SAMI POOTA & SONS INC V MICHIGAN LIQUOR CONTROL COMM
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SAMI POOTA & SONS, INC., d/b/a WIXOM
FOOD MARKET,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 285836
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-089130-AA
MICHIGAN LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION and WIXOM SHOPPE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a circuit court order dismissing its complaint for a writ of
superintending control seeking to overturn the decision of the Michigan Liquor Control
Commission (“defendant”) to grant a specially designated distributor (“SDD”) license to
defendant Wixom Shoppe, Inc. The circuit court dismissed the complaint because plaintiff failed
to challenge defendant’s decision in a circuit court appeal pursuant to MCL 600.931. We affirm.
This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).1
Plaintiff challenges the circuit court’s dismissal of its complaint for superintending
control. In general, this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a circuit court’s decision to
grant or deny an order of superintending control. Shepherd Montessori Ctr Milan v Ann Arbor
Twp, 259 Mich App 315, 346; 675 NW2d 271 (2003). To the extent that plaintiff is raising an
issue of law, our review is de novo. Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 578-579; 751 NW2d 493
(2008). “For superintending control to lie, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant has
1
We disagree with defendant’s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal.
Defendant’s argument is based on the incorrect premise that plaintiff filed a complaint for
superintending control in this Court, for which dismissal is required under MCR 3.302(D)(2).
However, plaintiff did not file a complaint for superintending control in this Court, but rather
timely filed a claim of appeal from the circuit court’s order dismissing its complaint for
superintending control filed in that Court. Thus, MCR 3.302(D)(2) is not applicable to this
appeal.
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failed to perform a clear legal duty and that plaintiff is otherwise without an adequate legal
remedy.” In re Credit Acceptance Corp, 273 Mich App 594, 599; 733 NW2d 65 (2007), aff’d
481 Mich 883 (2008).
Plaintiff argues that the circuit court appeal authorized by MCL 600.931 would not have
provided an adequate remedy at law because, under J & P Market, Inc v Liquor Control Comm,
199 Mich App 646; 502 NW2d 374 (1993), the circuit court would have been limited to
determining whether defendant’s decision was “authorized by law.” Plaintiff’s reliance on
Cahill v Fifteenth Dist Judge, 393 Mich 137; 224 NW2d 24 (1974), and Shaughnesy v Tax
Tribunal, 420 Mich 246; 362 NW2d 219 (1984), as examples of cases in which superintending
control was granted despite the availability of an appeal is misplaced. Neither of those cases
involved a claim that appellate relief would have been inadequate because the scope of review
would have been too limited.
Here, plaintiff attributes the alleged inadequacy of the relief available through a circuit
court appeal to the deference accorded to an agency’s decision and interpretation of its rules.
However, to the extent that plaintiff sought to show that defendant violated its rules, a circuit
court appeal could have provided adequate relief. See Semaan v Liquor Control Comm, 425
Mich 28, 37, 41; 387 NW2d 786 (1986) (a court may examine whether an agency violated its
rules to determine whether the agency’s decision was “authorized by law”). To the extent that
plaintiff sought judicial intervention to change a rule or craft a new rule, neither a circuit court
appeal nor a writ of superintending control could accomplish that goal. Thus, the circuit court
did not err in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint.
Plaintiff also argues that where superintending control is not available, the circuit court
had jurisdiction to consider his complaint as a delayed application for leave to appeal. After
plaintiff filed its claim of appeal in this matter, however, plaintiff filed a delayed application in
the circuit court for leave to appeal the commission’s decision, which the circuit court denied.
We therefore reject this claim of error. Defendant, being the prevailing party, may tax costs
pursuant to MCR 7.219.
We affirm.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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