PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFREY GUY RINGLE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 25, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283239
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-002377-FC
JEFFREY GUY RINGLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Whitbeck and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Jeffrey Ringle appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for first-degree
murder,1 felon in possession of a firearm,2 carrying a concealed weapon (CCW),3 and two counts
of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm).4 The trial court
sentenced Ringle as an habitual offender, third offense,5 to life imprisonment for his first-degree
murder conviction; 57 to 120 months’ imprisonment for his felon-in-possession conviction; 57 to
120 months’ imprisonment for his CCW conviction; and two years’ imprisonment for each
felony-firearm conviction.6 We affirm Ringle’s convictions, but remand for correction of
Ringle’s judgment of sentence as to the CCW conviction.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Chris Arnett was killed on May 18, 2002, in CD’s Party Store in Burlington, Michigan.
Arnett owned the store, which was located on the first floor of a two-story building. According
1
MCL 750.316(1)(a).
2
MCL 750.224f.
3
MCL 750.227.
4
MCL 750.227b.
5
MCL 769.11.
6
Ringle was also charged with and convicted of felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), armed
robbery, MCL 750.529, and two additional counts of felony firearm, MCL 750.227b; however,
those charges were vacated at sentencing.
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to Michigan State Trooper Reinhard Pope, an expert in the area of firearms, Arnett was killed
with a .357-caliber or .38-caliber handgun. According to Detective Guy Picketts, $203 was also
stolen from the store.
Della Harris, Ringle’s girlfriend, testified that she drove Ringle and her two sons to the
party store on the day of the murder. That morning, Harris saw Ringle near the gun safe in their
bedroom. Ringle then told her he wanted cigarettes and insisted on going to CD’s Party Store.
When they arrived at the store, Ringle went inside and returned shortly thereafter with a six-pack
of beer. According to Harris, Ringle appeared to be in a hurry, hysterical, and nervous. He told
Harris: “Let’s get the f--- out of here.” As Harris drove back to their home, Ringle repeatedly
said: “I f---ed up. I f---ed up. I f---ed up, Della, I f---ed up.” When Harris asked what he
meant, Ringle responded by telling her “to shut the f--- up.”
Once they reached their home, Ringle immediately went inside. When Harris entered the
home, she saw that Ringle was in their bedroom, locking the gun safe. When she asked him
what was wrong, he responded: “Just shut the f--- up.” Later that day, Ringle told her that “he
had gotten money from Chris [Arnett].” Eventually, Ringle also told her he shot Arnett.
However, Harris explained that she did not come forward because Ringle told her “he would kill
[her], he would kill [her] kids, and he would kill [her] family if [she] told anyone.”
According to Harris, Ringle had physically and verbally abused her and her children on
several occasions. She testified that “[t]here was more than one incident where [Ringle] would
pull guns out on [her]” and threaten to kill her.
Harris also testified regarding her and Ringle’s drug use. She stated that Ringle started
using crack cocaine in 1996, and then moved on to other “narcotic pills,” including OxyContin.
Harris began using OxyContin in 1999. They obtained prescriptions for OxyContin from their
physicians. In 2001, she and Ringle began to experience financial problems as a result of their
drug use.
Ringle’s friend, Dallas Blankenship, testified at the evidentiary hearing regarding an
incident involving Ringle that took place within one week prior to the murder. Ringle went to
Blankenship’s residence unannounced and entered the residence. Blankenship heard the door
open, and he soon saw Ringle holding Blankenship’s toolbox. When Blankenship confronted
him, Ringle began to cry and asked Blankenship for money and OxyContin. Ringle had a .357caliber or a .44-caliber handgun with him at that time. Indeed, Blankenship also indicated that
Ringle always carried a “Dirty Harry”7 type revolver, either a .357-caliber or .44-caliber
handgun.
Another of Ringle’s friends, Mitchell Messer, testified that he purchased OxyContin from
Ringle on four or five occasions. He also testified that, on another occasion, Ringle told him that
he had robbed the party store and “wasted a guy.” Ringle claimed he had robbed other small
7
Blankenship was apparently referring to Clint Eastwood’s “Dirty Harry” movie character, who
used a .44 Magnum.
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businesses and that he once used a .357 Magnum to beat someone. Ringle then suggested that he
and Messer rob several small businesses together.
II. Motion For Mistrial
A. Standard Of Review
Ringle argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for mistrial
based on a police witness’s alleged reference to Ringle’s post-Miranda8 silence. We review a
trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion.9 “[A]n abuse of discretion
standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there will be no single correct
outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled outcome.”10
B. Witness’s Unresponsive Answer
A trial court should only grant a mistrial when an irregularity occurs that prejudices the
rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial.11 The Michigan Supreme Court
has held that a defendant’s silence at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings is
not admissible for impeachment purposes.12 And police officers have a special obligation not to
venture into forbidden areas that may prejudice the defense.13 However, the constitutional
preclusion of evidence of the defendant’s silence does not extend to a brief and oblique
reference.14 Furthermore, an unresponsive, volunteered answer that injects improper evidence
into a trial is generally not a ground for a mistrial unless the prosecutor knew in advance that the
witness would give the unresponsive testimony or the prosecutor conspired with or encouraged
the witness to give that testimony.15
Here, the police witness testified at trial regarding Ringle’s statements to the police after
he was advised of his Miranda rights. The following colloquy then took place:
Q.
And is that the extent of your conversation with the defendant on that
date?
A.
Yeah, shortly after that he stated that—
8
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
9
People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 572; 628 NW2d 502 (2001).
10
People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
11
People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995).
12
People v Boyd, 470 Mich 363, 374-375; 682 NW2d 459 (2004).
13
People v Holly, 129 Mich App 405, 415-416; 341 NW2d 823 (1983).
14
See Dennis, supra at 576-581.
15
People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990); Haywood, supra at 228.
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Q.
Ah—
A.
Okay.
Q.
‘Cause he has the right not to talk to you?
A.
Yes, absolutely.
Q.
Okay. And that’s what happened?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Okay, but you understand that that’s his absolute right, he can—
A.
Absolutely.
This exchange suggests that the prosecutor was not inquiring into Ringle’s post-Miranda
silence, but was merely attempting to elicit a close-ended response from the police witness
regarding whether the interview with Ringle had concluded. While the prosecution made
general, clarifying comments that a defendant does not have to speak to police, there was no
testimony that Ringle invoked his right to silence in this case. Finally, because the trial court
instructed the jury that attorneys’ statements or questions are not evidence, and because juries are
generally presumed to have followed the instructions,16 there could be no error where such a
curative instruction prevented any prejudicial effect.
Ultimately, we conclude that the single question and somewhat unresponsive testimony
did not rise to the level of an inadvertent inquiry into Ringle’s post-Miranda silence. There was
no irregularity in the trial that prejudiced Ringle or impaired his ability to get a fair trial.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ringle’s motion for mistrial.
III. Admission Of Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Ringle claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court made several
erroneous admissions of improper bad-acts evidence. We review the admission of evidence for
an abuse of discretion.17 Error in the admission of bad acts evidence does not require reversal
unless it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome
determinative. The defendant bears the burden of establishing that, more probably than not, a
16
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
17
People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 99; 712 NW2d 703 (2006).
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miscarriage of justice occurred.18 We review de novo evidentiary issues that are based on
preliminary questions of law.19
B. MRE 404(b)
Although evidence of misconduct similar to that charged is logically relevant to show
that the charged act occurred,20 “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts of an individual is
[generally] inadmissible to prove a propensity to commit such acts”21 Thus, under MRE 404(b),
such evidence is only admissible for other purposes, “such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are
contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.”22 The list of
exceptions in MRE 404(b) is nonexclusive.23
Generally, bad acts evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b) if (1) it is offered for a
proper purpose, (2) it is relevant, and (3) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its
potential for unfair prejudice.24 Under MRE 404(b), a prosecutor must also provide reasonable
notice of his intent to present such evidence.25
Here, the prosecution properly filed a notice of intent to use evidence of Ringle’s other
crimes, wrongs, or acts. However, Ringle argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted allegedly improper character or propensity evidence that Ringle (1) was addicted to
OxyContin before and after the instant homicide; (2) entered Blankenship’s residence to rob him
while brandishing a weapon; (3) asked Messer if he wanted to rob convenience stores or gas
stations; (4) told Messer that he pistol-whipped another individual with a .357 Magnum; and (5)
physically and verbally abused Harris and her sons.
First, the prosecution presented evidence of Ringle’s drug use in connection with his
financial difficulties, and in the context of Ringle’s relationship with other witnesses. Evidence
that Ringle’s drug use was the cause of his financial difficulties was relevant to prove Ringle’s
motive to commit the robbery during which the murder took place. Furthermore, the evidence
was necessary to give the jury an intelligible presentation of the full context in which the
criminal activity took place.26 Therefore, evidence of and references to Ringle’s drug use were
18
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
19
People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003).
20
MRE 401.
21
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998) (emphasis added).
22
MRE 404(b)(1).
23
People v Engelman, 434 Mich 204, 212; 453 NW2d 656 (1990).
24
People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).
25
MRE 404(b)(2).
26
People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996).
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relevant and properly admitted under MRE 404(b) to demonstrate Ringle’s motive to commit the
charged offenses.
Second, Blankenship testified regarding the incident in which Ringle may have been
attempting to rob him. Contrary to Ringle’s characterization, Blankenship’s testimony does not
demonstrate that Ringle was attempting to rob Blankenship. There is a reasonable inference that
that may have occurred; however, the record also provided that, according to Blankenship,
Ringle had permission to enter Blankenship’s residence at any time; that Ringle set down the
toolbox after Blankenship confronted him; and that Ringle never threatened or assaulted
Blankenship. However, even if we interpret the testimony to demonstrate that Ringle was
attempting to rob Blankenship, the evidence would still be admissible. The evidence was
relevant and properly offered under MRE 404(b) to demonstrate both motive for the robbery and
identity with regard to the weapon Ringle was carrying.
Third, Messer testified regarding Ringle’s statements about robbing convenience stores
and gas stations. According to Messer, Ringle suggested they rob several small businesses
together. This evidence was relevant and properly admitted under MRE 404(b) as a statement of
Ringle’s general intent, or as evidence of a common plan or scheme to rob small businesses such
as the one in which the instant robbery and murder took place.
Fourth, Messer also testified regarding Ringle’s statement that he pistol-whipped another
individual with a .357 Magnum. This evidence, like Blankenship’s description of the weapon he
observed in Ringle’s possession, is relevant to establishing the murderer’s identity and is
therefore also admissible under MRE 404(b).
Finally, Harris’s testimony that Ringle verbally and physically abused her and her sons
corroborated her fear of Ringle, and explained why she did not disclose Ringle’s involvement in
the instant homicide to the police. The evidence was essential to the prosecution’s ability to
rebut a defense of fabrication and to Harris’s credibility as a witness. Therefore, Harris’s
testimony was relevant and offered for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b).
In conclusion, none of the challenged evidence was aimed at proving Ringle’s propensity
to commit the charged crimes, which is the prohibited purpose underlying MRE 404(b).27 The
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, as the record does not demonstrate that the jury gave this evidence undue or
preemptive weight, or that the evidence confused the jury.28 Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
27
People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 450; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
28
People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75-76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995).
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IV. Sentencing
A. Standard Of Review
Ringle argues that the trial court erroneously ordered his sentences for felony firearm to
run consecutively to his sentence for CCW.
This issue was not preserved, and we review unpreserved sentencing errors for plain error
affecting substantial rights.29 “[A] constitutional right may be forfeited by a party’s failure to
timely assert that right.”30 There are three requirements to avoid forfeiture: “1) error must have
occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial
rights.”31 Even if a defendant establishes these requirements, we may reverse “only when the
plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error
‘seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings’
independent of the defendant’s innocence’”32
B. Predicate Felony
A felony-firearm sentence may run consecutively only to its predicate felony.33 Under
MCL 750.227b, CCW is not a predicate felony for felony firearm.34 Therefore, a sentence for
felony firearm may not run consecutively to a sentence imposed for CCW.
Here, the trial court erroneously ordered Ringle’s felony-firearm sentences to run
consecutively to his CCW sentence. Therefore, we remand this case for the amendment of
Ringle’s sentence to reflect that the CCW sentence is concurrent with the felony-firearm
sentences.
We affirm Ringle’s convictions, but we remand for correction of the judgment of
sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
29
People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269, 276; 651 NW2d 798 (2002).
30
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
31
Id.
32
Id. (citation omitted).
33
People v Cortez, 206 Mich App 204, 207; 520 NW2d 693 (1994).
34
MCL 750.227b.
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