PEOPLE OF MI V SCOTT RICHARD HOLLOWAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 16, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286368
Livingston Circuit Court
LC Nos. 05-015374-FH
05-015440-FH
SCOTT RICHARD HOLLOWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Bandstra and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by delayed leave granted the sentences imposed on his plea-based
convictions. In Docket No. 05-015374-FH, defendant pleaded no contest to possession of
controlled substance analogues, MCL 333.7403(2)(b), and possession of marijuana, MCL
333.7403(2)(d). In Docket No. 05-015440-FH, defendant pleaded no contest to three counts of
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and one count of possession of a
narcotic/cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial
court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of two to ten years for the felon in
possession convictions, and to two to eight years for his narcotic possession conviction. Because
the trial court utilized appropriate information in its sentencing of defendant after revocation of
probation, we affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR
7.214(E).
Initially, the trial court sentenced defendant to three years’ probation, with the first year
in jail, for all the above offenses. During sentencing, defendant challenged a number of items in
the presentence investigation report (PSIR), including various statements in the report that
intimated that defendant might be involved in narcotics trafficking. The trial court ordered the
PSIR modified to indicate that defendant denied that he sold narcotics, but denied defendant’s
request to remove the information.
Subsequently, defendant was sentenced in an unrelated third drunk driving charge in
Clinton County. Apparently attached to the PSIR for that offense was the PSIR prepared for
defendant’s Livingston County offenses. The Clinton Circuit Court entered a stipulated order
directing the Department of Corrections (DOC) to change the PSIR to remove the challenged
information. The DOC was directed to “remove and discard all copies” of the original report and
not to use “any information” in the original PSIR “for any purpose.”
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Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to violating his probation in the instant cases by
using alcohol and cocaine. During resentencing on his initial convictions, defendant did not
challenge the guidelines scoring. Nor did he again challenge the statements in the PSIR, which
according to the copy furnished to this Court, apparently remained unchanged apart from the trial
court’s initial corrections. Instead, defendant challenged additional alleged inaccuracies in the
probation violation report concerning his activities following his conviction. The trial court held
that, “without any additional specifics” it would leave the supplemental report as written.
Defendant subsequently moved to correct his “invalid sentence” in part on the ground
that the Livingston County PSIR continued to contain the information that was stricken by the
Clinton County court. During a hearing, the trial court found that it would not allow defendant
to use the Clinton County ruling to collaterally attack its prior determination. After considering
defendant’s remaining issue, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for resentencing.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s decision to not follow the Clinton
Circuit court’s order and strike the language from the PSIR. He then argues that, because this
information should have been stricken, he is entitled to resentencing since the trial court relied on
inaccurate information in determining his sentence. See MCL 769.34(10).
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s response to a claim of inaccuracies in
a defendant's PSIR. People v Spanke, 254 Mich App 642, 648; 658 NW2d 504 (2003). We
review issues of law de novo. People v Grant, 470 Mich 477, 484-485; 684 NW2d 686 (2004).
Essentially, defendant appears to argue that something akin to the law of the case
doctrine should have prevented the trial court from refusing to redact the PSIR during
resentencing to comply with the actions taken by the Clinton County court in the unrelated
criminal case. However, defendant is mistaken. “The law of the case doctrine holds that a ruling
by an appellate court on a particular issue binds the appellate court and all lower tribunals with
respect to that issue. Thus, a question of law decided by an appellate court will not be decided
differently on remand or in a subsequent appeal in the same case.” Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245
Mich App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001) (citations omitted). Defendant has not presented anything
to suggest that the doctrine is applicable here.
Defendant’s reliance on MCR 2.613(B) is also misplaced. MCR 2.613(B) provides that
“[a] judgment or order may be set aside or vacated, and a proceeding under a judgment or order
may be stayed, only by the judge who entered the judgment or order, unless that judge is absent
or unable to act.” However, accepting for the sake of argument defendant’s questionable
contention that this court rule can be applicable in separate criminal transactions in differing
counties, see e.g., Huber v Frankenmuth Mut Ins Co, 160 Mich App 568, 572-574; 408 NW2d
505 (1987), defendant cannot show he is entitled to relief. Were this doctrine applicable to the
instant case, it should have instead precluded the Clinton Circuit judge from issuing the
stipulated order in the first place because it, in effect, set aside the trial court’s initial order to
leave the material in the PSIR. Nor is defendant’s resentencing after his probation violation a
collateral proceeding since it is a sentencing on the underlying criminal conviction. See MCL
771.4; People v Hendrick, 472 Mich 555, 562-563; 697 NW2d 511 (2005). Therefore, we
conclude that defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court was obliged to follow the
Clinton Circuit Court’s order deleting this information from the PSIR instead of its own earlier
decision to not redact this material.
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Furthermore, defendant does not discuss on appeal how the challenged information is
inaccurate. When a defendant is resentenced for a felony conviction, the sentencing court must
utilize a reasonably updated presentence report. People v Triplett, 407 Mich 510, 511, 515; 287
NW2d 165 (1980). This occurred in the instant case. Defendant was provided the ability to
revisit this issue during resentencing, but chose to not contest the accuracy of the statements in
the initial PSIR or present facts showing how those statements, or the statements in the probation
report, were inaccurate. Nor has he now done so. Under the circumstances, we conclude that
defendant has not shown that he is entitled to resentencing due to the trial court’s reliance on
inaccurate information.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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