PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INS CO V ROZAFA TRANSPORT INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 9, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283000
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-004495-NI
ROZAFA TRANSPORT, INC., and GJERGI
RROGOMI,
Defendants,
and
GWENDOLYN NEILL, Personal Representative of
the Estate of WILLIAM J. NEILL IV,
Intervening Defendant-Appellant.
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283395
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-004495-NI
ROZAFA TRANSPORT, INC., and GJERGI
RROGOMI,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
GWENDOLYN NEILL, Personal Representative of
the Estate of WILLIAM J. NEILL IV,
Intervening Defendant.
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Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Owens and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These consolidated appeals arise from plaintiff Progressive Michigan Insurance
Company’s action for declaratory relief concerning its duty to defend and indemnify its insured,
defendant Rozafa Transport, Inc. (“Rozafa Transport”), and Rozafa Transport’s employee,
Gjergi Rrogomi, in a separate wrongful death action brought by intervening defendant
Gwendolyn Neill, as Personal Representative of the Estate of William J. Neill IV, against Rozafa
Transport and Rrogomi in connection with the death of William Neill. The trial court granted
Progressive’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10),
concluding that an exclusion in Progressive’s commercial automobile insurance policy negated
its liability for coverage and, accordingly, it was not required to defend or indemnify Rozafa
Transport and Rrogomi in the underlying wrongful death action. Intervening defendant Neill
now appeals as of right in Docket No. 283000, and defendants Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi
appeal as of right in Docket No. 283395. We reverse and remand.
This action arises from an accident at a Ford Visteon Plant, which occurred when
William Neill, a journeyman millwright, and James Victor Borelli, a millwright apprentice, were
removing conveyor components from a truck owned by Rozafa Transport and driven by
Rrogomi. While the truck was being unloaded, a large piece of equipment (“piece D”) weighing
approximately 800 pounds fell from the truck and struck William Neill, causing his death. It is
undisputed that, before piece D fell, Rrogomi had removed the straps that secured the load and
had at least partially pushed back the truck’s retractable metal tarp, and that Borelli had used a
forklift vehicle to remove two other pieces of equipment. However, the circumstances that
caused piece D to fall from the truck were disputed. Both Borelli and Rrogomi denied any
involvement in causing piece D to fall. According to Borelli, his forklift was away from Rozafa
Transport’s truck when piece D fell off the truck. Borelli also claimed that his forklift never
touched any pallets except those that he had removed. Borelli believed that the metal tarp of
Rozafa Transport’s truck was pushed back immediately before piece D fell, thereby allowing
piece D to fall, but Rrogomi claimed that he had pushed it back earlier.
Intervening defendant Gwendolyn Neill, as the personal representative for William’s
estate, filed a wrongful death action against defendants Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi, alleging
that Rrogomi’s negligence during the unloading process proximately caused William’s death.
Progressive thereafter filed this declaratory action against Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi,
seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify them in Neill’s underlying
wrongful death action. Neill was permitted to intervene. The trial court subsequently granted
Progressive’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that Progressive was not liable for
coverage under its commercial automobile policy pursuant to an exclusion for “[b]odily injury . .
. resulting from or caused by the movement of property by a mechanical device, other than a
hand truck, not attached to an insured auto.”
The interpretation of an insurance contract is an issue of law, which we review de novo
on appeal. Tenneco, Inc v Amerisure Mut Ins Co, 281 Mich App 429, 444; 761 NW2d 846
(2008). We likewise review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Progressive moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10). A motion for
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summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(9) “tests the sufficiency of a defendant’s pleadings
and is properly granted when the party has failed to state a valid defense to a claim.” In re Mary
Griffin Revocable Grantor Trust, 281 Mich App 532, 536; 760 NW2d 318 (2008), lv pending.
“A defense is invalid for purposes of MCR 2.116(C)(9) when the party’s pleadings are so clearly
untenable as a matter of law that no factual development could possibly deny the opposing
party’s right to recovery.” Id.
A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support for a claim. In reviewing a motion under this subrule, the court must consider the
affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. MCR
2.116(G)(3)(b); Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999).
“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt
to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Allstate
Ins Co v Dep’t of Mgt & Budget, 259 Mich App 705, 709-710; 675 NW2d 857 (2003).
Although the trial court stated that it granted Progressive’s motion under both MCR
2.116(C)(9) and (10), it relied on the documentary evidence submitted by Progressive in granting
the motion. Because the trial court did not limit its consideration to the pleadings alone, and
because Progressive similarly did not allege that it was entitled to summary disposition on the
basis of the pleadings alone but rather relied on documentary evidence in support of its motion,
summary disposition was not appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(9). Thus, we consider whether
summary disposition was appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Defendants Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi, and intervening defendant Neill, initially
argue that William Neill’s death arose from an event that is within the scope of coverage under
Progressive’s automobile policy. An insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify is tied to the
availability of coverage. American Bumper & Mfg Co v Hartford Fire Ins Co, 452 Mich 440,
450; 550 NW2d 475 (1996). However, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify,
and an insurer must provide a defense “if the allegations of a third party against the policyholder
even arguably come within the policy coverage.” Id. at 450-451. “This is true even where the
claim may be groundless or frivolous.” Id. As explained in American Bumper & Mfg Co, supra
at 451-452:
“An insurer has a duty to defend, despite theories of liability asserted
against any insured which are not covered under the policy, if there are any
theories of recovery that fall within the policy. The duty to defend cannot be
limited by the precise language of the pleadings. The insurer has a duty to look
behind the third party’s allegations to analyze whether coverage is possible. In a
case of doubt as to whether or not the complaint against the insured alleges a
liability of the insurer under the policy, the doubt must be resolved in the
insured’s favor.” [Citations omitted, quoting Protective Nat’l Ins Co v City of
Woodhaven, 438 Mich 154, 159; 476 NW2d 374 (1991), quoting Detroit Edison
Co v Michigan Mut Ins Co, 102 Mich App 136, 142; 301 NW2d 832 (1980).]
In this case, it is undisputed that Progressive’s policy provides coverage for “bodily
injury . . . for which an insured becomes legally responsible because of an accident arising out of
the ownership, maintenance or use of an insured auto.” Neill’s wrongful death complaint alleged
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that William Neill’s death was caused by Rrogomi’s negligent conduct in operating and
unloading Rozafa Transport’s truck, which was an insured vehicle under Progressive’s policy.
In addition, although the circumstances surrounding the accident were disputed, the submitted
evidence showed that William Neill was killed when he was struck by a large piece of equipment
that fell from Rozafa Transport’s truck. These allegations and evidence were sufficient to show
that coverage under Progressive’s policy was possible on the basis that William Neill’s death
arose out of the use of an insured automobile.
Indeed, in granting Progressive’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court stated
that “Progressive does not dispute that the subject accident falls within the contractual language
providing for coverage[.]” Similarly, in its brief on appeal, Progressive asserts that
“[r]ealistically speaking, the loss that is described in this case fits within the general definitions
of a covered loss.” Progressive instead asserts that the question of its duty to defend and
indemnify is dependent on whether any of the exclusions contained in its policy apply. It was on
this basis that the trial court granted Progressive’s motion, agreeing with Progressive that its
liability for coverage was negated by an exclusion. But “determining the scope of coverage
under an insurance policy is a separate question from whether liability is negated by an
exclusion.” Tenneco, Inc, supra, 281 Mich App at 444. Thus, the resolution of this case does
not turn on the question of coverage, but rather on the applicability of the exclusions raised by
Progressive.
The trial court found that Progressive’s liability for coverage was negated by the
following exclusion in Progressive’s policy:
Coverage under this part I, including our duty to defend, does not apply to:
***
8. Bodily injury or property damage resulting from or caused by the
movement of property by a mechanical device, other than a hand truck, not
attached to an insured vehicle.
The trial court found that this exclusion was applicable, reasoning as follows:
According to the evidence submitted by Progressive, the accident occurred
when employee(s)/agent(s) of Ford attempted to remove the load by using a hi lo
truck that was capable of being driven, had adjustable forks, and was separate and
distinct from the vehicle that was driven by Rrogomi. . . . Rozafa and Rrogomi
have failed to submit any opposing evidence. Under these circumstances, the
Court is persuaded that the accident is excluded from coverage[.]
Thus, the trial court focused on whether the forklift was “a mechanical device, other than a hand
truck, not attached to an insured vehicle.” But even if the forklift qualifies as such a device, the
exclusion applies only if William Neill’s death resulted from or was caused by the movement of
property by the device. Progressive did not assert in its motion that the forklift moved or
touched piece D, only that, during the course of unloading, Borelli moved another piece of
equipment and then piece D fell. However, the submitted deposition testimony established a
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question of fact whether the forklift was linked to the movement of property, which thereby
caused piece D to fall and strike William Neill.
In particular, Borelli testified that he had previously removed piece B, and was in the
process of moving piece E on his forklift, after having already removed the piece from Rozafa
Transport’s truck, when the accident occurred. Moreover, Borelli testified that he did not strike
any of the other pieces of equipment before removing pieces B and E. According to Borelli,
after removing piece E, he cleared Rozafa Transport’s truck and had driven away from it,
preparing to unload piece E, when he stopped to allow another oncoming truck to pass. Borelli
claimed that one or two minutes had elapsed between the time he removed piece E from Rozafa
Transport’s truck and the time piece D fell off the truck. Borelli denied causing part D to fall off
Rozafa Transport’s truck and instead believed that the equipment fell after Rrogomi pulled back
the remaining portion of the truck’s tarp, thereby allowing piece D to fall off.
Viewed most favorably to defendants Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi, and intervening
defendant Neill, the evidence reveals a genuine issue of material fact whether William Neill’s
death resulted from or was caused by the movement of property by the forklift. Therefore, the
trial court erred in granting Progressive’s motion for summary disposition on the basis of
exclusion 8.1
Defendants Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi, and intervening defendant Neill, also argue
that exclusion 9 in Progressive’s policy is inapplicable to negate coverage. Although Progressive
alternatively argued below that exclusion 9 was also applicable, the trial court did not reach this
issue. Exclusion 9 provides:
Coverage under this part I, including our duty to defend, does not apply to:
***
9. Bodily injury or property damage resulting from or caused by the
handling of property:
a. before it is moved from the place where it is accepted by the insured for
movement into or onto your insured auto; or
b. after it has been moved from your insured auto to the place where it is
finally delivered by the insured.
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We disagree with Progressive’s argument that it was entitled to summary disposition because
defendants Rozafa Transport and Rrogomi, and intervening defendant Neill, failed to present any
independent evidence in opposition to its motion. Even though these defendants did not present
additional evidence, the issue is whether the evidence that was submitted established that there
was no genuine issue of material fact.
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Exclusion 9(a) is not applicable because William Neill’s death was not caused by or
result from the handling of the equipment before Rrogomi accepted it from the distributor, Steel
Master Transfer, Inc., for movement onto his truck. Exclusion 9(b) would be applicable only if
William Neill’s death was caused by or resulted from the handling of piece D after it had been
“moved from” Rozafa Transport’s truck. Because it is undisputed that piece D had not yet been
removed from Rozafa Transport’s truck, this exclusion also does not apply. Thus, Progressive
was not entitled to summary disposition on the basis of exclusion 9.
Reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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