IN RE KCS MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KCS, Minor.
JESSICA ARRON STRAUB, BRUCE STRAUB,
and AMANDA CHRISTINE RIZE,
UNPUBLISHED
June 2, 2009
Petitioners-Appellees,
v
No. 288824
Jackson Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 08-006507-AD
MATTHEW VINCENT HELMUTH,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent birth father, Matthew Vincent Helmuth (Vincent), appeals as of right from an
order that terminated his parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 710.37(1)(a) of the
Adoption Code. We affirm.
The birth mother, Amanda Christine Rize (Amanda), together with the adoptive parents,
Jessica and Bruce Straub, petitioned to identify the birth father and terminate his parental rights.
The record presented to the trial court in support of the petition contained a form approved by the
State Court Administrator’s Office (SCAO), dated April 25, 2008 (the PCA 316 form), in which
Vincent expressly disclaimed any interest in the child. The file also contained a June 12, 2008
“Family Medical History Form” in which Vincent stated that “[t]he decision to allow an adoption
was relatively easy because I know that me and the mother would not have been able to give the
child any kind of life and also I would never have been able to support the child fairly,” as well
as paperwork from the Michigan Central Adoption Registry, also dated June 12, 2008, in which
Vincent indicated that he did not give consent to have his name or address released to the child.
The child was born July 5, 2008. A hearing on the petition to terminate Vincent’s rights took
place on July 22, 2008. Although the trial court mistakenly stated that notice of the petition had
been served on Vincent, it had not been, and he did not appear. At the hearing, Amanda testified
that she was present when Vincent signed the PCA 316 form after reading it; that testimony was
corroborated by testimony from a social worker at Catholic Social Services where the document
had apparently been executed. Based on the file documents and this testimony, the trial court
granted the petition and terminated Vincent’s parental rights.
-1-
On August 12, 2008, Vincent filed a timely petition for rehearing pursuant to MCL
710.64(1) and MCR 3.806(B). Vincent filed the petition himself and indicated that “[a]fter much
soul searching I cannot live with giving my child up for adoption.” Vincent’s petition explained
that, at the time he made his “foolish decision” to give up his parental rights, “I had not talked
with my family about the matter” and that, “after informing my family of the situation we have
come to the conclusion that we will be able to take care of” the child.
Vincent later retained counsel and filed a brief in support of his petition. In the brief,
Vincent for the first time claimed that he agreed to give up rights to the child only because
Amanda coerced him into doing so by threatening to tell his Catholic family and his athletic
coaches that he had impregnated her. According to Vincent, when he signed the custody
statement at the Catholic Social Services offices, Amanda and a girlfriend were there, along with
at least one female CSS staff member, creating a coercive atmosphere. In addition, Vincent said
he had been taking Vicodin for a medical condition and was under the influence of the drug
when he signed the custody statement. Vincent also stated that, although he was a student at the
University of Michigan, he was there on an athletic scholarship and had extreme reading
comprehension difficulties. Vincent further claimed that he signed a “blank” PCA 316 form and
that someone else must have checked the box indicating his custody interest. Vincent also
claimed that he was told that it would be an “open adoption” and that he could still see the child.
Vincent argued that, because of these “irregularities,” the execution of the custody statement was
invalid.
The trial court denied Vincent’s petition for rehearing, concluding that Vincent had
merely experienced a change of heart. The judge did not accept any of Vincent’s arguments
regarding coercion, reading difficulties, or the like. We do not find that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying Vincent’s petition for rehearing, In re Koroly, 145 Mich App 79, 87; 377
NW2d 346 (1985), nor that this decision resulted from any clearly erroneous factual findings, In
re Cornet, 422 Mich 274, 277; 373 NW2d 536 (1985).
In this adoption proceeding, the trial court was authorized to grant a rehearing “only for
good cause.” MCR 3.806(B). Vincent first argues that “good cause” was shown because he
failed to receive notice of the termination hearing. We find that the trial court was correct in
concluding that Vincent, in executing the PCA 316 form,1 effectively waived notice of hearing.
Vincent’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL 710.37(1)(a), which clearly provides
that, if a putative father has been timely served with notice that a birth mother intends to release
a child for adoption or consent to an adoption, has been served with or waived his statutory right
to a hearing regarding a termination hearing, and has submitted a verified affirmation of his
paternity and a denial of his interest in custody of the child, the court may permanently terminate
the putative father’s rights without notice of a hearing. The PCA 316 form was apparently
developed by the SCAO to comply with that statute and an associated Court Rule, MCR 3.801.
It informed Vincent that Amanda intended to sign a release or consent to relinquishing her rights
to the child and specified that, by signing the form, Vincent acknowledged his paternity, denied
1
As discussed below, we do not conclude that the trial court erred in determining that Vincent’s
execution of the form was in any way invalid.
-2-
any interest in the custody of the child and gave up his right to notice of any hearing to terminate
his paternal rights. Accordingly, the trial court properly terminated Vincent’s rights without
providing him notice of the hearing and the failure to provide him notice does not constitute
“good cause” warranting any rehearing.
Most of Vincent’s remaining arguments focus on his claim that his signing of the PCA
316 form was not knowing or voluntary. We do not conclude that the trial court’s determination
of this question was clearly erroneous.
The trial court rejected this claim on the basis of the record and pleadings presented to it
in support of the rehearing request, as authorized by MCR 3.806(B). Contrary to Vincent’s
argument, that Rule does not require any evidentiary hearing on the petition for reconsideration.
We find it notable that Vincent’s original petition mentioned none of the grounds that his
attorney later claimed suggested that his execution of the PCA 316 form was invalid. Instead,
the petition constituted an honest admission on Vincent’s part that he had simply changed his
mind. He acknowledged that he had previously “[given] my child up for adoption” but after
“much soul searching” reached the conclusion that this had been a “foolish decision.” We also
note that, in addition to the PCA 316 form, Vincent filled out a Family Medial History Form and
a Michigan Central Adoption Registry form some months later. Both of these later forms
support the finding that the PCA 316 statement was voluntarily signed. The PCA 316 form and
the forms Vincent subsequently signed demonstrate that he had determined to, and, in fact, did
relinquish his rights to the child, not withstanding his later attempt to rescind that decision.
Reviewing the petition in light of Vincent’s earlier declarations showing no interest in the
child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that this change of heart was the
real reason that Vincent sought a rehearing. A change of heart is insufficient grounds to warrant
a rehearing. Koroly, supra at 87.
Vincent also argues that he was denied equal protection under the law because he was
treated differently than Amanda. However, this argument has already been rejected by this Court
in In re RFF, 242 Mich App 188, 210; 617 NW2d 745 (2000):
In short, mothers and fathers of children born out of wedlock are not
similarly situated. There are several differences between mother and fathers of
out of wedlock children, including the identity of the mother of the child born out
of wedlock is rarely in question and that “only a father can by voluntary unilateral
action make an illegitimate child legitimate.” Moreover, the mother of a child
born out of wedlock has made the decision to give birth to the child rather than
have an abortion and, as a result of that decision, has carried the child in her
womb for nine months. Accordingly, the gender-based classification created by
[section] 39 is substantially related to the achievement of the Adoption Code’s
legitimate objective. Appellant’s equal protection claim is without merit.
[Citations omitted.]
In sum, the record here demonstrates that Vincent and his family ultimately concluded
that he should father the child. We have no reason to doubt that, as he claimed in his petition for
rehearing, Vincent would be a good father. Nonetheless, while we sympathize with his situation,
we cannot overlook the concerns and interests of Amanda, the Straubs and, of course, the child.
-3-
The statutory scheme that we apply here was established to fairly accommodate the interests of
all involved interested parties, in a process that is orderly and predictable. That process cannot
be undermined simply because, as the trial court correctly determined was the case here, one of
the parents has a change of heart regarding a decision to terminate parental rights.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
