IN RE VANESSA AELISSA FIELDS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRITTANY MARIE MESTER,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 21, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 288230
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-722593-NA
ROGER WILLIAM MESTER II,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of VANESSA AELISSA FIELDS,
Minor.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 288231
Oakland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 06-722594-NA
ROGER WILLIAM MESTER II,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Owens and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s orders terminating his parental rights
to the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii) (g), (j), and (l). We affirm.
I. Facts
In June 2006, protective services took respondent’s four-year-old daughter Brittany into
care after Brittany alleged that respondent, with whom she was living, had sexually abused her.
Respondent’s other daughter, three-year-old Vanessa, was living with her mother, and was
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previously observed acting out sexually during a period of time when she and her mother lived
with respondent. Defendant’s parental rights to an older daughter were terminated in 2000 in
California after allegations of sexual abuse.
Brittany and Vanessa were separately interviewed at Care House. Brittany appeared
fearful that respondent was involved in or could hear her interview at Care House; she ran out of
the room several times to see who was outside. Vanessa made remarks suggesting that she and
Brittany engaged in sexualized behavior. By agreement of the parties, respondent later pleaded
no contest to allegations concerning his prior criminal history, domestic violence, the prior
termination of his parental rights to his older daughter, and general neglect of Brittany. All
allegations involving alleged sexual abuse were stricken. The Court assumed jurisdiction over
the children and they were made temporary wards of the court.
Subsequently, while in therapy, Brittany and Vanessa made other statements that
indicated that respondent had sexually abused them. In addition, respondent told Brittany not to
“talk the crazy talk” referring to her conversations with her therapist. Both girls also reported
that they engaged in sexual behavior with one another and that Brittany digitally penetrated
Vanessa’s “private” while respondent told Vanessa that if she didn’t “like it”, she would have to
“fight her off”. Brittany also disclosed that she engaged in sexual play with a little boy.
Brittany remained in foster care for nearly two years, while Vanessa resided with her
mother. Respondent did comply with the terms of his parent agency agreement; however, he did
not benefit from the services. He continued to deny any responsibility for his behavior or for the
events that lead to Brittany’s removal from his care. He did not address the inappropriate
boundaries with his children or their sexual acting out behaviors.
After a lengthy hearing, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. Additionally, after a hearing on the best interests of the children,
the trial court found that “it is in the best interest of Brittany and Vanessa to terminate
[respondent’s] parental rights at this time.” Respondent now appeals as of right.
II. Statutory Grounds for Termination
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that statutory grounds for termination under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i),(g),(j) and (l) were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
3.977(J); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 351; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624,
633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). Respondent’s parental rights to another child were previously
terminated in similar proceedings in California. Like respondent’s previous child, the young
children involved in these cases engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior, which was suggestive
of sexual abuse. Respondent showed little concern for the children’s situation and behavior, and
instead blamed the respective mothers for each child’s problems. Several witnesses testified that
although respondent participated in services for more than two years, he failed to benefit from
those services, and a sexual abuse assessment indicated that the children would be at risk if
returned to respondent’s custody.
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We find that the trial court erred in terminating under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii).1 The
supplemental petition did not identify what “other conditions” existed in support of the request
for termination under §19b(3)(c)(ii) and the trial court did not specify in its decision what “other
conditions” it believed existed and had not been rectified. Nonetheless, because only one
statutory ground need exist to warrant termination of parental rights, this error was not outcome
determinative. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1991).
III. Best Interests
Further, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights was in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 356357. There was no significant bond between respondent and the younger child, who had only
lived with respondent for approximately one month of her life. Although a strong bond clearly
existed between respondent and the older child, that child had expressed concern about
respondent’s ability to provide appropriate care, and she adjusted well to her placement away
from respondent. Both children2 needed permanence and emotional stability that respondent
could not provide. Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights to
the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
1
Termination is appropriate under § 19b(3)(c)(ii) when “[t]he parent was a respondent in a
proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an
initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds * * * [that]
[o]ther conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s jurisdiction, the parent has
received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by
the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable
opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions
will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.”
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