PEOPLE OF MI V MARCO ANTONIO HERCULES-LOPEZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 30, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280887
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 06-000220-FC
MARCO ANTONIO HERCULES-LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 10 to
27 years for the robbery conviction and 9 to 27 years for the conspiracy conviction, to be served
consecutive to a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We reverse
and remand for a new trial.
As an initial matter, we disagree with defendant’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446, 459; 697 NW2d 494 (2005).
Defendant argues that he could not be convicted of conspiracy because the evidence
showed that he agreed to participate in the offense only to gather evidence to report codefendants
Martin Harris and Solivan Francisco Solivan to the police, which he did. We disagree.
Any person who conspires together with one or more persons to commit an offense
prohibited by law or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty of conspiracy. MCL
750.157a. Conspiracy requires proof of both the intent to combine with others and the intent to
accomplish the illegal objective. People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629; 628 NW2d 540 (2001).
This may be shown by evidence a defendant participates cooperatively to further the objective of
an existing conspiracy. People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 483-484; 505 NW2d 843 (1993).
Feigned agreement or participation is insufficient. People v Smyers, 398 Mich 635, 640; 248
NW2d 156 (1976); People v Barajas, 198 Mich App 551, 558-559; 499 NW2d 396 (1993).
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Thus, to establish defendant’s guilt of conspiracy, the prosecutor was required to prove
that defendant intended to agree with Solivan and/or Harris to commit the robbery, and intended
the robbery occur. It is undisputed that defendant was not working on behalf of the police or
with police authorization. Therefore, his agreement to participate in the robbery could not be
excused on this basis, and he could not claim feigned agreement or participation. Compare
Smyers, supra, and People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 311-312; 220 NW2d 465 (1974), overruled in
part on other grounds People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). Even if
defendant’s claim that he wanted to see Harris and Solivan punished for their involvement was
true, and that he participated in the robbery toward that end, the evidence showed that he agreed
to commit the robbery and intended for it to occur. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence of
defendant’s guilty intent to support his conspiracy conviction.
We agree with defendant, however, that reversal is required because the trial court gave a
supplemental jury instruction1 outside of defense counsel’s presence and without defendant’s
having waived his right to counsel’s presence. Because defendant did not object when the trial
court initially made a record of its communication with the jury, which was after the jury
returned its verdict, this issue is unpreserved. But an unpreserved constitutional error that is
structural in nature requires automatic reversal. People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 51; 610 NW2d
551 (2000).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches to criminal prosecutions when the
judicial process is initiated, and it extends to every “critical stage” of the proceeding. People v
Williams, 470 Mich 634, 641; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). The complete denial of counsel at a
critical stage of a criminal proceeding is structural error. Roe v Flores-Ortega, 528 US 470, 483;
120 S Ct 1029; 145 L Ed 2d 985 (2000); Duncan, supra at 51-52. A “critical stage” is “a step of
a criminal proceeding, such as an arraignment, that [holds] significant consequences for the
accused.” Bell v Cone, 535 US 685, 695-696; 122 S Ct 1843; 152 L Ed 2d 914 (2000). This
Court has also defined a “critical stage” requiring counsel as one in which “counsel's absence
might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.” People v Buckles, 155 Mich App 1, 6;
399 NW2d 421 (1986).
A trial court's communication with a deliberating jury may constitute a “critical stage” of
the proceedings depending on the nature of the communication. Compare French v Jones, 332
F3d 430 (CA 6, 2003) (the giving of a new, nonstandard supplemental instruction constitutes a
“critical stage”), and Hudson v Jones, 351 F3d 212 (CA 6, 2003) (the rereading of instructions
previously given to the jury is not a “critical stage”).2 Unlike in Hudson, the trial court here did
not simply reread an unchallenged original instruction, but rather crafted a new, nonstandard
supplemental instruction in response to the jury’s question, similar to the situation in French.
1
The jury asked, “Does [defendant’s] intent, goals, thoughts, change any verbal agreement that
he may have made to commit a crime?” Without consulting defense counsel and outside of
defense counsel’s presence, the trial court responded, “If the defendant actually agreed with
another to commit a crime, it does not matter why he agreed.”
2
While not binding, federal decisions can constitute persuasive authority. Walters v Nadell, 481
Mich 377, 390 n 32; 751 NW2d 431 (2008).
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Because the nature of the instruction was substantive, it involved a critical stage of the
proceedings. Therefore, prejudice is presumed and automatic reversal is required unless
defendant waived his right to have counsel present. The record does not indicate that defendant
did so. A silent record is insufficient to establish a valid waiver. People v Willing, 267 Mich
App 208, 220; 704 NW2d 472 (2005). Accordingly, we must reverse defendant’s convictions
and remand for a new trial. Duncan, supra at 51-52.
In light of our decision, it is unnecessary to address defendant’s remaining issues on
appeal.
We reverse and remand for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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