PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID WAYNE TWEED
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 289352
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2008-008814-AR
DAVID WAYNE TWEED,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., and O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from a circuit court order reversing a district court’s
decision dismissing a charge of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), for failure
to establish the corpus delicti of the crime and reinstating the charge. We affirm.
In February 2008, defendant was charged with murdering 71-year-old Donald Vance in
1986. Vance’s death was originally ruled to have been from natural causes, but was reevaluated
as part of an investigation after defendant confessed to murdering Vance by smothering him with
a pillow. In one of his confessions, defendant stated that he decided to kill Vance before going
to Vance’s house and that the death was “premeditated.” Following defendant’s preliminary
examination, the district court found that the prosecution had not sufficiently established the
corpus delicti of the crime because it failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence,
independent of defendant’s confessions, that Vance’s death resulted from a criminal agency.
Therefore, it dismissed the charge. The prosecutor appealed to the circuit court, which held that
the corpus delicti of the crime was sufficiently established and reinstated the charge of firstdegree premeditated murder. Defendant thereafter filed an interlocutory application for leave to
appeal the circuit court’s decision, which this Court granted.
The question whether defendant should have been bound over for trial turns on whether
there was sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of murder, thereby allowing
consideration of his confessions. “[A] challenge to the admission of a defendant’s statement
under the corpus delicti rule constitutes a challenge to the admission of evidence, not to the
sufficiency of evidence.” People v Harden, 474 Mich 862, 862; 703 NW2d 189 (2005); see also
People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 269; 536 NW2d 517 (1995). A decision to admit or exclude
evidence is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 550;
581 NW2d 654 (1998). In this particular case, however, the evidentiary challenge concerns
whether the prosecutor sufficiently established a foundational fact, i.e., a death by a criminal
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agency. We review preliminary questions of fact for clear error.1 People v Barrera, 451 Mich
261, 268-269; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
In Michigan, it has long been the rule that proof of the corpus delicti is
required before the prosecutor is allowed to introduce the inculpatory statements
of an accused.” “The underlying purposes of the corpus delicti rule are (1) to
guard against, indeed to preclude, conviction for a criminal homicide when none
was committed, and (2) to minimize the weight of a confession and require
collateral evidence to support conviction. [People v McMahan, 451 Mich 543,
548-549; 548 NW2d 199 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).]
The corpus delicti rule “provides that a defendant’s confession may not be admitted
unless there is direct or circumstantial evidence independent of the confession establishing (1)
the occurrence of the specific injury (for example, death in cases of homicide) and (2) some
criminal agency as the source of the injury.” Konrad, supra at 269-270. However, these
elements “need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and courts may draw reasonable
inferences and weigh the probabilities.” People v Mumford, 171 Mich App 514, 517; 430 NW2d
770 (1988). Only a preponderance of the direct or circumstantial evidence is required to satisfy
the rule. People v King, 271 Mich App 235, 239; 721 NW2d 271 (2006). “‘Preponderance of
the evidence’ means such evidence, as, when weighed with that opposed to it, has more
convincing force and the greater probability of truth.” People v Cross, 281 Mich App 737, 740;
760 NW2d 314 (2008).
Once the necessary showing of the corpus delicti has been made, “[a] defendant’s
confession then may be used to elevate the crime to one of higher degree or to establish
aggravating circumstances.” People v Ish, 252 Mich App 115, 117; 652 NW2d 257 (2000)
(citation omitted); see also King, supra at 241-242. Thus, it is not necessary to prove all
elements of the crime before a confession is admitted.2 Ish, supra. “[F]or first-degree
premeditated murder, the corpus delicti consists of a showing of the death of the victim and some
criminal agency as a cause of the death.” People v Hughey, 186 Mich App 585, 587; 464 NW2d
914 (1990). The degree of homicide is not part of the corpus delicti. Id. at 587-588.
At defendant’s preliminary examination, the medical examiner testified that an
examination of the crime scene photographs and autopsy photographs led him to conclude that
Vance’s death was the result of a criminal agency. The medical examiner explained that the
photographs depicted lividity on both sides of Vance’s body, which indicated that the body had
been moved after death. This shifting of lividity was not mentioned in the autopsy report.
1
Conversely, preliminary questions of law, such as whether a rule or statute precludes the
admission of evidence, are reviewed de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
2
For example, “[p]roof of the identity of the perpetrator of the act or crime is not part of the
corpus delicti.” Konrad, supra at 270 (citation omitted). Similarly, malice is not part of the
corpus delicti. See People v Spearman, 195 Mich App 434, 440; 491 NW2d 606 (1992), rev in
part sub nom People v Rush, 443 Mich 870; 504 NW2d 185 (1993).
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Further, there was evidence of defecation, which occurs when a death results from stress. In
addition, fecal matter was found smeared on Vance’s body and at the side of the bed, away from
where the body was found, which further indicated that the body had been moved post mortem.
These facts also were not discussed in the original autopsy report. The photographs also
revealed a recent injury to Vance’s forehead that could have been caused by an application of
force to Vance’s face. That injury was unrelated to Vance’s immediate surroundings, thereby
indicating that force was applied to Vance somewhere else, not where he was found. The
autopsy photographs also revealed distortion on the opposite side of Vance’s face from the
abrasions. The medical examiner explained that this meant that Vance was moved after the
abrasions were inflicted, and that the distortion was the result of being placed face down on the
pillow where his body was found. The distortion of Vance’s face was not discussed in the
autopsy report.
Although the medical examiner did not examine Vance’s body, his opinions and
conclusions were based on the crime scene photographs, the autopsy photographs, his
experience, and the original autopsy report. The district court seemed to believe that it was not
acceptable for a medical examiner to find fault with an autopsy report that had stood
unchallenged for over 20 years, especially where the medical examiner did not personally
examine the victim’s body. We disagree.
In People v Burns, 250 Mich App 436, 437; 647 NW2d 515 (2002), the defendant’s
eleven-month daughter died of asphyxiation in 1987, when a frozen plastic “ice cube” used to
relieve teething pain became lodged in her throat. The death was ruled accidental and no charges
were brought. Id. In 1997, however, the police reopened the case after receiving information
from the defendant’s niece, who indicated that the defendant had admitted responsibility for the
death and had confessed to lying to the police. Id. In 1998, the defendant was charged with
second-degree murder. Id. at 438. He was subsequently tried and convicted of voluntary
manslaughter. Id. at 437. On appeal, the defendant argued that the corpus delicti of the offense
was not independently established and, therefore, his statements were improperly admitted at
trial. Id. at 438. Specifically, like defendant in this case, the defendant in Burns argued that “the
prosecutor failed to prove that some criminal agency caused the child’s death because the
medical examiner’s conclusion, that her death was a homicide, was unsupported by objective
medical evidence.” Id. at 439. This Court disagreed, explaining:
[T]he medical examiner’s testimony was that (1) given the size limitations of the
throat, (2) the normal response of the gag reflex, (3) the size, shape, and
dimensions of the object that was lodged in the child’s throat, and (4) the extent of
bruising in her throat, the object was forced into the child’s throat. The testimony
sufficiently established that the child’s death was caused by a criminal agency;
therefore, defendant’s argument is without merit. [Id. at 439.]
In this case, as in Burns, it is undisputed that a death occurred, there was an autopsy, the
death was ruled not to be a homicide, and a death certificate was prepared. Many years later, as
in Burns, defendant’s statements caused the police to reopen the investigation. The medical
examiner was asked to reconsider the matter and he offered an opinion that, as in Burns, was
based on the available, objective evidence, not on an examination of the victim’s body. As in
Burns, the medical examiner disagreed with the original autopsy report and concluded that the
objective evidence showed that the death was the result of a criminal agency.
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Aside from the original autopsy report, no evidence was presented in opposition to the
medical examiner’s testimony. His opinions and conclusions, although questioned by defendant,
were based on the available, objective evidence, which preponderated in favor of a finding that
Vance’s death resulted from a criminal agency. Thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that
the corpus delicti was sufficiently established and that defendant’s confessions were therefore
admissible in establishing probable cause to bind defendant over for trial for first-degree murder.
Affirmed.
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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