SHIRLEY B AKERS V BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SHIRLEY B. AKERS,
UNPUBLISHED
June 23, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BANKERS LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY
and SHANNON NELSON,
No. 283771
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 07-026056-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JOHN DOE,
Defendant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Whitbeck and M.J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Shirley Akers appeals as of right from orders granting the motions for summary
disposition of defendants Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Bankers Life) and Shannon
Nelson. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
In 1999, Margaret Zimmerman, who was employed by Bankers Life, sold Akers a longterm care insurance policy. Bankers Life terminated Zimmerman in April 2002 for unethical
activities related to her job. A Bankers Life representative informed Akers by letter that
Zimmerman “no longer represent[ed]” the company, but was not told that Zimmerman had been
terminated or the reasons for her termination. Bankers Life reassigned Akers’s policy to another
insurance agent, “John Doe.”
In May 2002, Zimmerman contacted Akers and advised her to buy a $50,000 annuity
from Standard Life Insurance of Indiana. Akers did so. She also followed Zimmerman’s advice
to obtain a “reverse mortgage” on her home and to withdraw funds from an IRA account.
Zimmerman then persuaded Akers to cash the annuity and invest its proceeds, as well as those
from the mortgage and the IRA, in an “Internet kiosk” investment opportunity, which was later
revealed as a Ponzi scheme. In January 2006, Zimmerman pleaded guilty to criminal fraud and
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was sentenced to serve 57 to 120 months in prison, and to pay restitution totaling $867,504.49,
with $224,967 to be paid to Akers. As of February 2008, Akers had received $77,834.24 in
restitution but was apparently unable to collect the remainder.
Akers filed this action against Bankers Life, Nelson, and John Doe on August 1, 2007,
alleging negligence, intentional misrepresentation and silent fraud, concert of action, civil
conspiracy, and violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA).1
II. Summary Disposition
A. Standard Of Review
Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a party may move for summary disposition on the ground that a
claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Neither party is required to file supportive material;
any documentation that is provided to the court, however, must be admissible evidence.2 The
plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true and construed in the
plaintiff’s favor, unless contradicted by documentation submitted by the movant.3 Under MCR
2.116(C)(8), a party may move for summary disposition on the ground that the opposing party
has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Under this motion, the legal basis of
the complaint is tested by the pleadings alone.4 All factual allegations are taken as true, and any
reasonable inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the facts are construed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.5 The motion should be denied unless the claim is so
clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development can possibly justify a right
to recover.6 We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition,
whether the cause of action is barred by a statute of limitations, and questions of statutory
interpretation.7
B. Statute Of Limitations
Akers claims that the trial court wrongly decided that her negligence claims were timebarred, asserting that defendants fraudulently concealed Zimmerman’s termination and the
reasons for her termination so as to postpone the running of the statute of limitations.
1
MCL 445.901 et seq.
2
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
3
MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden, supra at 119; Gortney v Norfolk & W R Co, 216 Mich App 535,
538-539; 549 NW2d 612 (1996).
4
Maiden, supra at 119.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Colbert v Conybeare Law Office, 239 Mich App 608, 613-614; 609 NW2d 208 (2000).
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We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary disposition on the tort claims
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations.8
We reject Akers’s claim that MCL 600.5855, which deals with fraudulent concealment, applied.
MCL 600.5855 provides:
If a person who is or may be liable for any claim fraudulently conceals the
existence of the claim or the identity of any person who is liable for the claim
from the knowledge of the person entitled to sue on the claim, the action may be
commenced at any time within 2 years after the person who is entitled to bring the
action discovers, or should have discovered, the existence of the claim or the
identity of the person who is liable for the claim, although the action would
otherwise be barred by the period of limitations.
Akers did not allege evidence sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment. In Prentis Family
Found, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Inst,9 the Court stated:
Generally, for fraudulent concealment to postpone the running of a limitations
period, the fraud must be manifested by an affirmative act or misrepresentation.
The plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in some arrangement or
contrivance of an affirmative character designed to prevent subsequent discovery.
Mere silence is insufficient.
Here, Akers admittedly did not contact Bankers Life to inquire about the reasons for
Zimmerman’s termination; thus, Akers relies on mere silence. Because silence is not enough to
show fraudulent concealment, Akers’s tort claims were not exempted from the applicable statute
of limitations.
Akers argues that, nonetheless, her intentional misrepresentation and silent fraud claims
should have survived summary disposition. However, there was no representation and thus, no
misrepresentation. Moreover, for silent fraud “mere nondisclosure of facts is insufficient.”10
Similarly, “a legal duty to make a disclosure will arise most commonly in a situation where
inquiries are made by the plaintiff, to which the defendant makes incomplete replies that are
truthful in themselves but omit material information.”11 But here, Akers made no inquiry at all.
Akers nevertheless argues that a duty arose by virtue of a “special relationship.” In an
analogous context, the Michigan Supreme Court held that such a duty arises when:
8
See MCL 600.5805(10).
9
Prentis Family Found., Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Inst, 266 Mich App 39, 48; 698
NW2d 900 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
10
Amco Builders & Developers, Inc v Team Ace Joint Venture, 469 Mich 90, 101; 666 NW2d
623 (2003).
11
Hord v Environmental Research Institute of Mich (After Remand), 463 Mich 399, 412-413;
617 NW2d 543 (2000).
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(1) [an insurance] agent misrepresents the nature or extent of the coverage offered
or provided (2) an ambiguous request is made that requires clarification, (3) an
inquiry is made that may require advice and the agent, though he need not, gives
advice that is inaccurate, or (4) the agent assumes an additional duty by either
express agreement with or promise to the insured.[12]
Here, there was no representation regarding the fact of termination or the reasons therefore and,
accordingly, no misrepresentation. There was no request for information, ambiguous or
otherwise, and no inquiry that led to inaccurate information. Moreover, there was no assumption
of duty. Thus, there was no basis for the finding of a special relationship. Accordingly, we
conclude that summary disposition on the intentional misrepresentation and fraud claims was
proper.
C. Michigan Consumer Protection Act
Akers argues that the trial court wrongly concluded that defendants were exempt from
liability under the MCPA. Akers alleges that because Bankers Life was “engaged in trade or
commerce in the State of Michigan,” it was liable under the MCPA for engaging in “[u]nfair,
unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce” by
failing to inform Akers of the reasons for Zimmerman’s termination. Because the MCPA
exempts any “transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a
regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States,”13
and the Insurance Code regulates the insurance industry, the trial court found that Bankers Life
and Nelson were exempt from the MCPA.
Akers claims that certain portions of the Insurance Code14 were intended to limit the
exemption in the MCPA. Specifically, she claims that the Legislature intended to limit the
exemption for regulated industries in MCL 445.904 with respect to the insurance industry based
on Chapter 20 of the Insurance Code. Neither statute supports this argument. As previously
stated, the MCPA prohibits “[u]nfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in
the conduct of trade or commerce.”15 However, § 4 of the act states clearly that the it does not
apply to “[a] transaction or conduct specifically authorized under laws administered by a
regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.”16
Akers acknowledges that Chapter 20 of the Insurance Code identifies a variety of prohibited
business practices. In addition, MCL 500.2002 provides that the purpose of the Act is to regulate
the insurance industry by defining “all such practices in this state which constitute unfair
methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and by prohibiting the trade
practices so defined.” Therefore, the Insurance Code’s statement of its purpose shows that it
12
Harts v Farmers Ins Exch, 461 Mich 1, 10-11; 597 NW2d 47 (1999).
13
MCL 445.904(1)(a).
14
MCL 500.2001 et seq.
15
MCL 445.903(1).
16
MCL 445.904(1)(a).
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governs the conduct within the insurance industry that the MCPA seeks to govern within nonregulated industries.
Akers argues that her claims against defendants do not stem from any transaction or
conduct regulated by the Insurance Code, and because the conduct is not regulated by the statute,
“it follows that the company may not be exempt from claims regarding that conduct.” However,
the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that in cases analyzing the MCPA exemption, “the
relevant inquiry is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of
whether the specific misconduct alleged is prohibited.”17 Applying this test here, the specific
transaction at issue—defendants’ letter to Akers notifying her that Zimmerman no longer worked
for the company—was a part of Bankers Life’s business as Akers’s insurance provider. Because
defendants’ conduct was “specifically authorized” by the Insurance Code, Akers’s claim that
defendants were not exempt under the MCPA lacks merit.
D. Failure To Address Identity Of John Doe
Akers argues that the trial court improperly closed the case before the identity of John
Doe could be determined. More specifically, Akers argues that the trial court’s failure to address
Akers’s claims with respect to John Doe must have been a “factual error” that should be
remedied on remand.
In its decision on Nelson’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court stated that it
would not discuss counts I and II of Akers’s amended complaint because they were “directed
against Defendants Bankers Life and John Doe . . . .” The trial court failed to expressly mention
“John Doe” in its decision on Bankers Life’s motion for summary disposition. Akers argues that
this was an oversight. However, Doe was in essentially in the same position to Akers as Nelson.
Moreover, as an agent of Bankers Life, any claim against “John Doe” was derivative of claims
against Bankers Life. As previously discussed, the limitations period had run on those claims.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
17
Liss v Lewiston-Richards, Inc, 478 Mich 203, 210; 732 NW2d 514 (2007) (internal quotations
omitted).
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