PEOPLE OF ROSEVILLE V COURTESY TRANSFER INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF ROSEVILLE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 26, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282071
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 07-002885-AV
COURTESY TRANSFER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this dispute regarding towing and storage fees, defendant Courtesy Transfer, Inc.,
appeals by leave granted a circuit court ruling that plaintiff City of Roseville properly imposed
the fees. We reverse.
I. Facts and Proceedings
On March 16, 2007, a semi-tractor truck owned by defendant stalled on a service drive of
I-696 in Roseville. The driver could not restart the truck’s engine, and called defendant’s
dispatcher seeking a mechanic. Before the mechanic arrived, Roseville police officer Steven
Boucher noticed the stalled truck and stopped to direct traffic around it. Bruce George,
defendant’s mechanic, joined the scene and opined that the truck required towing. George called
defendant’s owner, David Miller, who made arrangements for the Boulevard and Trumbull
towing service to tow the truck to defendant’s premises. Meanwhile, a second Roseville police
officer arrived and observed several equipment violations related to the truck, including a flat
tire.
Officer Boucher decided that it would take too long for the Boulevard and Trumbull tow
truck to reach the scene, and called Van’s, the towing service ordinarily used by the Roseville
Police Department. When the Van’s truck arrived, the driver determined that it lacked the
capacity to tow a commercial vehicle. Van’s then dispatched a tow truck from Ruehle’s, another
towing company. According to the officers, as the driver of the Ruehle’s wrecker finished
hooking up defendant’s truck, the Boulevard and Trumbull tow truck arrived at the scene. At
Officer Boucher’s direction, the Ruehle’s wrecker towed defendant’s truck to Van’s lot, where
the City of Roseville impounded it. A motor carrier officer inspected the truck that evening and
issued four violations. Van’s released the truck several days later, and charged defendant $525
for the truck’s towing and storage.
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Defendant petitioned the district court seeking reimbursement of the towing and storage
fees charged by Ruehle’s. Defendant’s petition asserted that pursuant to MCL 257.252d(2), the
police and their designated towing companies were required to disconnect the truck when the
Boulevard and Trumbull wrecker arrived. The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing
and concluded that the Roseville police properly directed the towing on the basis of the
equipment violations and defendant’s failure to tender a reasonable service fee, as required by
MCL 257.252d(2). Defendant appealed this ruling to the circuit court, which also rejected
defendant’s arguments, explaining that “in the interest of safety, which is over-riding,” the police
properly ordered the disabled truck towed from the scene.
II. Analysis
The decisions of the district court and circuit court involve the application of statutory
provisions in the Michigan vehicle code, MCL 257.1 et seq. This Court reviews de novo legal
issues of statutory construction. In re Petition of Attorney Gen for Investigative Subpoenas, 274
Mich App 696, 698; 736 NW2d 594 (2007). When construing a statute, this Court must
ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s intent. People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645
NW2d 275 (2002). “The first step in that determination is to review the language of the statute
itself.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
We give the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, looking
outside the statute to ascertain the Legislature’s intent only if the statutory
language is ambiguous. Where the language is unambiguous, we presume that the
Legislature intended the meaning clearly expressed—no further judicial
construction is required or permitted, and the statute must be enforced as written.
[Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253 Mich App 1, 10; 654 NW2d
610 (2002), quoting Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d
219 (2002) (internal quotation omitted).]
This Court gives effect to every word, phrase, and clause in the statute. People v Hill,
269 Mich App 505, 515; 715 NW2d 301 (2006). We must avoid construing a statute in a manner
that renders statutory language nugatory or surplusage, and instead endeavor to “construe an act
as a whole to harmonize its provisions and carry out the purpose of the Legislature.” Id., quoting
Macomb Co Prosecutor v Murphy, 464 Mich 149, 159-160; 627 NW2d 247 (2001). A particular
word in one statutory section must be interpreted in conjunction with “every other section, so as
to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.” Grand Rapids v
Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182-183; 189 NW 221 (1922).
Under MCL 257.252d(1), a police agency may immediately remove a vehicle from a
public road, at the owner’s expense,
(a)
If the vehicle is in such a condition that the continued operation of
the vehicle upon the highway would constitute an immediate hazard to the public.
(b)
If the vehicle is parked or standing upon the highway in such a
manner as to create an immediate public hazard or an obstruction of traffic.
However, subsection 252d(2) qualifies the police agency’s towing powers as follows:
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If the owner or other person who is legally entitled to possess the vehicle
arrives at the location where a vehicle is located before the actual towing or
removal of the vehicle, the vehicle shall be disconnected from the tow truck, and
the owner or other person who is legally entitled to possess the vehicle may take
possession of the vehicle and remove it without interference upon the payment of
the reasonable service fee, for which a receipt shall be provided.
In MCL 257.252f, the Michigan vehicle code also sets forth a procedure that a vehicle
owner may employ to challenge police conduct under MCL 257.252d, and to recover the costs of
improper towing and storage. In relevant part, this section provides,
(1)
Upon the filing of a petition prescribed in section 252a, 252b, or
252d, signed by the owner of the vehicle which has been taken into custody, the
court shall do both of the following:
(a)
Schedule a hearing within 30 days for the purpose of determining
whether the police agency . . . acted properly.
***
(2)
At the hearing specified in subsection (1), the police agency . . .
shall have the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it has
complied with the requirements of this act in processing the abandoned vehicle or
vehicle removed under section 252d.
(3)
After the hearing, the court shall make a decision that includes 1 or
more of the following:
(a)
A finding that the police agency complied with the procedures
established for the processing of … a vehicle removed under section . . . 252d . . .
.
(b)
A finding that the police agency did not comply with the
procedures established for the processing of … a vehicle removed under section .
. . 252d. After making the finding, the court shall issue an order directing that the
vehicle immediately be released to the owner, and that the police agency is
responsible for the accrued towing and storage charges. . . . [Emphasis added.]1
The parties agree that Boulevard and Trumbull arrived “before the actual towing or
removal of the vehicle” owned by defendant had been accomplished by Ruehle’s. The plain
language of MCL 257.252d(2) contemplates that under these circumstances, “the owner or other
person who is legally entitled to possess the vehicle may take possession of the vehicle and
1
After the district court’s and circuit court’s rulings in this case, the Legislature amended MCL
257.252d and MCL 257.252f in several respects, none of which have any bearing on the issues
raised in this case. 2008 PA 539, effective January 13, 2009.
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remove it without interference . . . .” Although the last sentence of subsection 252d(2) envisions
that a truck owner must pay a “reasonable service fee,” the evidence in this case agrees that after
the Roseville police officers decided to impound the truck, they failed to offer defendant’s
employees the opportunity to pay a service fee. Because the record evidence undisputedly
establishes that defendant’s employees and its designated tow truck arrived at the scene before
“the actual towing or removal of the vehicle,” defendant was entitled to the vehicle’s possession
and should have been allowed to remove it “without interference.” And because the City of
Roseville’s officers failed to comply with the requirements of MCL 257.252d, its “police agency
is responsible for the accrued towing and storage charges.” MCL 257.252f(3)(b).
The City of Roseville has presented no authority supporting the proposition that its
officers could impound defendant’s truck for equipment violations without regard to the express
language of subsection 252d(2). Despite that practical considerations of public safety may have
mitigated against disconnecting the truck from the Ruehle’s wrecker and reconnecting it to the
Boulevard and Trumbull tow truck, the clear and unambiguous language of subsection 252d(2)
compels a conclusion that the Legislature intended this result. “If the wording or language of a
statute is unambiguous, the Legislature is deemed to have intended the meaning clearly
expressed, and we must enforce the statute as written.” Hill, supra at 515. When police
intervene because a vehicle poses an “immediate public hazard or an obstruction of traffic,”
subsection 252d(1)(b), the Legislature intended that the vehicle’s owner may select a towing
service, even if that decision requires disconnection of the vehicle from a tow truck chosen by
the police. The district court’s and the circuit court’s interpretations of § 252d rendered nugatory
the statutory language plainly requiring disconnection of the truck under the circumstances of
this case.
In summary, the Roseville police officers’ failure to adhere to the procedures prescribed
in subsection 252d(2) subjects the department to liability for the towing and storage charges
under MCL 257.252f(3)(b).
Reversed.
involved.
No costs are taxable pursuant to MCR 7.219, a public question being
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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