PEOPLE OF MI V ELISA REDWINE JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 19, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280326
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 06-018939-FC
ELISA REDWINE, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Wilder and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316(1)(a) (premeditated murder), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
murder, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm crime. He appeals as of right. We
affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting other acts evidence under
MRE 404(b), and that the trial court also erred in admitting hearsay statements. We disagree.
Generally, this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion decisions whether to admit
evidence. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). However, defendant’s
unpreserved claims of evidentiary error are reviewed for plain error affecting his substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762-763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To avoid forfeiture
under the plain error rule, a defendant must establish that: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error
was plain, (3) and the plain error affected the defendant’s substantial rights, i.e., it affected the
outcome of the circuit court proceedings. Id.
Defendant’s convictions stem from the shooting death of Ronnie Wayne Turberville, who
was found dead in his trailer on July 18, 2006. Michael Ashbaker testified that, on the evening
of Turberville’s killing, defendant approached him and asked him where Turberville was.
Although Ashbaker knew that Turberville was sitting on a nearby porch, he told defendant that
he did not know where Turberville was. The prosecutor asked Ashbaker why he lied to
defendant. Ashbaker answered that defendant once beat up a kid for stealing his car and
videotape, and thus, Ashbaker was concerned that defendant would start a fight with Turberville.
Defendant contends that Ashbaker’s testimony was admitted for the improper purpose of
showing defendant’s bad character. The prosecution argues, as it did at trial, that the testimony
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was admitted for the proper purpose of explaining why Ashbaker lied to defendant, a relevant
issue.
MRE 404(b)(1) governs the admission of other acts evidence, and provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
To be admissible under MRE 404(b), other acts evidence generally must satisfy three
requirements: (1) it must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) it must be relevant, and (3) its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004). A proper purpose is one other than
establishing the defendant’s character to show his propensity to commit the offense. People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod 445 Mich 1205 (1994).
The challenged testimony was offered for the proper purpose of explaining why
Ashbaker lied to defendant about Turberville’s whereabouts. Evidence explaining why a witness
acted the way he did, in a relevant matter, is considered a proper purpose under MRE 404(b).
See People v Dunham, 220 Mich App 268, 273; 559 NW2d 360 (1996) (in a criminal sexual
conduct case, evidence of the defendant’s threats against the victim’s mother were admitted for
the proper purpose of explaining why the mother left the marital home). The evidence was
relevant because it bore on the credibility of a material witness. The prosecution could properly
introduce evidence to show that Ashbaker had a legitimate reason for lying to defendant, in order
to prevent Ashbaker’s credibility from being undermined. Moreover, defendant has not
established that this testimony was unfairly prejudicial. Defendant’s prior altercation was not
particularly egregious, nor was it so similar in nature to the charged offenses, that a jury would
likely conclude that because he committed the prior act, he likely committed the charged
offenses.
Even assuming that the MRE 404(b) evidence was improperly admitted, defendant fails
to demonstrate prejudice. The remaining unchallenged evidence against defendant was strong.
Ashbaker testified that defendant came looking for Turberville, shortly before the killing.
Defendant’s friend, Robert Fritzler, testified that, on the day of the killing, defendant told Fritzler
that he needed to “take somebody out,” armed himself with a gun that would not leave shell
casings, and he and Fritzler rode bicycles to the vicinity of Tuberville’s trailer. Fritzler saw
defendant walk up to the trailer, heard a gunshot and saw defendant run away from the trailer.
Fritzler saw defendant run into his neighbor’s house, and come out a few minutes later in
different clothing. Defendant stated that he needed to sprinkle pepper on the ground so that dogs
could not track his scent. David Pearson, who met defendant while they were both in jail,
testified that defendant admitted to shooting Turberville in the back of the head, while he was
sleeping, and to throwing the gun in the river. Although defendant testified that he had nothing
to do with Turberville’s death, the jury was entitled to disbelieve him. Indeed, defendant’s
credibility was undermined, when another inmate testified that defendant asked him to lie under
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oath in order to discredit Fritzler. Considering the totality of the testimony, there is no basis to
set aside defendant’s conviction, even if the MRE 404(b) evidence was erroneously admitted.
Next, defendant claims that the testimony of two investigating officers, concerning
Fritzler’s prior consistent statements about what occurred on the day of the killing, constituted
inadmissible hearsay. Fritzler’s trial testimony was substantially similar to his statements to the
officers.
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
MRE 801(c). A statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is” “consistent with the
declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.” MRE 801(d)(1).
Here, the declarant, Fritzler, testified at trial, and was subject to cross-examination
concerning his statements to the officers. In addition, the challenged testimony was properly
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or
improper influence or motive. In her opening statement, the prosecutor outlined Fritzler’s
prospective testimony, and emphasized how it would be damaging to defendant. In response, in
defendant’s opening statement, defense counsel stated that the prosecution’s witnesses were not
worthy of belief, and that Fritzler changed his story, by initially stating that he knew nothing
about the killing, then altering his statement after receiving a plea deal. Later, while crossexamining Fritzler regarding his plea deal, defense counsel stated, “I’m concerned about this
witness’s motivation to tell the truth. . . . He just said that he was facing mandatory life, and now
he’s going to do two years.” Consequently, the challenged testimony is nonhearsay, pursuant to
MRE 801(d)(1), and was properly admitted. Even assuming that the testimony was improperly
admitted, defendant cannot show prejudice, because of the strength of the remaining,
unchallenged evidence against him. Thus, defendant’s claim of evidentiary error fails.
Furthermore, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which is based entirely on
counsel’s failure to seek exclusion of the aforementioned evidence, also fails, because the
evidence was properly admitted. See People v Rodriguez, 212 Mich App 351, 356; 538 NW2d
42 (1995) (stating that a failure to pursue a meritless objection does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel).
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, when she suggested
that defendant’s nickname of “Gotti” was associated with the gangster John Gotti. We disagree.
The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial
trial, i.e., whether prejudice resulted. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411
(2001).
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and the reviewing
court must examine the record and evaluate a prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v Thomas,
260 Mich App 450, 454; 678 NW2d 631 (2004). Prosecutorial comments must be read as a
whole, and evaluated in light of defense arguments, and the relationship they bear to the
evidence admitted at trial. People v Brown, 267 Mich App 141, 152; 703 NW2d 230 (2005).
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The prosecutor’s references to John Gotti were not baseless, but rather, were grounded on
defendant’s actual nickname, which other witnesses had referred-to even before defendant took
the stand. Defendant’s nickname, even absent prosecutorial questioning on the matter, would
likely have invoked associations in the jurors’ minds with the notorious gangster. The
prosecutor’s questions provided defendant an opportunity to explain to the jury that his nickname
had nothing to do with the gangster, or a gangster-lifestyle, but rather, was given to him for
another reason. The prosecutor’s questions were not unfair, in that she did not suggest that
defendant’s nickname was in fact associated with the famous gangster, rather, she merely asked
him if that was the case. Defendant answered in the negative, and the prosecutor moved on to a
different question. Given the circumstances, the prosecutor’s challenged questions did not
constitute misconduct. Even assuming that the prosecutor committed misconduct by pursuing
such a line of questioning, defendant cannot show prejudice. The untainted evidence against
defendant was substantial, and not meaningfully undermined by the prosecutor’s questions.
Thus, defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claim fails.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of a defense
witness on the basis that the witness would assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. We disagree. Whether the trial court erred in excluding a witness from testifying
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 398; 633 NW2d
376 (2001).
Outside the presence of the jury, defense witness Tatiana Fernandez, defendant’s live-in
girlfriend, testified that, if called to testify before the jury, she would assert her Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, in regard to pending drug charges against her, and any other
charges against her. Apparently, the drug charges stemmed from an incident in June 2006. It
was also revealed that police found marijuana at the home shared by Fernandez and defendant,
on July 18, 2006, the day that defendant was arrested for Turberville’s murder. On the basis of a
blanket assertion by Fernandez of her Fifth Amendment privilege, however, the trial court,
without any analysis or elaboration, excused Fernandez from testifying.
The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by both the United States Constitution
and the Michigan Constitution. People v Bassage, 274 Mich App 321, 324; 733 NW2d 398
(2007). A witness may assert the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at any
proceeding in which the witness reasonably believes that the information sought, or that is
discoverable as a result of the witness’s testimony, may lead to subsequent criminal proceedings
against him or her. Id. at 324-325. The privilege against self-incrimination may only be asserted
on a question-by-question basis, to questions that would tend to incriminate the witness, and
cannot be asserted as a blanket response to all questions. People v Dyer, 425 Mich 572, 578579; 390 NW2d 645 (1986).
Although Fernandez was entitled to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege with respect
to questions related to the drug charges against her, she could have answered other questions
material to defendant’s defense, because such answers would not have incriminated her. For
example, Fernandez could have testified concerning defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the
killing; what activities defendant was engaged in during the time of the killing; whether she
observed him going out on a bicycle ride; whether she observed him with a gun, etc. . . . Given
that defendant had earlier testified that he spent a portion of the day in question with Fernandez
and desired to call her as a witness, presumably, Fernandez’s answers to these questions would
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have been favorable to defendant. Consequently, the trial court erred in excluding Fernandez as
a defense witness, on the basis of a blanket assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
Nevertheless, there was an independent basis to support the exclusion of Fernandez’s
testimony. Because Fernandez was to be an alibi witness who would testify regarding
defendant’s whereabouts on the evening of the killing, under MCL 768.20(1), defendant was
required to file an alibi notice. However, defendant failed to file an alibi notice. Since defendant
was at all times aware of Fernandez’s existence, and of the testimony that she could provide,
there is nothing in the record that would excuse defendant’s failure to list Fernandez as an alibi
witness. A trial court may exclude alibi evidence if the statutory notice is not given. People v
McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 140; 539 NW2d 553 (1995). Thus, while Fernandez’ testimony
should not have been precluded by the trial court based solely on a blanket assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, this Court will affirm a correct result even
where it is based on incorrect reasoning. People v Goold, 241 Mich App 333, 342 n 3; 615
NW2d 794 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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