DARRYL SCHINDLER V ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DARRYL SCHINDLER,
UNPUBLISHED
June 9, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
ASPLUNDH TREE EXPERT COMPANY and
LUMBERMENS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,
No. 279295
WCAC
LC No. 06-000084
Defendants-Appellants,
and
RELIANCE NATIONAL INDEMNITY
COMPANY and MICHIGAN PROPERTY &
CASUALTY,
Defendants.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Cavanagh and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This workers’ compensation case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court for
consideration as on leave granted, Schindler v Asplundh Tree Expert Co, 482 Mich 882; 752
NW2d 463 (2008). The Supreme Court directed this Court to consider “whether the Michigan
Bureau of Worker’s Compensation has jurisdiction over the controversy arising out of plaintiff’s
injury, MCL 418.845.” This Court is to address the remaining issues “only if it determines that
jurisdiction in Michigan is proper.” Id. We decide that Michigan has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims and we affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission
(WCAC).
I.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, a Michigan resident, was injured on October 12, 1999, while working for
defendant Asplundh in Wisconsin as a tree trimmer. Plaintiff had notched a tree to knock it
down, but instead of falling to one side, the trunk swung out and hit plaintiff’s groin, pinning him
to the ground. Plaintiff sustained multiple injuries to his back, a fractured knee, and a fractured
pelvis, along with nerve problems in his urethra and scrotum.
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Plaintiff had begun working for Asplundh in June of 1993, in Iron River, Michigan, as a
tree trimmer. His job included brushing under power lines, climbing trees, using a chainsaw,
using ropes to pull down cuttings, stacking wood, and running a chipper. He worked at the sides
of roads and in the woods, where the terrain could be rough. Plaintiff was assigned to Division
62, which encompasses Michigan’s Upper Peninsula and Wisconsin. He worked at various
locations, including Michigan (both the Upper and Lower Peninsulas), Wisconsin, and
California. He belonged to a union that covered both Michigan and Wisconsin.
After the accident, plaintiff remained hospitalized for over three weeks. He had a
fractured pelvis and a torn urethra. He also complained of injury to his right knee, left hip, and
needed a hernia repair. He has had at least six surgeries since the accident. Plaintiff had surgery
in June of 2000 to repair a urethral disruption, April of 2001 for an arterial reconstruction, and in
June of 2001 for his right knee. Also, plaintiff underwent instruction for intracavernosal
injection due to his difficulties with erectile function.
After the surgeries, plaintiff continued to complain of urinary incontinence, dribbling
after urination, and continued lack of sensation in the penile area. His doctors discussed possible
reinnervation surgery, which was designed to restore nerve control, but plaintiff was denied
coverage for that surgery.
Dr. Joseph Babiarz, M.D., plaintiff’s treating urologist, opined that plaintiff’s medical
condition was the result of the work injury. Dr. Babiarz stated that plaintiff’s urethral disruption
was permanent and plaintiff would be at risk for complications from the injury for the rest of his
life. Dr. Babiarz believed that all of the treatment that he had provided to plaintiff was
reasonable and necessary. He also believed that the reinnervation surgery would be reasonable
and necessary.
Physiatrist, Dr. Laurie Wolf, M.D., a physical medicine and rehab specialist, treated
plaintiff after the accident and through at least 2004. Dr. Wolf opined that plaintiff had sustained
the following injuries due to his work:
[Plaintiff] sustained massive soft tissue injuries to the perineum and hip
regions, with associated urethral disruption and associated erectile dysfunction,
right superior inferior pubic rami fractures, left posterior iliac wing fracture
extending into the joint. Worsening of the avascular necrosis for the femoral
head, significant retroperitoneal hemorrhage, urinary retention, secondary to the
urethral disruption requiring suprapubic catheter placement. Anemia requiring
transfusions, exacerbation of mechanical low back pain and associate sciatica and
bilateral meralgia paresthetica.
He had significant right knee trauma, including evulsion fracture about the
knee and ACL disruption, which was surgically amenable and exacerbation of his
inguinal hernia during his rehabilitation, which also requires surgical intervention.
In Dr. Wolf’s opinion, the injuries listed above were related to plaintiff’s work injury. Two and
one-half years after the tree incident, Dr. Wolf recommended a return to work with a permanent
50-pound lifting restriction and a restriction against frequently carrying more than 25 pounds.
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Defense expert Dr. Michael Borkowski, board-certified in occupational medicine,
disagreed with Dr. Wolf’s restrictions. He opined that plaintiff could return to work without
restriction.
Defendants’ expert Dr. Michael Small, a board-certified urologist, opined as follows
regarding the reinnervation surgery:
Q. Have all treatments for [plaintiff’s] urological/reproductive system rendered to
date been a direct result of the work injury?
A. All treatments for [plaintiff’s] urologic/reproductive system rendered to date
have been a direct result of his work injury.
Q. What, if any, further treatments, medications or surgeries do you feel are
necessary in regard to [plaintiff’s] work injury? Please specifically address
the potential microneurosurgery.
A. Further treatments, medications or surgery: He will need long-term Caverject
or Trimax or similar medications, so that the patient can have satisfactory
sexual relations. I did discuss the micro nerve surgery for reinnervation of the
perineum and penis to see if this will help with his sexual function. I left this
decision up to Dr. Terzis, the neurosurgeon, and the patient. I encouraged the
patient as well as Ms. Stanbrook [the case manager] to be sure that the patient
talks specifically to the neurosurgeon and see what she anticipates the success
rate for this surgery. It is my feeling that the sensation to the perineal area and
the penis may return; however, I’m not sure that the results are going to be as
high as Dr. Jordan stated – 75 percent.
I would think that because of the length of time and the scar tissue and
difficulty in finding these nerves, it may be much more difficult than
anticipated and the results may not be as good. I’m also not convinced that
this is going to improve plaintiff’s erectile dysfunction because of the extent
of damage that he has had to the proximal corpora on each side. Even though
the blood flow is improved, there is still a portion of his penile bodies which
are not functioning. As Dr. Jordan described, this is the reason why the
patient would not be able to undergo penile implant surgery.
Plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits under Wisconsin law. After those
benefits terminated, plaintiff sought benefits under Michigan law. Defendants objected, so
plaintiff filed the instant claim for benefits.
In an opinion mailed March 8, 2006, Magistrate Thomas G. Moher ruled that Michigan
had jurisdiction over plaintiff’s case because plaintiff was a Michigan resident who worked out
of Michigan:
Plaintiff in the instant case was hired by Defendant to work in the State of
Michigan. On the date of hire, Plaintiff was a resident of Alpha, Michigan and
continues to reside in that locale. The contract of hire was made in Michigan.
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The Asplundh Tree Expert Co. continues to be a nationwide company that does
business in the State of Michigan. The Plaintiff has worked at various locales
including Wisconsin for the Defendant. The Plaintiff has received certain benefits
pursuant to Wisconsin Workers’ Compensation Law. Plaintiff continued to work
for the Defendant until his injury on October 12, 1999.
Based on those facts, the magistrate concluded that Michigan had jurisdiction pursuant to MCL
418.845.
The magistrate rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff had not shown an injury
arising out of employment given his preexisting health problems. The magistrate opined that
plaintiff was a credible witness. The magistrate acknowledged that plaintiff had preexisting
degenerative conditions in his lower back and a hernia, but noted that the diagnostic tests did not
show a significant degenerative process. The magistrate then detailed testimony from plaintiff’s
treating physicians and observed:
I am persuaded that Dr. Babiarz and Dr. Wolf as the treating physicians
provide the appropriate opinions concerning causation and that they are in the best
position having seen, evaluated and treated the Plaintiff shortly after his acute
incident and having follow[ed] this gentleman for over a substantial period of
time are in the best position to diagnose his problems and complaints. I do not
disbelieve either the testimony of Dr. Small or Dr. Borkowski. Most of the
testimony of Dr. Small concurs with the testimony of Dr. Babiarz and most of the
testimony of Dr. Borkowski concurs with the testimony of Dr. Wolf. Both of
these defense doctors have made several observations that are valuable to this
process. I simply believe that Dr. Wolf’s opinion and the opinion of Dr. Babiarz
in regard to disability and future surgeries are more reasonable than that of Dr.
Small or Dr. Borkowski.
Thus, I find that the Plaintiff through his believable testimony and by the
testimony records of Drs. Babiarz and Wolf meets his burden of proof under the
Aquilina [v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206; 267 NW2d 923 (1978)] and
survives any possible Rakestraw [v General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc, 469
Mich 220; 666 NW2d 199 (2003)] analysis. Plaintiff has persuaded me that he
has met with a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment
on October 12, 1999 and that his present disability was caused by the injury of
that date. Clearly, the symptoms and changes that have occurred in his nerves at
that site and cause him problems up to the present time with urination and loss of
sensation in that area of body are attributable to the injuries that he suffered on
that date. Had he not suffered these injuries that Plaintiff would likely be working
normally today without necessity of any future medical treatment. It is difficult to
picture based on the medical that has been presented that the Plaintiff is capable
of returning to his former employment that he was performing with Asplundh
Tree Expert Co. where he was working out in the field and working up on trees
and working on pieces of equipment up in the air.
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The magistrate also ruled that plaintiff had suffered a disability under Sington v Chrysler
Corp, 467 Mich 144; 648 NW2d 624 (2002):
[I]n summary, I find that the Plaintiff has suffered severe extensive disabling
injuries to the various areas of his anatomy that have been noted by the different
physicians and that he has suffered severe nerve damage to these areas. I further
find that based on the medical testimony I find that Plaintiff has negotiated the
maze of Michigan Workers’ Compensation Law and is currently unable due to
this back, knee, pelvis and nerve problems in his urethra area and scrotal area to
perform the regular duties of his current employment or any other employment
that he has held or is qualified to hold based on his limited education, training and
experience.
The magistrate awarded plaintiff an open award of benefits. The magistrate also ruled
that plaintiff was entitled to payment for all his medical treatment, as well as further treatment
for his erectile dysfunction condition in the future.
Defendants appealed to the WCAC, which agreed with the magistrate regarding
jurisdiction in Michigan:
We agree with plaintiff that it is irrelevant which union local collected his
dues; the record reflects that he was employed at all relevant times by Asplundh,
performing duties in Michigan as well as Wisconsin and even California.
Plaintiff has established that his contract of hire was made with Asplundh in
Michigan, in 1993. There is no substantial evidence presented by defendants to
convince us that the initial contract was ever terminated. Nor is there any
evidence that a subsequent contract of hire was entered into in Wisconsin.
The fact that Wisconsin’s workers’ compensation system may also have
jurisdiction bears no consequence here. Our Act allows, and specifically provides
for a credit in the event of, receipt of benefits for work injuries under two or more
separate jurisdictions. MCL 418.846.
We affirm the magistrate’s conclusion that the Michigan Workers’
Compensation Agency had proper jurisdiction of this case.
Contrary to defendants’ arguments under Rakestraw v Gen Dynamics Land Sys, Inc, 469
Mich 220; 666 NW2d 199 (2003), the WCAC held that the magistrate was free to accept Dr.
Wolf’s testimony as most persuasive, and found reasonable the magistrate’s reliance on Dr.
Wolf’s opinions. The WCAC declined to reweigh the medical evidence and substitute
defendants’ interpretation of the medical evidence for that of the magistrate. Instead, the WCAC
noted that Dr. Wolf’s testimony established that plaintiff’s symptoms supported a finding that his
work-related injuries were medically distinguishable from his preexisting condition and were not
a result of the aging process.
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The WCAC also ruled that plaintiff had a disability under Sington:
Plaintiff testified that he could no longer perform the tree climbing that
was required in his job. He stated: “I was climbing trees every day for them. I
can’t do it no more. I’ve got a clunking in there. My leg goes numb on that side.”
This testimony in and of itself, without more, is sufficient to support the
magistrate’s finding of disability if plaintiff is found to be credible. Sanford v
Ryerson & Haynes, Inc, 396 Mich 630 [; 242 NW2d 393] (1976). The magistrate
made a specific finding that this plaintiff was credible. Dr. Babiarz testified that
plaintiff should avoid activities such as “. . . a lot of squatting, bending and also
anything that put him at risk for a straddle type of injury.” These are all necessary
part of climbing trees.
Thus, the WCAC found competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record to support
the magistrate’s findings.
The WCAC then addressed defendants’ argument that the magistrate should not have
ordered them to pay for future surgery regarding plaintiff’s erectile dysfunction. The WCAC
carefully examined the pertinent statutes and their history and concluded:
There is nothing in the language of section 315(1) that places an obligation
on the injured employee to obtain an order from the magistrate for medical
treatment as there was prior to 1965. If the Legislature intended such an
obligation, it would have so stated as it had prior to 1965. In fact, the statute
clearly places the obligation on the employer to establish why medical treatment
should not be paid for by the employer.
The WCAC went on to conclude that the record supported the magistrate’s finding that the
surgery was reasonable:
Dr. Small does not rule out the innervation surgery as unnecessary or
unreasonable. Even if the surgery was for the sole purpose of restoring plaintiff’s
ability to have an erection, this would not relieve defendants of their obligation
pursuant to section 315(1). Whether a medical treatment is necessary and
reasonable is a finding of fact for the magistrate to determine. Weakland v Toledo
Engineering Co, Inc, 467 Mich 344 [; 656 NW2d 175] (2003). Our function as an
appellate body is to perform a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of the
evidence to determine whether a magistrate’s fact finding is supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. . . . Based on
Dr. Small’s testimony cited above, we are convinced that the magistrate’s finding
that the innervation surgery is necessary to alleviate the effects of plaintiff’s
injury is supported by competent, material and substantial evidence. We affirm.
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Therefore, the employer is obligated to pay for all medical treatment for
the employee’s work related injures until such time as it can establish good cause
why it should be relieved of its obligation.
Defendants sought leave to appeal the WCAC order. This Court initially denied leave to
appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented (see Unpublished Order of the Court of Appeals
entered January 31, 2008, Docket No. 279295). Defendants appealed to our Supreme Court,
which remanded as on leave granted.1
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review under the Workers’ Compensation Disability Act (WDCA) is limited.
Rakestraw, supra at 224. In the absence of fraud, the appellate courts consider the WCAC’s
findings of fact conclusive if any competent evidence in the record exists in support. MCL
418.861a(14); id. Where substantial evidence on the whole record does not exist to support the
magistrate’s factual finding, the WCAC may substitute its own finding of fact for that of the
magistrate. Mudel v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 462 Mich 691, 698-699; 614 NW2d 607
(2000). In contrast, in the absence of fraud, this Court must treat findings of fact made by the
WCAC acting within its powers as conclusive. MCL 418.861a(14).
This Court, however, does not independently review whether substantial evidence
supports the magistrate’s findings of fact. Mudel, supra at 698-699. Rather, this Court's review
is complete once it is satisfied that the WCAC has understood and properly applied its own
standard of review. Id. Provided the WCAC did not misconstrue the substantial evidence
standard test and the record reflects evidence supporting the WCAC’s decision, this Court treats
the WCAC’s factual decisions as conclusive. Id. at 703.
Further, questions requiring statutory interpretation are questions of law that courts
review de novo. Brackett v Focus Hope, Inc, 482 Mich 269, 275; 753 NW2d 207 (2008).
III.
JURISDICTION IN MICHIGAN
Defendants argue that the magistrate and the WCAC erred in ruling that Michigan has
jurisdiction in this case. We cannot agree.
MCL 418.845 governs jurisdiction in worker’s compensation matters and provided at the
time of plaintiff’s injury:
The bureau shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of
injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this
state at the time of injury and the contract of hire was made in this state. Such
1
We presume that the Supreme Court’s order had the effect of vacating our prior orders so that
we are not bound by the law of the case doctrine.
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employee or his dependents shall be entitled to the compensation and other
benefits provided by this act.2
When this case was tried, the leading case on section 845 was Boyd v WG Wade Shows,
443 Mich 515; 505 NW2d 544 (1993), overruled by Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co, 478
Mich 28; 732 NW2d 56 (2007). Boyd held that if the contract of hire was entered into in
Michigan, even if the worker was not a resident of Michigan, the Michigan Workers’
Compensation Board of Magistrates would have jurisdiction to resolve controversies for any outof-state injuries arising from that employment. Our Supreme Court overruled Boyd and held that
for a workers’ compensation claim to come under the jurisdiction of this state, where the injury
itself occurs in another state, the injured employee must be a resident of Michigan at the time of
the injury and the contract of hire must have occurred in Michigan. Karaczewski, supra at 33.
The Court thus now interprets section 845 to mandate both requirements. Id.
The parties do not dispute that plaintiff was a Michigan resident when he was injured.
Thus, this issue turns on whether the contract of hire was entered into in Michigan. Asplundh
hired plaintiff in 1993 via a contract of hire in Michigan. Plaintiff experienced a number of
layoffs between 1993 and 1999, when he was injured, including an extended layoff from 1994
through 1997. Defendants contend that plaintiff signed a new contract of hire in 1997. The
WCAC, however, indicated that there was no evidence that a subsequent contract of hire was
entered into in Wisconsin. In the absence of fraud, the appellate courts consider the WCAC’s
findings of fact conclusive if any competent evidence in the record exists in support. MCL
418.861a(14). The record contains competent evidence – the 1993 contract and a union letter in
2004 reflecting that plaintiff was a member of the Michigan union -- that plaintiff’s contract of
hire arose in Michigan. This Court thus declines to disturb the WCAC’s finding on this issue.
Pursuant to Karaczewski, where plaintiff was a resident of Michigan at the time of the injury and
where the contract of hire occurred in Michigan, Michigan has jurisdiction over his worker’s
compensation claim.
IV.
PLAINTIFF’S WORK-RELATED INJURIES
Defendants next assert that plaintiff has not shown that his work-related injuries sustained
on October 12, 1999, were medically distinguishable from his preexisting injuries. We reject
defendants’ contention.
In Rakestraw, supra, our Supreme Court examined the issue of aggravation of the
symptoms of a nonwork-related condition, which is pertinent here because plaintiff had a
preexisting low back condition and a hernia. The Rakestraw Court held that a plaintiff must
produce evidence of the injury that is medically distinguishable from the preexisting nonworkrelated condition to establish a compensable personal injury. Rakestraw, supra at 234.
2
The statute has been amended, effective January 13, 2009, and now provides: “The worker's
compensation agency shall have jurisdiction over all controversies arising out of injuries suffered
outside this state if the injured employee is employed by an employer subject to this act and if
either the employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury or the contract of hire was
made in this state. The employee or his or her dependents shall be entitled to the compensation
and other benefits provided by this act.”
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The magistrate and the WCAC relied on testimony from Dr. Wolf, one of plaintiff’s
treating physicians, in ruling that plaintiff had produced evidence that his work-related injuries
were medically distinguishable from his preexisting back condition and hernia. Defendants
complain that Dr. Wolf was not asked about plaintiff’s injuries in relation to the proper causal
standard, but instead was asked regarding the possibility of a causal relationship. However, Dr.
Wolf’s testimony clearly established that she believed that plaintiff’s work injury caused all of
his current medical problems. Where the record contains competent evidence from the doctors
who treated plaintiff to support the magistrate’s finding that his employment-related injury was
medically distinguishable from his preexisting condition, this Court should not disturb that
conclusion.
Defendants next argue that the magistrate should not have permitted plaintiff’s counsel to
ask Dr. Babiarz questions regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform manual labor on redirect when
that topic was not explored on either direct examination or cross examination. This point is
largely immaterial where Dr. Wolf already established plaintiff’s restrictions. Nevertheless, a
trial court has the discretion to permit an open redirect examination, People v Stevens, 230 Mich
App 502, 507; 584 NW2d 369 (1998), and magistrates presumably would have that same
discretion. Further, a worker’s compensation magistrate is not strictly bound by the rules of
evidence. MCL 418.841(6). This point thus offers no relief to defendants.
V.
PLAINTIFF’S ONGOING DISABILITY
Defendants next contend that plaintiff has not demonstrated an ongoing disability under
Sington. This issue has no merit.
“[T]he plain language of MCL 418.301(4) indicates that a person suffers a disability if an
injury covered under the WDCA results in a reduction of that person’s maximum reasonable
wage earning ability in work suitable to that person’s qualifications and training.” Sington v
Chrysler Corp, 467 Mich 144, 155; 648 NW2d 624 (2002). Thus, an employee is not disabled if,
because of a work-related injury, he or she can no longer perform a job that pays the maximum
salary in light of his or her qualifications and training, but can perform an equally well-paying
job suitable to his or her qualifications and training. Id.
In determining whether a claimant is disabled, the magistrate and WCAC “should
consider whether the [work-related] injury has actually resulted in a loss of wage earning
capacity in work suitable to the employee’s training and qualifications in the ordinary job
market.” Id. at 158. In making this determination, the magistrate and WCAC consider
the particular work that an employee is both trained and qualified to perform,
whether there continues to be a substantial job market for such work, and the
wages typically earned for such employment in comparison to the employee’s
wage at the time of the work-related injury. If the employee is no longer able to
perform any of the jobs that pay the maximum wages, given the employee’s
training and qualifications, a disability has been established under § 301(4). [Id.
at 157.]
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Consequently, a finding of disability requires a determination of an employee’s
maximum, wage-earning capacity in all jobs suitable to an injured employee’s qualifications and
training. Id. at 159. Plaintiff is required to sustain his burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, MCL 418.851.
Plaintiff has established that universe of jobs for which he is qualified and trained is tree
trimming. Plaintiff has established his work-related impairments, including injuries to his pelvis,
back, knee, and urethra nerve. Those injuries do not permit him to perform jobs within his
qualifications and training and, as such, he has established that he has lost wages. Plaintiff also
has established that he could do some sedentary work, but has been unable to obtain a sedentary
job. According to Sington, if each question is answered by the fact-finder in the affirmative,
plaintiff has proven a threshold disability: he is no longer able to perform any of the jobs that
pay the maximum wages given his training and qualifications. Competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the whole record supports the magistrate’s and the WCAC’s conclusion
that plaintiff sustained a Sington disability.
Defendants argue that, where plaintiff never testified as to the amount of weight he was
required to lift or carry while tree trimming, the magistrate should not have concluded that
plaintiff’s restrictions precluded him from tree trimming. Defendants’ argument, however, is
nothing more than an invitation for this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate
and reach alternate findings of fact. This is particularly true where defendants admit that Dr.
Wolf placed weight-lifting restrictions on plaintiff; on appeal, defendants would like this Court
to make a finding of fact that plaintiff could perform work as a tree trimmer despite those
restrictions, a request we refuse.
That defendants would like this Court to reweigh facts in their favor is amply illustrated
by defendants’ reference to the surveillance tape submitted to the magistrate and the WCAC.
We consider, however, these comments from the magistrate regarding the videotape:
It also shows that he moves very cautiously when exiting his vehicle. The tape of
March 7, 2002 shows him carrying an aluminum stepladder and shoveling some
snow and it also shows that he got down from his truck very gingerly. The tape of
March 8, 2002 shows him limping by his truck and pushing a snow blower in the
truck. The tape of April 9, 2003 shows him picking up the mail and limping. The
tape of April 10, 2003 shows him walking gingerly. . . . [Magistrate Opinion, 5.]
We decline defendants’ invitation to review the magistrate’s factual findings and reach a
different conclusion.
VI.
FUTURE SURGERY
Defendants finally argue that they should not pay for plaintiff’s future surgery as plaintiff
has not shown that that surgery is reasonable or necessary. We disagree.
Whether a medical treatment is necessary and reasonable is a question of fact for the
magistrate. See Weakland v Toledo Engineering Co, Inc, 467 Mich 344, 351; 656 NW2d 175
(2003). This Court does not independently review whether the magistrate’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence. Mudel, supra at 698-699. Where the record reflects evidence
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supporting the WCAC’s decision, this Court treats the WCAC’s factual decisions as conclusive.
Id.
The WCAC relied on testimony from Dr. Small, who indicated that all of the treatments
so far rendered to plaintiff’s urologic/reproductive system were a direct result of his work injury.
Further, when Dr. Small was asked about future treatments that he thought would be necessary in
regard to plaintiff’s work injury, Dr. Small stated that he discussed micro nerve reinnervation
surgery with plaintiff. It is apparent that Dr. Small, defendants’ own expert witness, believed
that the surgery could be considered necessary as a result of plaintiff’s work injury.
Consequently, the record contains evidence supporting the WCAC’s decision that the
surgery is reasonable and necessary. That factual decision therefore is conclusive.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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