PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID LEE FORBES II
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282629
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 06-028351-FC
DAVID LEE FORBES, II,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Cavanagh and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of four counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (victim under age 13). Defendant was sentenced
to serve four concurrent prison terms of 210 months to 27 years. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his six-year-old nephew when the boy
spent the night at defendant’s apartment. The victim told his grandmother about the abuse a
week later and then repeated the story to his mother. A month later he was physically examined
and underwent a forensic interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center.1 He repeated his
accusations at that time. Defendant denied any sexual contact with his nephew.
I. Testimony of Rebuttal Witnesses
Defendant first argues on appeal that the testimony by the rebuttal witnesses was
improperly admitted because it related to collateral issues. Defendant also argues that the
prosecutor committed misconduct by seeking to admit this rebuttal evidence because it was
other-acts evidence used to establish action in conformity with the charged acts. Although this
second assertion is framed as an issue of prosecutorial misconduct, it is in essence an evidentiary
issue. See People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 70; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Neither argument
was timely presented below, so our review is for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
1
The facility is also known as the Children’s Assessment Center.
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Rebuttal evidence is evidence that is admitted to contradict, explain, or disprove evidence
offered by the other party. People v Figgures, 451 Mich 390, 399; 547 NW2d 673 (1996). Only
rebuttal evidence that is properly responsive to evidence introduced or a theory developed by the
opponent is proper. People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App 305, 314; 625 NW2d 407 (2001).
Rebuttal evidence must relate to a substantive rather than a collateral matter, and “contradictory
evidence is admissible only when it directly tends to disprove a witness’[s] exact testimony.”
City of Westland v Okopski, 208 Mich App 66, 72; 527 NW2d 780 (1994).
In the instant case, the prosecution offered three rebuttal witnesses who testified about
complaints concerning defendant’s work as an attendant at the community pool in defendant’s
mother’s trailer park, that defendant watched pornography with and made sexually oriented
comments to young teenagers, and that defendant possessed a garbage bag full of pornography.
One of the rebuttal witnesses also testified that defendant appeared to be masturbating while
watching the pornography with her, and another testified that defendant related a dream to her
about having sex with a 12-year-old boy. At trial, the prosecution said that this evidence was
raised to contradict testimony that defendant was fired from the pool due to inattention, that he
had a diminished libido, and that he was unable to maintain an erection.
One of defendant’s theories at trial was that he could not have sexually violated anyone
because he was suffering from Klinefelter’s syndrome, a chromosomal abnormality that has
diminished his libido and impacted his ability to achieve an erection. Defendant testified that his
condition has caused him to suffer from erectile dysfunction for ten years, and that he has been
completely unable to achieve an erection or perform any type of sex act with his penis for a long
time. Defendant also called his treating physician to testify as a fact and expert witness on this
issue. The testimony of the rebuttal witnesses directly contradicted this theory as it attested to
defendant’s active libido and ability to engage in sexual acts with his penis despite his condition.
Defendant was not asked on direct examination about pornography or his relationship
with minors while working at the pool. When asked on cross-examination if he possessed or
watched pornography, defendant testified that he had not viewed or owned pornography since
2003. However, a prosecutor may not elicit a denial on cross-examination of a defendant in
order to create an issue for rebuttal. Figgures, supra at 401. Further, cross-examination cannot
be used as a mechanism to introduce evidence that could have been introduced in the case-inchief. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 442; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Nonetheless, rebuttal evidence may address a matter that the prosecutor cross-examined
on if the cross-examination merely addressed details of a subject raised by the defense. People v
Losey, 413 Mich 346, 352 n 5; 320 NW2d 49 (1982). Defendant’s level of libido and ability to
sexually perform were issues interjected into the case by defendant. The prosecutor crossexamined defendant on these issues with questions about pornography and sexuality with
minors, and contradicted defendant’s responses with rebuttal testimony. The admission of the
rebuttal testimony on these matters was not plain error that substantially affected defendant’s
rights.
However, the reasons that defendant lost his job at the pool were certainly collateral to
the charges against him and his defense and were, therefore, not the proper subject of rebuttal.
City of Westland, supra. Nonetheless, although introduction of this evidence was plain error, it
did not result in a violation of defendant’s substantial rights because it did not “affect[] the
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outcome of the lower court proceedings” in light of the evidence of guilt adduced. Carines,
supra. Moreover, in light of that evidence, defendant cannot establish his actual innocence. Id.
Additionally, the court gave the following limiting instruction on the proper use of the rebuttal
evidence:
You have heard evidence that was introduced to show that the defendant
has engaged in improper sexual conduct or pornography for which the defendant
is not on trial. If you believe this evidence, you must be very careful to consider
it for only one limited purpose, and that is to help you judge the believability of
testimony regarding the acts for which defendant is now on trial. You must not
consider this evidence for any other purpose.
For example, you must not decide that it shows that the defendant’s a bad
person or that the defendant’s likely to commit crimes. You must not convict the
defendant here because you think he’s guilty of other bad conduct.
In light of the well-established principle of appellate practice “that jurors are presumed to follow
their instructions,” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998), the court’s
instructions alleviate the possibility that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
system in general, or this trial in particular, were undermined.
Use of other acts as evidence of character is excluded, except as allowed by MRE 404(b),
“to avoid the danger of conviction based on a defendant’s history of misconduct.” People v
Johnigan, 265 Mich App 463, 465; 696 NW2d 724 (2005). Generally, to be admissible under
MRE 404(b), other-acts evidence (1) must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) must be relevant,
and (3) must not have a probative value substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair
prejudice. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). A proper purpose is one
other than establishing the defendant’s character to show his propensity to commit the offense.
Johnigan, supra. Generally, a prosecutor must provide reasonable notice of his intent to present
other-acts evidence. See MRE 404(b)(2). However, as is the case here, the notice requirement
does not apply to evidence introduced to rebut a defendant’s evidence. People v Lukity, 460
Mich 484, 499; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401. In this case, the evidence admitted was
certainly relevant to examining defendant’s libido and ability to perform sexually, which were
issues raised by defendant. This evidence was provocative and certainly may have impacted the
jury in a way that extended beyond establishing defendant’s libido and sexual performance.
However, the probative value of the evidence was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice,” particularly in light of the limiting instruction quoted above. MRE 403.
Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor improperly referred to the prior bad acts during
closing argument. Although he has quoted at length from the closing argument, defendant does
not advance an argument on why these comments were improper. “A party may not merely
announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.”
Nat’l Waterworks, Inc v Int’l Fidelity & Surety, Ltd, 275 Mich App 256, 265; 739 NW2d 121
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(2007). Assuming that defendant’s position is that the prosecutor’s references to the evidence
during closing were improper because the evidence was improper other-acts evidence,
defendant’s argument fails for the reasons set forth above. The prosecutor did not argue that the
evidence should be used for a purpose other than that for which it was admitted. See People v
Quinn, 194 Mich App 250, 253; 486 NW2d 139 (1992).
II. Bolstering of Victim’s Credibility by Prosecution Witnesses
Defendant next argues that testimony was improperly elicited from the prosecution’s
witnesses that bolstered the credibility of the victim’s statements and denied defendant a fair
trial. Defendant’s challenge is focused on the testimony of four witnesses: the victim, Dr. Harry
Frederick, Cheryl Courtney, and Arlene Forbes, the victim’s grandmother. This issue was not
preserved for appeal and will be reviewed for plain error that affected defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003).
It is the province of the jury to assess the credibility of witnesses. People v Odom, 276
Mich App 407, 419; 740 NW2d 557 (2007). Generally, it is “improper for a witness to comment
or provide an opinion on the credibility of another witness.” Dobek, supra at 71. Further, an
expert is not allowed to vouch for the veracity of a victim. Id. This Court in People v Izzo, 90
Mich App 727, 730; 282 NW2d 10 (1979), explained that an expert may not engage in
“unwarranted reinforcement of the complaining witness’s testimony” by giving a “stamp of
scientific legitimacy to the truth of the complaining witness’s factual testimony concerning the
[crime].”
Bolstering evidence is evidence offered for the purpose of enhancing a witness’s
credibility. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), p 186. People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 352-353;
537 NW2d 857 (1995), amended on other grounds 450 Mich 1212 (1995), provides:
(1) an expert may not testify that the sexual abuse occurred, (2) an expert may not
vouch for the veracity of a victim, and (3) an expert may not testify whether the
defendant is guilty. However, . . . (1) an expert may testify in the prosecution’s
case in chief regarding typical and relevant symptoms of child sexual abuse for
the sole purpose of explaining a victim’s specific behavior that might be
incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an actual abuse
victim, and (2) an expert may testify with regard to the consistencies between the
behavior of the particular victim and other victims of child sexual abuse to rebut
an attack on the victim’s credibility.2
Regarding the victim, it is not improper to ask a witness if he or she is testifying
truthfully, especially when the witness is a young child. See Dobek, supra at 71 (stating that it is
generally improper for a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness).
2
Consistent with the common law, MRE 608(a)(2) provides that “evidence of truthful character
[of a witness] is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.”
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Dr. Frederick, the physician who examined the victim at the Children’s Advocacy Center,
was asked if there was anything about the victim’s behavior during the doctor’s examination that
made Dr. Frederick suspect the boy’s veracity. Dr. Frederick responded, “No.” Because the
question was focused on the victim’s specific behavior, the first exception recognized by
Peterson does not apply. The only witness to testify at trial prior to Dr. Frederick was the
victim. Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim was extensive and tried to uncover any
inconsistencies in his story, but it cannot be characterized as an attack on the boy’s character for
truthfulness. Thus, the second exception recognized by Peterson does not apply. Accordingly,
the question and answer were improper attempts to bolster the victim’s credibility.
Courtney, a child sexual abuse expert employed by the prosecutor’s office, testified that
when examining a suspected child victim of sexual abuse, she makes an assessment of the child’s
credibility. She explained that her process for doing so included examining the child’s
description of how the assault felt. She was then asked if a child would know what it feels like
to have an object placed into his anus from watching a pornographic movie, facts from the
instant case. Courtney responded, “Absolutely not. . . . [Y]ou don’t feel sensation watching a
movie.” She then stated that the victim’s report that something came out of defendant’s penis
that was white and tasted badly was not something a child would learn from watching a
pornographic movie. While this testimony did not directly comment on the victim’s truthfulness,
it did in essence enhance the boy’s credibility by pointing out that he had knowledge he could
not have gained elsewhere. As with the doctor’s testimony, neither of the Peterson exceptions
applies to this testimony.
As for Forbes, she was asked if she had any reason to suspect that the victim was making
this story up, and responded, “No.” On its own motion, the court instructed the jury to disregard
the question and answer. However, Forbes was then allowed to testify that the victim’s story had
not changed. It is presumed that the jury followed the court’s instruction to ignore the
disregarded question and answer. Graves, supra. The testimony that the victim’s story had not
changed, however, was not being offered to counter a charge of recent fabrication or improper
influence. MRE 801(d)(1)(B).
At issue is whether these repeated plain errors require reversal of defendant’s conviction.
Expert testimony is provided to “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact [of consequence].” MRE 702. Such assistance can also include assisting in the
examination of the veracity of the witnesses. However, an expert may not supplant the jury’s
role—or more to the point, care should be taken that juries do not abdicate their role—in
assessing witness credibility and determining the facts. Such a danger exists when experts
provide opinions on the veracity of the alleged victims of abuse.
Arguably, the solicited bolstering of the victim’s credibility by the prosecution’s
witnesses may have impacted the outcome of the proceedings by adding a stamp of approval to
the victim’s testimony. In light of the properly admitted evidence, however, including the
victim’s testimony, Forbes’ appropriate corroboration of his testimony as described below, and
other admissible testimony by Dr. Frederick and Courtney, defendant is unable to establish that
he is actually innocent of the charges. Further, the court’s clear instructions on the jury’s role in
determining the facts and assessing credibility and the role expert witnesses play at trial, which
we presume was followed absent any evidence to the contrary, Graves, supra, sufficiently
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alleviated the possibility that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial system in
general, or this trial in particular, has been undermined.
III. Hearsay Evidence
Finally, defendant argues that hearsay was improperly admitted at trial, and that defense
counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he did not raise an objection to the testimony.
Because defendant’s hearsay argument is also unpreserved, that issue will be reviewed for plain
error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra. “Hearsay is an unsworn, out-ofcourt statement that is offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted.” People v Stamper,
480 Mich 1, 3; 742 NW2d 607 (2007), citing MRE 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible
unless it meets the requirements of one of the hearsay exceptions set forth in the Michigan Rules
of Evidence. MRE 802; Stamper, supra. Defendant’s assertion that the statements do not
qualify as non-hearsay statements as defined in MRE 801(d) is correct. MRE 801(d)(1)(B) states
that a prior statement of a witness who testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination is not
hearsay if the statement is consistent with the witness’s testimony and offered to rebut a charge
of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. At the time that Forbes and the expert
witnesses testified, there was no implication that the victim’s testimony was not genuine.
In this case, both of the prosecution’s expert witnesses, Dr. Frederick and Courtney,
testified about what the victim said regarding the assault. The victim’s grandmother, Forbes,
also testified about the details of the incident as told to her by the victim. Presumably, the
testimony was offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted, even though the prosecution
may have been able to offer other justifications if there had been an objection at trial.
With respect to Forbes’ testimony, Michigan provides a “tender years” exception to the
general rule excluding hearsay. People v Hammons, 210 Mich App 554, 558; 534 NW2d 183
(1995). MRE 803A, which codified the Michigan tender years hearsay exception, provides in
relevant part:
A statement describing an incident that included a sexual act performed with or
on the declarant by the defendant or an accomplice is admissible to the extent that
it corroborates testimony given by the declarant during the same proceeding,
provided:
(1) the declarant was under the age of ten when the statement was made;
(2) the statement is shown to have been spontaneous and without indication of
manufacture;
(3) either the declarant made the statement immediately after the incident or any
delay is excusable as having been caused by fear or other equally effective
circumstance; and
(4) the statement is introduced through the testimony of someone other than the
declarant.
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If the declarant made more than one corroborative statement about the incident,
only the first is admissible under this rule.
A statement may not be admitted under this rule unless the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party the intent to offer the statement, and
the particulars of the statement, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
Here, the six-year-old victim’s statement to Forbes was the first time he had disclosed the
incident. This was approximately a week after it occurred, a short delay that was excusable due
to his fear. See People v Dunham, 220 Mich App 268, 272; 559 NW2d 360 (1996). The
victim’s statement to Forbes was made spontaneously while he was taking a bath, at which time
he told her that he and defendant shared a “secret.” Forbes’ testimony about the statement
corroborated the victim’s previous testimony. Forbes’ testimony was thus admissible under
MRE 803A.
Dr. Frederick testified regarding the victim’s subsequent disclosure of the incident during
his physical examination and interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center. The prosecution
argues that the victim’s statements to Dr. Frederick were made for purposes of medical treatment
or diagnosis in connection with treatment, and thus, are excepted from the hearsay exclusion
under MRE 803(4). In order to be admitted under MRE 803(4), a statement must be made for
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis in connection with treatment, and must describe
medical history, past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source of injury insofar as reasonably necessary to such
diagnosis and treatment. MRE 803(4). The rationale underlying admission through MRE 803(4)
is a patient’s self-interest in speaking the truth to treating physicians “in order to receive proper
medical care,” and the “necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient.”
People v Meeboer, 439 Mich 310, 322; 484 NW2d 621 (1992). The admissibility of hearsay as a
statement necessary to medical treatment requires a showing of trustworthiness based on the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 324.
According to Dr. Frederick’s own testimony, however, the Children’s Advocacy Center
is an organization designed to facilitate and aid children and their families in the initial
assessment and evaluation of children who may be victims of sexual abuse by conducting
forensic interviews and/or medical examinations of these children. The evaluation was
conducted at an off-site location, not on hospital premises. As explained by Courtney, the
purpose of a forensic examination is to obtain information for use by law enforcement and child
welfare agencies. The victim in this case was taken to Dr. Frederick a month after the family
was aware of the alleged abuse. Clearly, the victim was not presented to Dr. Frederick for
purposes of medical treatment, but rather, evaluation of whether a crime had occurred for
purposes of prosecution. Defendant is correct that Dr. Frederick’s testimony regarding the
victim’s description of the alleged abuse was hearsay and not admissible under MRE 803(4).
Courtney observed a forensic interview of the victim from an observation room at the
Children’s Advocacy Center. At trial, she related the details of the alleged incident that the
victim reported to the interviewer. The prosecution argues that Courtney’s recount of the
victim’s statements was not offered to establish the truthfulness of the statements, but to show
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how a child victim reacts to a sexual assault. This argument is not convincing considering that
Courtney’s testimony specifically pertained to the victim’s statements and included how she
assessed his truthfulness. As such, the victim’s statements about the alleged incident as relayed
by Courtney were not admissible.
Although inadmissible hearsay statements by Dr. Frederick and Courtney were admitted
at trial, careful review of the record reveals that this did not substantially affect the rights of
defendant. Through direct and cross-examination, the victim testified repeatedly and
consistently for a child of his age and intellect regarding the facts of the alleged incident, and
Forbes properly corroborated the testimony through statements the victim spontaneously made to
her within a week of the incident. The additional hearsay accounts regarding the incident did not
give the jury any new information on which to base its decision. The cumulative nature of the
testimony reduced any prejudice to a minimum degree. People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516,
530; 455 NW2d 358 (1990). By hearing the same story several times, it is possible that this
repetition enhanced the victim’s credibility, which could have been compounded by the
witnesses also addressing the victim’s veracity. However, the jury was also free to believe that
the victim merely repeated the same false accusations to different people. In fact, the trial record
reveals that defendant may have purposefully failed to object to the hearsay testimony as part of
his defense strategy. In his case in chief, defense counsel called the victim’s mother as a hostile
witness and elicited similar hearsay testimony from her, then questioned why she refused to
continue taking her child to counseling but actively encouraged him to tell family members and
others about the details of the incident. In his closing argument, defense counsel suggested that
the victim’s mother had an ax to grind against defendant, her brother, so she undertook to have
him repeatedly tell the story to others in order to “rehearse” and memorize it like an actor.
Under the circumstances of this case, defendant has not met his burden of proving that any error
either resulted in the conviction of an innocent person or seriously affected the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the proceedings. Jones, supra.
Defendant also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the admission
of the alleged hearsay statements. A defendant’s right to counsel is guaranteed by the United
States and Michigan Constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963 art 1, § 20. This right to
counsel encompasses the effective assistance of counsel. People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634,
637; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel a
defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. People v Taylor, 275 Mich App 177, 186; 737
NW2d 790 (2007). A counsel’s performance is deficient if it fell below an objective standard of
professional reasonableness. People v Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007).
The performance prejudiced the defense if it is reasonably probable that, but for counsel’s error,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. The effective assistance of counsel is
presumed, and the defendant bears the heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v LeBlanc,
465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
Here, defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the alleged hearsay
statements was deficient performance and prejudicial to defendant. As discussed above, Forbes’
testimony about the victim’s statements to her was admissible under MRE 803A, and thus,
counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object. See People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 256;
749 NW2d 272 (2008). However, an objection to Dr. Frederick’s and Courtney’s recount of
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what they heard the victim say was sustainable. Regardless of defense counsel’s failure to object
to this hearsay testimony, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the case would have
been different. The jury properly heard the victim recount details of the abuse, which facts were
corroborated by Forbes, as well as other admissible testimony by Dr. Frederick and Courtney.
Based on our review of the entire record, we deem it unlikely that these additional consistent
statements were decisive to any of the jurors in ascertaining defendant’s culpability.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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