GREAT NORTHERN INS CO V DANG NGO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GREAT NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 25, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 285569
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-072575-NZ
DANG NGO, a/k/a DENNY NGO, a/k/a DAN
NGO, a/k/a DANG NHO, d/b/a U.S. NAILS,
L.L.C.,
Defendant,
and
FARM BUREAU GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MICHIGAN,
Garnishee Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Servitto and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this garnishment action, plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of garnishee defendant. We affirm. This appeal has been
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant Dang Ngo (“Ngo”) owned and operated a U.S. Nails store in Royal Oak. On
or around March 30, 2005, an employee of Ngo stole two diamond rings belonging to a customer
that were insured through plaintiff. Garnishee defendant insured Ngo under a business liability
policy (the “Policy”). Ngo’s employees were also insureds under the Policy. A jury convicted
the employee of two counts of larceny for the theft of the rings. Subsequently, plaintiff, as
subrogee of the customer, filed a complaint against Ngo for the theft of the rings, alleging that
Ngo was negligent for failing to take measures to ensure the rings were not stolen.
By way of consent judgment, Ngo admitted the allegations in the first amended
complaint. The consent judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $196,000,
plus interest. Pursuant to the consent judgment, Ngo assigned to plaintiff any rights he may have
under the Policy. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a writ of garnishment against garnishee defendant.
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Garnishee defendant moved for summary disposition to dismiss the writ of garnishment
on the grounds that there was no accident triggering coverage and, alternatively, the intentional
and criminal acts exclusions barred coverage due to the intentional and criminal acts of Ngo’s
employee. The trial court granted garnishee defendant’s motion and ruled there was no
“occurrence” or accident since the rings were stolen and, therefore, garnishee defendant was not
required to provide coverage under the Policy. The trial court entered a separate order
dismissing the writ of garnishment. Plaintiff now appeals as of right.
Plaintiff argues on appeal, as it did in the trial court, that the “occurrence” exclusion in
the Policy does not bar coverage because, when viewed from Ngo’s standpoint, an “accident”
occurred, thus triggering coverage. Specifically, according to plaintiff, Ngo did not intend the
employee’s act that caused the injury. This, in combination with Ngo’s separate negligence,
constituted an “occurrence.”
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition under the
de novo standard of review. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d
201 (1998). An issue involving the proper interpretation of an insurance contract is also
reviewed de novo. Allstate Ins Co v McCarn (After Remand), 471 Mich 283, 288; 683 NW2d
656 (2004).
An insured’s claims are lost if any exclusion in the insurance policy applies. Hayley v
Allstate Ins Co, 262 Mich App 571, 574; 686 NW2d 273 (2005). Hence, exclusionary clauses in
insurance policies shall be strictly construed in favor of the insured. Id. But a court must
enforce an insurance contract in accordance with its terms to avoid holding an insurance
company liable for a risk it did not assume. Henderson v State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, 460
Mich 348, 354; 596 NW2d 190 (1999). Therefore, when an exclusion in an insurance policy is
clear and specific, the exclusion must be enforced. Hayley, supra at 574. Further, when
reviewing an exclusionary clause, the court should read the contract as a whole to effectuate the
overall intent of the parties. Id. at 575.
Here, the Policy states in relevant part:
BODILY INJURY LIABILITY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
COVERAGE.
We will pay, on behalf of the insured, all sums which the Insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage caused
by an occurrence to which this insurance apples.
The term “occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions which results in bodily or property damage neither expected or intended from your
standpoint.”
Plaintiff maintains that whether an “accident” occurred should be viewed from Ngo’s
standpoint, not from that of the employee who stole the rings, because Ngo did not intend the
employee’s act that caused the injury. Plaintiff argues that Ngo’s negligence constitutes an
“occurrence.” In Michigan Basic Prop Ins Ass’n v Wasarovich, 214 Mich App 319; 542 NW2d
367 (1995), this Court rejected a similar argument. In Wasarovich, the Court examined
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insurance coverage issues regarding a bodily injury claim that arose from the intentional
discharge of a firearm. The underlying action arose from the death of an innocent third party
who was shot in the head by Mrs. Wasarovich’s ex-husband. The decedent’s estate sued Mrs.
Wasarovich for negligence allegedly arising from the crime.
At issue was the definition of “occurrence” which, similarly, required an “accident”
including “exposure to conditions” that results in injury or damages. Wasarovich, supra at 323324. The Court held that the trial court erroneously considered the question of whether there was
an “accident” from the standpoint of Mrs. Wasarovich, rather than from the standpoint of her exhusband, who was also an insured under the policy. Id. at 325-326. Relying on the Michigan
Supreme Court’s decision in Arco Industries Corp v American Motors Ins Co, 448 Mich 395,
531 NW2d 168 (1995), the Court stated, “In determining whether an accident occurred, we must
view the incident itself from the standpoint of the insured actor who caused the injury in
question.” Wasarovich, supra at 327. Because the shooting by Mrs. Wasarovich’s ex-husband
was clearly intentional and was not a “chance happening,” the Court concluded there was no
“accident.” Id. at 324. We agree with that holding.
Here, because the theft of the rings by Ngo’s employee, who was an insured under the
terms of the Policy, was clearly intentional and was not a “chance happening,” there was no
“accident.”1 Because the theft of the rings by an insured employee was not an accident as
required by the Policy, there is no coverage and summary disposition was property granted to
garnishee defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
1
Contrary to plaintiff’s suggestion, the form and language of the consent judgment, in which
Ngo conceded negligence in failing to warn or take precautions resulting in the loss of the rings,
does not trigger coverage in this case. A court must focus on the cause of the injury to ascertain
whether coverage exists. US Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Citizens Ins Co of America, 201 Mich
App 491, 493-494; 506 NW2d 527 (1993). Here, the employee’s theft of the rings was the direct
cause of the property loss.
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