PEOPLE OF MI V PAUL FOUST RUSHLOW
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 28, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284569
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-218013-FH
PAUL FOUST RUSHLOW,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Hoekstra and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury convictions of two counts of identity theft,
MCL 445.65, for which he was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL
769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 3 to 20 years each. We affirm.
The victim’s personal information was utilized on June 30 and July 1, 2007, to make
credit purchases at Home Depot and Sears stores. A suspect was not identified until defendant
was arrested in connection with another offense at a Staples store and the July 1 Sears receipt
bearing the victim’s name was found in defendant’s possession. The jury viewed surveillance
videos corresponding to the two transactions and determined that defendant was the person who
committed the offenses.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding the incident
at the Staples store, which defendant maintains was inadmissible under MRE 404(b). Because
defendant did not challenge the admissibility of this evidence under MRE 404(b) at trial, this
issue is not preserved. People v Bauder, 269 Mich App 174, 177-178; 712 NW2d 506 (2005);
People v Metzler, 193 Mich App 541, 548; 484 NW2d 695 (1992). Accordingly, we review the
issue for plain error affecting the outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Houston, 261 Mich App 463, 466; 683 NW2d 192 (2004),
aff’d 473 Mich 399 (2005).
Under MRE 404(b)(1), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith. Thus, if the sole purpose
in offering the evidence is to show the defendant’s propensity for particular conduct based on his
character as inferred from other wrongful conduct, it is not admissible. People v Gimotty, 216
Mich App 254, 259; 549 NW2d 39 (1996). It is admissible, however, for other purposes, “such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act,
-1-
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” MRE 404(b)(1). However, not all
“other-acts” evidence is subject to MRE 404(b) analysis. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52,
64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Evidence of other acts may be
admissible under MRE 401 as substantive evidence without regard to MRE 404(b) if it does not
operate through an intermediate inference of character. Id.
In this case, the jury was not asked to infer from some particular characteristic of the
Staples incident that defendant was the person who committed the instant offenses. Rather, the
evidence was offered to explain how the July 1 receipt issued to the victim was discovered in
defendant’s possession, thereby connecting him to the charged offenses. It was that receipt and
the video evidence that was utilized to prove that defendant committed the offenses. The fact
that the evidence may not have been admissible for a proper purpose under MRE 404(b) is
irrelevant; “[e]vidence that is admissible for one purpose is not inadmissible because its use for a
different purpose is precluded.” People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 5; 532 NW2d 885 (1995).
Thus, there was no plain error in admitting this evidence. Further, there was no violation of the
trial court’s ruling that defendant’s arrest for identity theft in connection with the Staples incident
was not admissible.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Barker to offer his
opinion that defendant was the person depicted in the surveillance videos. Defendant preserved
this issue by objecting below, MRE 103(a)(1), and thus the issue is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Hine, 467 Mich 242, 250; 650 NW2d 659 (2002). An abuse of discretion
occurs when the court selects an outcome that is outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes. People v Orr, 275 Mich App 587, 588-589; 739 NW2d 385 (2007).
A lay witness may offer opinion testimony that is rationally based on the witness’s
perception and is helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony, or to the determination of a
fact in issue. MRE 701. Here, Barker’s opinion was based on his perception of the videographic
evidence and was helpful to a determination of a fact in issue (i.e., defendant’s identity as the
perpetrator). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony.
Defendant lastly argues that the trial court erred in scoring offense variable (OV) 9 of the
statutory guidelines. “A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points to
be scored, provided that evidence of record adequately supports a particular score.” People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002). A scoring decision “for which there
is any evidence in support will be upheld.” People v Elliott, 215 Mich App 259, 260; 544 NW2d
748 (1996). The interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines present questions of
law subject to de novo review on appeal. People v Cannon, 481 Mich 152, 156; 749 NW2d 257
(2008).
OV 9 takes into account the number of victims. MCL 777.39(1). It is to be scored at ten
points if at least four persons were placed in danger of property loss. MCL 777.39(1)(c). If
fewer than four persons were placed in danger of property loss, zero points are to be assessed.
MCL 777.39(1)(d). The instructions state that “each person who was placed in danger of
physical injury or loss of life or property” is counted as a victim. MCL 777.39(2)(a). Defendant
does not dispute that there were four victims in all: the identity theft victim, a credit card
company, and two retailers, but submits that there were only three victims for each offense: the
-2-
identity theft victim, the credit card company, and the retailer associated with each transaction.
Thus, he argues that OV 9 should be scored at zero points. We disagree.
OV 9 is to be scored “only with respect to the specific criminal transaction that gives rise
to the conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced.” People v Chesebro, 206 Mich
App 468, 471; 522 NW2d 677 (1994). Thus, when scoring OV 9, the court cannot count persons
unaffected by the transaction as victims, e.g., those who are victims of uncharged offenses.
People v Gullett, 277 Mich App 214, 217-218; 744 NW2d 200 (2007). Rather, “only people
placed in danger of injury or loss of life when the sentencing offense was committed (or, at the
most, during the same criminal transaction) should be considered.” People v Sargent, 481 Mich
346, 350; 750 NW2d 161 (2008). Because the criminal transaction at issue, the theft of the
victim’s identity for personal financial gain, resulted in losses to four victims, OV 9 was properly
scored at ten points.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.