JAMES DEE SHINN V KELLIE MARIE SHINN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES DEE SHINN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 11, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 288458
Allegan Circuit Court
LC No. 07-042550-DM
KELLIE MARIE SHINN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and Wilder and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals in propria persona as of right a divorce judgment that incorporated a
custody agreement between the parties concerning the custody of their minor child. We vacate
the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on December 27, 2007, and shortly thereafter
moved the trial court for an ex-parte order and filed a motion for temporary custody and support
of the parties’ minor child. On February 1, 2008, the trial court held a motion hearing to address
defendant’s objections. At the hearing, the trial court granted defendant temporary physical
custody of the child pending a March 4, 2008, evidentiary hearing; it declined plaintiff’s request
to conduct the evidentiary hearing that day. At the evidentiary hearing in March, defendant
offered testimonial evidence, but plaintiff specifically declined the trial court’s offer to present
evidence. After hearing the offered testimony, and considering plaintiff’s comments made at the
start of the hearing, the trial court granted temporary physical custody to defendant and granted
plaintiff supervised parenting time with no overnight visits. The trial court also ordered plaintiff
to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, and stated that plaintiff would not be granted overnight visits
or unsupervised parenting time pending the psychiatric evaluation. On October 7, 2008, the day
scheduled for trial, the parties reached a divorce settlement that included a custody agreement.
Pursuant to the agreement, defendant retained physical custody of the minor child, the parties
shared joint legal custody, and plaintiff was given unsupervised parenting time with overnight
visits. The trial court entered a divorce judgment incorporating the terms of the custody
agreement on the same day.
I
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court failed to act in the best interests of the minor
child. This issue was not properly preserved for our review because plaintiff did not raise any
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objection to the terms of the divorce judgment in the lower court. See Polkton Charter Twp v
Pellegrom, 265 Mich App 88, 95; 693 NW2d 170 (2005). In fact, plaintiff specifically agreed to
the terms. Nevertheless, “this Court may overlook preservation requirements if the failure to
consider the issue would result in manifest injustice . . . .” Smith v Foerster-Bolser Constr, Inc,
269 Mich App 424, 427; 711 NW2d 421 (2006). This issue involves the custody of a minor
child, and the court’s failure to consider whether the custody order was in the best interests of the
child may result in manifest injustice. We therefore will address the merits of this issue.
We review a trial court’s entry of a custody order for an abuse of discretion. Fletcher v
Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 879-881; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). “An abuse of discretion exists when
the trial court’s decision is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a
perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias.” Berger v Berger,
277 Mich App 700, 705; 747 NW2d 336 (2008).
Child custody disputes are governed by the Child Custody Act (CCA), MCL 722.21 et
seq. Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 191-192; 680 NW2d 835 (2004). A trial court has a duty
to “ensure that the resolution of any custody dispute is in the best interests of the child.” Id. at
192. Stipulated agreements regarding custody do not relieve the trial court of its affirmative duty
under the CCA, as “[t]he trial court cannot blindly accept the stipulation of the parents, but must
independently determine what is in the best interests of the child.” Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich
App 17, 21; 614 NW2d 183 (2000). Where parties agree to a custody arrangement, the trial
court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing so long as the court can “determine
independently what custodial placement is in the best interests of the children.” Harvey, supra at
187, 192-193.
In this case, nothing on the record suggests that the trial court satisfied itself regarding the
best interests of the minor child. The trial court did not reference the provisions of the custody
agreement or the child’s best interests before it entered the divorce judgment. At the March 4,
evidentiary hearing, the trial court did not make findings with respect to the statutory best
interest factors when it entered the temporary custody order, and there appears to be no
independent Friend of the Court (FOC) evaluation in this case where the best interest factors
were considered. In addition, nothing on the record suggests that plaintiff complied with the trial
court’s March 4, order to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, yet the trial court entered the divorce
judgment which provided plaintiff with unsupervised parenting time and overnight visits that
were not formerly permitted under the temporary order.1 The record does not reflect that the trial
court made an independent determination that these and other aspects of the custody agreement
were in the best interests of the minor child. Therefore, a remand for determination whether the
custody arrangement is in the minor child’s best interests is appropriate. Rivette v Rose-Molina,
278 Mich App 327, 330; 750 NW2d 603 (2008).
1
Parenting time was to occur at the home of plaintiff’s sister, Teresa Obst, but references to
supervision of plaintiff’s parenting time in the judgment of divorce were crossed out.
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II
Next, plaintiff alleges that the trial court “withheld proofs and evidences,” and he cites to
the February 1, 2008, motion hearing where the trial court declined to accept evidence or hold
the evidentiary hearing that day. However, plaintiff refused the court’s offer to introduce
evidence at the scheduled March 4, 2008, evidentiary hearing. He stated, “I’ll withhold all other
evidence until such temporary arrangements can be made with the Government to secure the
child.” “‘One who waives his rights . . . may not then seek appellate review of a claimed
deprivation of those rights . . . .’” People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000),
quoting United States v Griffin, 84 F3d 912, 924 (CA 7, 1996). In ruling, we note that plaintiff’s
argument that the trial court did not act on evidence of abuse and neglect has no merit where
such evidence was not presented.
III
Plaintiff raises several other issues on appeal including reference to emergency
jurisdiction and federal immunity, an assertion that defense counsel and both judges involved in
the lower court proceedings committed misconduct, an assertion that the City of Allegan is
involved in a conspiracy against him, and allegations that the trial court violated several of his
constitutional rights. Plaintiff provides cursory treatment of all of these issues; many of
plaintiff’s arguments are also incoherent and all are undeveloped. Further, he fails to provide
any supporting authority or citation to the lower court record to create a factual basis to
substantiate his claims. “A party may not leave it to this Court to search for a factual basis to
sustain or reject its position.” Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich
App 379, 424; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). And, where an issue is not discussed, explained or
rationalized, it is abandoned. See People v Anderson, 209 Mich App 527, 538; 531 NW2d 780
(1995). We therefore decline to review these issues.
Vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Alton T. Davis
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