial court cannot accept a guilty
plea unless the plea was made with understanding, voluntarily, and accurately. MCR
6.302(B)(2) provides:
(B) An Understanding Plea. Speaking directly to the defendant or
defendants, the court must advise the defendant or defendants of the following
and determine that each defendant understands:
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(2) the maximum possible prison sentence for the offense and any
mandatory minimum sentence required by law[.]
This court rule has been interpreted to mean that a defendant must be advised of the
consequences of a plea, but that requirement has not been extended beyond informing the
defendant of the maximum possible sentence and any mandatory minimum sentence applicable
to the charged offense. People v Johnson, 413 Mich 487, 490; 320 NW2d 876 (1982); Boatman,
supra at 408. The habitual offender statue does not create a substantive offense separate from
and independent of the underlying principal offense. People v Oswald (After Remand), 188
Mich App 1, 12; 469 NW2d 306 (1991). Accordingly, the specific argument defendant raises
here has been rejected in Boatman; MCR 6.302(B)(2) “does not encompass a specific
requirement to inform an habitual offender regarding the effect this status has on sentencing.”
Boatman, supra at 409.
Defendant points out that, notwithstanding this ruling, the Boatman panel vacated the
defendant’s plea to support his claim that the trial court’s failure to inform him that he would be
sentenced as a habitual offender deprived him of the opportunity to make an intelligent plea.
However, the Boatman panel did not vacate the defendant’s plea because of the trial court’s
failure to comply with MCR 6.302(B)(2), the argument defendant raises here. Instead, the
Boatman panel noted that the defendant’s guilty plea arose out of an agreement between him, his
attorney and the prosecutor’s office whereby the prosecutor would recommend that the court
impose a sentence within the guidelines. Id. at 410. Because the lower court record also
indicated that there was confusion as to “which guidelines [were] being agreed to,” the Boatman
panel reasoned that the defendant was not properly “informed of the nature and consequences of
his . . . bargain.” Id. at 412. Defendant cannot rely on this logic in seeking relief here as the
record amply demonstrates that his plea was not the result of any sentencing agreement
whatsoever, much less one that was misunderstood or confusing.
In sum, defendant pleaded guilty to third-degree fleeing and alluding and operating a
motor vehicle on a suspended license, second offense. The trial court informed defendant of the
minimum and maximum sentences for both charges as required by MCR 6.302(B)(2). Johnson,
supra at 490; Boatman, supra at 408. The trial court thus complied with MCR 6.302(B)(2), and,
accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Defendant next argues that the trial court should not have scored prior record variable
(PRV) 5 at ten points for three prior misdemeanor convictions because he did not have the
benefit of counsel at the time of those convictions. Defendant argues that he had the right to
counsel for these misdemeanor convictions because he received a suspended or a probated
sentence. This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error. People
v Mack, 265 Mich App 122, 125; 695 NW2d 342 (2005). This Court reviews a trial court’s
decision to impose an increased sentence pursuant to the habitual offender act for an abuse of
discretion. Id.; People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 252; 611 NW2d 316 (2000).
The federal and state constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the
assistance of counsel. US Const, Ams VI and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Convictions
obtained in violation of the constitutional right to counsel may not be used to enhance a criminal
sentence. United States v Tucker, 404 US 443, 449; 92 S Ct 589; 30 L Ed 2d 592 (1972),
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quoting Burgett v Texas, 389 US 109, 115; 88 S Ct 258; 19 L Ed 319 (1967). However, in
People v Reichenbach, 459 Mich 109, 120; 587 NW2d 1 (1998), our Supreme Court held that,
“under both the federal and state constitutions, a defendant accused of a misdemeanor is entitled
to appointed trial counsel only if ‘actually imprisoned.’” The Court further held that lawful
uncounseled prior misdemeanor convictions can be used for sentence enhancement purposes. Id.
at 124.
Because there is no evidence that defendant was actually imprisoned, and defendant does
not claim that he was actually imprisoned for the three misdemeanor convictions on which the
trial court based the PRV 5 scoring of ten points, defendant’s sentence enhancement was valid,
and he is not entitled to resentencing on this basis.
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. He first
contends that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to object to defendant’s
misdemeanor convictions, which he accrued without the benefit of counsel, being used to score
PRV 5 at ten points. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms and that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceedings would have been different. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600;
623 NW2d 884 (2001). As discussed above, PRV 5 was properly scored based on the
misdemeanor convictions because defendant was not actually imprisoned and thus, was not
entitled to counsel. Counsel is not required to advocate a meritless position. Mack, supra at 130.
Accordingly, this argument is without merit.
Finally, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object
to the enhancement of defendant’s sentence as a habitual offender when his prior operating while
intoxicated (OUIL), third offense conviction was already an enhanced charge. Defendant offers
no support for this argument other than stating that his 1999 conviction had “no business being a
felony.” A defendant cannot simply announce a position or assert an error and leave it up to this
Court to do his research and develop his arguments and then accept or reject his position.
Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655 n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984). Moreover, defendant’s
argument is without merit. The Supreme Court has ruled that OUIL convictions that have
become felonies because of previous OUIL convictions pursuant to MCL 256.625(7)(a)(ii) can
be further enhanced under the habitual offender statute. People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich 55, 70;
475 NW2d 231 (1991). As such, defendant’s sentence was properly enhanced.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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