JOHN FLANAGAN V COMAU PICO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOHN FLANAGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 4, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 282983
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2003-047238-CZ
COMAU PICO, WISNE AUTOMATION
ENGINEERING, CO., JAMES HAAS and
GEORGE BILLS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this wrongful discharge case, plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants, Comau Pico and Wisne Automation Engineering, Co.
(“Wisne”).1 Because plaintiff’s claims were time-barred under the applicable statute of
limitations and defendants did not waive a defense based upon the statute of limitations, we
affirm.
Defendants terminated plaintiff’s employment in March 2001. He filed the wrongful
discharge action on February 4, 2003. Approximately, one month later, defendants filed an
answer including the general assertion that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendants subsequently moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Applying Michigan law, they claimed that plaintiff failed to prove he was a just cause employee.
In response, plaintiff similarly applied Michigan law to argue that the Wisne Shop Employee
Handbook was a contract for just cause employment and other practices and assurances also
created legitimate expectations of just cause employment. The trial court applied Michigan law
to grant summary disposition to defendants. It determined that plaintiff failed to overcome the
presumption of at-will employment.
1
Plaintiff made additional claims against Comau Pico, Wisne, James Haas and George Bills in
his complaint, but they were dismissed previously and are not relevant to this appeal.
-1-
Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order. This Court did not address plaintiff’s claim, but
rather, suggested that the handbook may be a collective bargaining agreement, which is “not
generally subject to ordinary contract principles grounded in state law.” Flanagan v Comau
Pico, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued September 1, 2005
(Docket No. 253078), slip op, p 2. It reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider
whether § 301(a)2 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 USC 185(a), preempted Michigan
law in this matter. Id. It also urged the trial court to consider whether § 301(a) was waived. Id.
On remand, defendants argued that preemption under § 301(a) is an affirmative defense,
which was waived by failing to raise it earlier in the litigation. Under defendant’s theory,
Michigan law applied. Plaintiff countered that § 301(a) could not be waived. Under plaintiff’s
theory, federal labor law applied. The trial court agreed with defendants and, again, dismissed
plaintiff’s claim under Michigan law because plaintiff failed to overcome the presumption of atwill employment.
On appeal, this Court reversed. Flanagan v Comau Pico, 274 Mich App 418, 431; 733
NW2d 430 (2007). It resolved that the handbook constituted a collective bargaining agreement
and Wisne was an “industry affecting commerce.” Id., p 425. Thus, this Court concluded that §
301(a) governed plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim. Id. Further, it held “that if a dispute is
governed by § 301, federal law preempts state law, and a party may not waive its application.”
Id., p 429. This Court also noted that the trial court had concurrent jurisdiction over the claim.
Id., p 431. Therefore, it remanded for the trial court to apply federal labor law. Id.
On remand, defendants filed a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(4) and (C)(7). They claimed that plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies and failed to file his complaint within the six-month statute of limitations applicable to
claims governed by § 301(a). See Del Costello v Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 US 151,
159; 103 S Ct 2281; 76 L Ed 2d 476 (1983); Romero v Paragon Steel Div, 129 Mich App 566;
341 NW2d 546 (1983). The trial court denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4). However, because plaintiff filed his complaint nearly 19 months
after he was discharged, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
In the instant appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it granted
defendants’ motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). Plaintiff alleges that defendants waived the
limitations defense. He maintains that defendants were aware that federal labor law governed his
wrongful discharge claim from the outset. However, he claims that they strategically delayed its
2
Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act .
. . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.
-2-
application by relying on Michigan law and arguing that § 301(a) could be waived. Plaintiff
notes that during the years since he filed his claim, he completed discovery and case evaluation,
prepared for trial, and responded to two motions for summary disposition and two appeals.
Thus, he claims that it is inequitable to dismiss based on a federal labor law affirmative defense
at this late date.
Plaintiff fails to cite Michigan authority regarding waiver to support his claim.
Therefore, it is abandoned on appeal. Flint City Council v Michigan, 253 Mich App 378, 393 n
2; 655 NW2d 604 (2002).3 However, even if we were to consider this claim, defendants’ initial
reliance on Michigan law and delayed assertion under federal labor law was not “an intentional
and voluntary relinquishment of a known right.” Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 384 n 14; 751
NW2d 431 (2008). Plaintiff filed this matter in state court, not once referencing federal law in
his complaint. The parties then proceeded as though state law was applicable and, in fact,
defendants filed their first motion for summary disposition citing only Michigan law.
Defendants aggressively maintained that Michigan, not federal law, governed this case until a
panel of this Court determined that §301(a) governed plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim and
held that a party may not waive application of § 301. Notably, it was then that plaintiff insisted
that federal law applied. Now that plaintiff has been determined to be correct in his assertion, he
nevertheless is dissatisfied with the actual application of federal law to the case at hand.
Initially, the application of federal labor law was unclear. Following this Court’s second
remand, ordering the application of federal labor law, defendants promptly argued that because
claims governed by § 301(a) are subject to a six-month statute of limitations period, plaintiff’s
wrongful discharge claim was time-barred. In light of both parties’ confusion as to the
application of federal law, there is no indication that defendants’ actions amounted to a voluntary
relinquishment of a known right. Because plaintiff failed to file his complaint within the sixmonth statute of limitations set forth in Del Costello, summary disposition was proper pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
3
Plaintiff’s reliance on authority from lower federal courts is not binding on this Court. Abela v
Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 603, 607; 677 NW2d 325 (2004).
-3-
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