GLENN M HOWARTH V BARRON PRECISION INSTRUMENTS LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GARY WARD and CLAUDIA WARD,
UNPUBLISHED
May 26, 2009
Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellees-Cross-Appellants,
v
BARRON PRECISION INSTRUMENTS, LLC
and HASSAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
LCC,
No. 280461
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-077358-CH
Defendants/Counter-PlaintiffsAppellants-Cross-Appellees.
GLENN M. HOWARTH and ANNE M.
HOWARTH,
Plaintiffs-Appellees-CrossAppellants,
v
BARRON PRECISION INSTRUMENTS, LLC
and HASSAN PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
LCC,
No. 280462
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 03-077850-CH
Defendants-Appellants-CrossAppellees.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and O’Connell and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this property dispute, defendants Barron Precision Instruments, LLC and Hassan
Property Management, LLC appeal as of right from the trial court’s ruling on remand. Plaintiffs
Gary and Claudia Ward and Glenn and Anne Howarth cross-appeal from the same ruling. We
affirm in part and reverse in part and remand.
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I. Facts
This case involves rights of ownership and access to the land bordering on Warwick
Lake, a man-made lake in Grand Blanc Township, Genesee County. The lake is shown on the
Warwick Farms subdivision plat, although defendants contend that the lake and the surrounding
land was not included in the plat. The plat map contains a handwritten note that states that the
land lying between Lots 6-11 and Warwick Lake is “reserved for the private use of the
proprietors.” Plaintiffs are owners of lots that abut the reserved strip. Defendants are owners of
all land that was part of the original parcel, but which was not platted as part of the subdivision.
The parties have an ongoing dispute regarding their respective rights and interests in the reserved
strip.
In Ward v Barron Precision Instruments, unpublished decision per curium of the Court of
Appeals, issued January 19, 2006 (Docket No. 263616) this Court held that the trial court erred
by finding that defendants’ lot lines extended to the water’s edge and were riparian lots, because
the plat unambiguously showed otherwise. Then, this Court found that summary disposition was
inappropriate where the language on the reserved strip was ambiguous regarding plaintiffs’
independent interests in the reserved strip.
After remand, the trial court held that where the plat map stated, “reserved for the private
use of the proprietors,” the term “proprietors” was an “improper use of a term” and that it
actually referred to the individual lot owners and not to William and Edna Hovey, who were the
original owners of the property. It concluded that the Hoveys intended to dedicate an irrevocable
easement in the reserved strip to all the lot owners in the plat.
The trial court went on to find that defendants had been the ones responsible for paying
taxes on the land and the lake; therefore, the trial court granted defendants the right to make
reasonable rules for their use. Then, the trial court held that the lot owners did not have any
riparian rights in the lake and that the lot owners could use the lake for swimming, fishing, and
boating. It held that the easement was not solely an ingress/egress easement, but that the
reserved strip could be used for gaining access to the lake, for walking dogs, or for strolling. The
trial court concluded that all of the lot owners had access to the entire reserved strip, not just the
portions extending to the lake from their property lines.
II. Interpretation of Language on the Plat
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in concluding that the meaning of the note on
the Warwick Farms Plat, which reserves the strip of land adjoining Warwick Lake to the “private
use of the proprietors,” intended “proprietors” to mean the lot owners as opposed to defendants.
We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact in a bench trial for clear error, but
applies a de novo standard when reviewing the court’s conclusions of law. Chapdelaine v
Sochocki, 247 Mich App 167, 169; 635 NW2d 339 (2001). Under the “clearly erroneous”
standard of reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, this Court will find that the trial court
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erred, even when a finding is supported by some evidence if, based upon a review of the entire
record, this Court has the firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake. Walters v Snyder,
239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). The scope of a dedication presents a question of
law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Christiansen v Gerrish Twp, 239 Mich App 380, 384;
608 NW2d 83 (2000).
At the outset, we note that in its prior opinion, this Court stated, “[i]n this case, however,
the plat is ambiguous with regard to whether the language ‘“reserved for the private use of the
proprietors”‘ was intended as a dedication of a private easement.” Ward I, supra at 3. “The law
of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a particular issue binds the
appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to that issue.” Ashker ex rel Estate of Ashker
v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001). Under this doctrine, the “previous
decision of an appellate court should be followed, even if the decision was erroneous, in order to
‘”maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided.’” The Meyer and
Anna Prentis Family Foundation, Inc v Barbara Ann Karmanos Cancer Institute, 266 Mich App
39, 52; 698 NW2d 900 (2005), quoting Bennett v Bennett, 197 Mich App 497, 499-500; 496
NW2d 353 (1992). Therefore, we will analyze all of the issues based on the underlying
assumption that the language on the plat was indeed ambiguous.
Our Supreme Court provided that “[w]here the language of a legal instrument is plain and
unambiguous, it is to be enforced as written and no further inquiry is permitted.” Little v Kin,
468 Mich 699, 700; 64 NW2d 749 (2003). However, “[i]f the text of the easement is ambiguous,
extrinsic evidence may be considered by the trial court in order to determine the scope of the
easement.” Id. The intent of the plattors must be determined from the language they used and
the surrounding circumstances. Bang v Forman, 244 Mich 571, 576; 222 NW 96 (1928).
In Little v Hirschman, 469 Mich 553, 559-562; 677 NW2d 319 (2004), our Supreme
Court recognized that a dedication of land for private use in a recorded plat grants lot owners an
irrevocable easement or right to use the dedicated land. In Dobie v Morrison, 227 Mich App
536, 540; 575 NW2d 817 (1998), this Court stated that “[t]he intent of the plattors should be
determined with reference to the language used in connection with the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of the grant.” (emphasis added).
Edna Hovey testified that she and William Hovey intended for all lot owners to have
access to the lake. Owners of lots 1-5 could use Outlot A to get to the lake, and owners of lots 611 could get there through their frontage. She stated that lake access was a selling point for lots
6-11. Hovey’s testimony lends support to plaintiffs’ claim that the reserved strip was not
reserved exclusively for the Hoveys as proprietors, but was intended for use by subsequent
owners of lots in the plat. Jack Sweet also testified, as one of the original lot owners and as a
plattor, that it was his intent that all lot owners have an irrevocable right to use Warwick Lake.
Additionally, Bruce Pollock, the licensed real estate broker, subdivision developer, and
friend of Willam Hovey testified that William Hovey intended that Warwick Lake remain a
private lake for private use of the lot owners. He also stated that the reservation note was
included to avoid the current understanding in Michigan law that a plat dedication adjoining
navigable water gave the public access to the water. Richard Kraft, the surveyor and engineer of
Warwick Farms Subdivision, and the author of the note on the plat, testified that William Hovey
intended that Lot Owners 6-11 would have direct access to Warwick Lake. He also stated that
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the term “proprietors” as used in the note he drafted meant all present and future owners of lots
6-11. He noted that the term “proprietors” was used because, at the time the language was
drafted, the proprietors and the lot owners were one and the same. We conclude that contrary to
defendants’ argument, the trial court’s decision was supported by the evidence.
In addition, as detailed in this Court’s first opinion in this case, a review of the plat
supports the trial court’s interpretation of the language in the plat. First, if the reserved strip
were not intended as an easement, then Outlot A, which the parties stipulated was a private
easement for the use of all lot owners within Warwick Farms, would not extend to Warwick
Lake and would dead-end at the reserved strip. Second, the fact that the reserved strip is
depicted on the plat suggests that it was platted as subdivision property; otherwise there would
have been no need to include it on the map. Third, the note on the reserved strip states that it is
reserved for the proprietors’ “private use,” which suggests that the “proprietors” would hold less
than full ownership rights in the reserved strip. And fourth, the Hoveys did not need to reserve
the strip to themselves because they already owned the property.
Defendants next assert that the original plattors did not intend to include the strip as part
of the platted land because they argue that the reserved strip is not included in the legal
description and therefore, cannot be a statutory dedication and violates the statute of frauds.
However, the 1929 Plat Act, which was in effect at the time the plat was drawn up, requires the
use of a traverse line, rather than the waterline, in the legal description. Specifically, it states,
“This intermediate traverse should be given in the written description and notation made that the
plat includes all land to the water’s edge or otherwise.” MCL 560.5. Thus, the written legal
description did include the reserved strip by including the traverse line. Further, the note on the
plat addresses whether the “plat includes all land to the water’s edge or otherwise.” Because the
reserved strip was included in writing in the legal description of the property and was a part of
the platted property, the statue of frauds was satisfied.
III. Admission of Evidence
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in refusing to admit a letter written by
Jack Sweet in 1978. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. However, any error in the admission or exclusion of evidence will not warrant
appellate relief unless refusal to take this action appears inconsistent with substantial justice or
affects a substantial right of the opposing party. Craig v Oakwood Hosp, 471 Mich 67, 76; 684
NW2d 296 (2004).
The letter defendants sought to admit was from Sweet to Milford Barron and was
apparently an attempt to resolve an issue that one of the lot owners was having regarding lake
access. The letter contained several suggestions for the resolution of the issue that included
various arrangements for the sharing of costs and establishment of rules of use for the lake and
the easement. The trial court ruled that the letter was inadmissible because it pertained to
Sweet’s ideas on how to resolve a “situation” and did not pertain to the relevant inquiry: the
original intent of the grantors. MRE 402 provides:
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All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these
rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.
As a matter of law, testimony or other evidence too far removed in time from the event at issue is
irrelevant. McDonald v Stroh Brewery Co, 191 Mich App 601, 606-607; 478 NW2d 669 (1991).
Here, the trial court’s inquiry was confined to the intent of the original plattors in 1963. As
plaintiffs argue, the 1978 letter relates to circumstances that did not exist in 1963. Defendants
assert that the letter is relevant to Sweet’s intent in 1963 because it was written a mere 13 years
after the note was written, as opposed to his deposition testimony which was taken 40 years later.
Our review of the letter indicates that it is merely a compilation of ideas about how to potentially
resolve a problem with lake access. It does not definitively state any information about Sweet’s
intent in 1963, nor does it clarify the legal rights of the lot owners at the time the letter was
drafted. The letter is merely another indication that the rights of the lot owners were legally
ambiguous. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the letter
into evidence.
IV. Statutory Dedication
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in finding an easement because there was
never a legal statutory dedication of the property. We disagree.
Defendants argue that without a writing granting an express easement, or an effective
statutory dedication, plaintiffs cannot establish anything more than a license. Defendants cite
Hirschman, supra and Martin v Beldean, 469 Mich 541, 549; 677 NW2d 312 (2004) in support
of their argument. Both Hirschman and Martin dealt with the issue of whether a dedication to lot
owners alone, without making the public a party to the dedication, constituted an enforceable
statutory dedication. The Hirschman Court extensively analyzed a long line of private
dedication cases before arriving at its conclusion:
For all these reasons, we hold that dedications of land for private use in plats
before 1967 PA 288 took effect convey at least an irrevocable easement in the
dedicated land. [Id. at 560-564].
The present case differs factually from Hirschman and Martin in that both of those cases
involved unambiguous dedication language and therefore, extrinsic evidence about the intent of
the dedicators in those cases was inadmissible as a matter of law. However, after resolving the
initial ambiguity of the note on the plat, the holding of Hirschman supports the trial court’s
conclusion that plaintiffs hold an irrevocable easement in the reserved strip. Having found the
private dedication of an irrevocable easement, the trial court properly disregarded defendants’
argument that plaintiffs have only a revocable license interest in use of the reserved strip and
Warwick Lake.
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Regarding defendants’ claim that plaintiffs failed to establish the elements necessary to
prove statutory dedication, the cases relied upon by defendants are not on point. The elements
cited by defendants1 apply to dedications to public use, not private use. As the Martin Court
noted, there is no provision in the Land Division Act for acceptance by donees of a private
dedication which mirrors the provision for acceptance of a public dedication. Martin, supra at
549 n 19. Furthermore, defendants again confuse public and private dedications when they
assert that the 1929 Plat Act requires that the plat contain a “dedication clause which must
mention the Reserved Strip for the dedication to be legal.” Defendants quote sections 12 and 13
of the 1929 Plat Act in their brief on appeal and they contend that the plat is deficient in that it
fails to reference the following: “(4) the character and extent of the dedication of any street, park
or other public place which although usually public, is not.” Here, the reserved strip is a private
lake access, it is not a “public place which although usually public is not.”
V. Plaintiffs’ Prior Knowledge
Next defendants argue that plaintiffs never had reasonable belief that they had more than
a license to access the lake. We find this argument to be irrelevant.
Whether or not plaintiffs relied on the note on the plat has absolutely no bearing on this
matter. This Court instructed the trial court to determine whether plaintiffs possess an
independent interest in the reserved strip and, if so, the nature of that interest. As previously
discussed, in light of the ambiguous language of the note, the inquiry relevant to that issue is the
intent of the original plattors.
Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ remedy is not against defendants, but rather against
the individuals who sold plaintiffs their houses. These remedies are not mutually exclusive.
Plaintiffs could pursue both causes of action; however, logically, plaintiffs would seek to clarify
the nature of their interest in the property before embarking on a lawsuit against the sellers.
VI. Reasonable Use and Maintenance of the Reserved Strip
On cross-appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s ruling that makes defendants solely
responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the reserved strip is contrary to Michigan law.
We agree.
Where equity is involved, this Court’s standard of review is de novo, and we will not
reverse unless the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous or this Court concludes that it
would have reached a different result had it occupied the trial court’s position. Schmude Oil v
Omar Operating Co, 184 Mich App 574, 582; 458 NW2d 659 (1990).
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1) A recorded plat that designates the area for public use and which evidences a clear intent to
dedicate the land; and 2) acceptance by the public authorities. Beulah Hoagland Trust v Emmet
County Road Comm’n, 236 Mich App 546, 554; 600 NW2d 698 (1999).
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The trial court ruled that defendants alone were responsible for the upkeep and
maintenance of the reserved strip and that “in fairness, [defendants] ought to be able to set the
rules for the use of the lake and the land, as long as their rules are reasonable . . .” A court acting
in equity “looks at the whole situation and grants or withholds relief as good conscience
dictates.” Michigan Nat’l Bank & Trust Co v Morren, 194 Mich App 407, 410; 487 NW2d 784
(1992). A trial court has jurisdiction to ensure that both parties can use an easement without
impediment. WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy (On Remand), 254 Mich App 6, 9; 656 NW2d
881 (2002). “The owner of the fee subject to an easement may rightfully use the land for any
purpose not inconsistent with the easement owner’s rights.” Morrow v Boldt, 203 Mich App 324,
329; 512 NW2d 83 (1994). “However, it is the owner of the easement, rather than the owner of
the servient estate, who has the duty to maintain the easement in a safe condition so as to prevent
injuries to third parties.” Id. at 329-330 (emphasis added).
We conclude that the trial court erred when it gave defendants exclusive rights to
maintain the easement. It appears that plaintiffs and the other subdivision lot owners have a duty
to maintain the easement under Michigan law. Furthermore, the grant of an easement includes
“such rights as are incident or necessary to the enjoyment of such right or passage.” Lakeside
Associates v Toski Sands, 131 Mich App 292, 299-300; 346 NW2d 92 (1983). The
reasonableness of the means used to maintain or use an easement is a question of fact to be
determined by the trial court or jury. Id. at 300. Therefore, the reasonableness of use and
maintenance of the reserved strip is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court.
Where an easement does not specifically denote its acceptable uses, then the surrounding
circumstances may be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties. In determining the scope
of permissible use by non-riparian owners Dobie, supra, provides this Court with guidance. In
Dobie, supra, this Court stated that the intent of the plattors should be determined by referencing
the language used in the instrument in conjunction with the facts and circumstances existing at
the time of the grant. The Court went on to endorse the idea that the extent of the non-riparian
owners’ dedicated use also may be determined according to the traditional and historical use of
the easement area. Dobie, supra at 540-541.
Here, the parties provided the trial court with evidence about the historical and traditional
uses and maintenance of the easement. This Court’s language in Dobie indicates that the trial
court may use this information to determine the scope of the subdivision lot owners’ use and
maintenance of the easement.
It is not the role of this Court to create rules in this situation. Therefore, we remand this
issue to the trial court with the specific instruction that the subdivision lot owners must be
allowed to reasonably use and maintain the reserved strip. We leave the scope of that use and
maintenance to the trial court. We remind the trial court that the reasonableness of the rules
should be determined in light of the testimony about the intent of the original plattors as to how
the reserved strip was to be used and maintained as well as testimony about the historical and
traditional uses and maintenance of the property. Finally, we note that he who seeks equity must
do equity as a reminder to the parties that although the trial court has some legal guidance in this
matter, where the law is silent, the trial court is proceeding in equity. All parties should be
mindful that their behavior regarding the reasonable use and maintenance of the reserved strip is
relevant to the trial court’s ultimate resolution of this matter.
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Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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