PEOPLE OF MI V OMAR JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283998
Wayne Circuit Court0
LC No. 07-013701-FH
OMAR JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murphy and M.J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right following his jury trial conviction for possession with intent
to deliver between 50 and 449 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). Defendant was
sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 78 months to 20 years’ imprisonment.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Defendant admits that the quantity and packaging of the cocaine would support a finding that
whoever possessed the cocaine had an intention of selling. Therefore, defendant’s argument on
appeal is predicated on the theory that the prosecution failed in its burden of proving that
defendant possessed the cocaine. Defendant argues that his mere presence in a flat owned and
leased by others was insufficient to show that he possessed the cocaine. However, possession
may be actual or constructive and may be proven by circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn from such evidence. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 622; 709 NW2d
595 (2005); People v Nunez, 242 Mich App 610, 615-616; 619 NW2d 550 (2000). Constructive
possession includes knowledge of the illegal substance and the right to control it. McGhee,
supra at 622; Nunez, supra at 615. Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that
arise from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Fennell, 260 Mich App 261, 270;
677 NW2d 66 (2004).
“A claim of insufficient evidence is reviewed de novo, in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, to determine whether the evidence would justify a rational jury’s finding that the
defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 622;
709 NW2d 595 (2005).
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There was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction. Two police officers
arrived at the home where the cocaine was seized based on a citizen’s complaint that narcotics
were being sold there. While the officers did not notice any illicit activity when they arrived,
they both noted that defendant separated himself from the group of individuals in the driveway
and clearly hoped to avoid contact with the officers. Defendant dropped a packet containing
cocaine on the back porch of the home. When the first officer arrived in the flat, he found
defendant in a bedroom. Defendant was ordered out of the room. As he was complying,
defendant kicked an Enfamil can to an open heating vent in the bedroom floor. His actions
indicated that he had possession of both the cocaine found on the porch and the cocaine found in
the Enfamil can. The officers also found more than $800 on defendant after they searched his
person. In addition to quantity and packaging of the cocaine, the officers seized a scale that was
commonly used to weigh and measure cocaine for distribution. Defendant’s girlfriend testified
that she was leasing the flat and that defendant did not live there. She testified that she was
holding the cocaine for someone else. The jury was best qualified to judge her credibility.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); People v
Passage, 277 Mich App 175, 177; 743 NW2d 746 (2007). See also, People v Lemmon, 456
Mich 625,636-637; 576 NW2d 492 (1992). (“The historic division of functions between the
court and the jury needs no citation of authority. It is the province of the jury to determine
questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses. ‘As the trier of fact, the jury is the final
judge of credibility’”.) (internal citations omitted). Also noteworthy was the fact that
defendant’s grandmother was a co-lessee, further evidence that defendant likely lived in the flat.
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence for a rational
trier of fact to find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Wolfe, supra at 515; People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that possession
of cocaine was a specific intent crime. In addition to the charge of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine, defendant was also charged with “mere possession” under MCL 333.7403(1),
which provides that “[a] person should not knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled
substance.” The trial court instructed the jury that:
The crime of possession of a controlled substance requires proof of a
specific intent. This means that the prosecution must prove not only that the
defendant did certain acts, but that he did the acts with the intent to cause a
particular result.
For the crime of possession of a controlled substance, this means that the
prosecution must prove that the defendant actually knowingly or intentionally
possessed the cocaine. The defendant’s intent may be proved by what he said,
what he did, how he did it, or by any other facts and circumstances in evidence.
[Emphasis added.]
The trial court’s instruction to the jury mirrored the language of the statute. The additional
instruction that possession was a specific intent crime was superfluous where the statute itself
included language that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed the controlled
substance. The trial court was under no obligation to distinguish the crime as one of specific
intent or general intent as long as the jury was properly instructed that defendant had to have
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acted with knowledge or intent. See People v Maynor, 470 Mich 289, 296-297; 683 NW2d 565
(2004).
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial
because defendant based his decision not to testify on the erroneous advice of counsel that
defendant’s prior convictions could be used as impeachment evidence. Defendant did nothing in
the trial court to preserve this argument. Following his appeal as of right to this Court, defendant
moved to remand under People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), but that
motion was denied by this Court. Where a defendant has failed to preserve the issue for
appellate review by moving for a Ginther hearing in the trial court, review by this Court is
limited to errors apparent on the record. People v Odom, 276 Mich App 407, 415; 740 NW2d
557 (2007). Defendant’s motion to remand to develop a record regarding his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel was accompanied by an affidavit sworn by defendant, stating, “that during
our pre-trial discussions my Trial Attorney informed me that if I took the stand and testified the
Prosecution would be able to put before my jury my prior convictions. That his advice in this
regard is the only reason that I did not testify at my trial.” Because this document was not part of
the lower court record, we decline to consider it as evidence. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31,
38; 755 NW2d 212 (2008); People v Watkins, 247 Mich App 14, 31; 634 NW2d 370 (2001).
Still, giving the benefit of doubt to defendant and assuming he received such erroneous
evidence, defendant has still failed in his burden of demonstrating that the result of the trial
would have been different. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994);
Odom, supra at 417; People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). Although
defendant would have liked an opportunity to testify regarding his version of events, it is not as
though he was denied a substantial defense. People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 710; 538
NW2d 465 (1995), vacated in part on other grounds 453 Mich 902; 554 NW2d 899 (1996).
Defendant presented his girlfriend as a witness. She testified that defendant did not live in the
flat and that the drugs belonged to her. During his cross-examination of witnesses and during his
closing arguments, defense counsel made it clear that his theory of the case was that defendant
did not live in the flat and that he did not possess the drugs. On appeal, defendant does not make
an offer of proof regarding what his testimony would have been. In keeping with his general
defense, defendant would have likely testified that many other individuals shared the flat and had
access to the contents therein. While we cannot be sure of all of counsel’s reasons for not
wanting defendant to testify, there is nothing that precludes us from assuming that the decision
was based on sound trial strategy, which we will not second-guess. People v Garza, 246 Mich
App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001). Defendant has failed to demonstrate to this Court that
trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that, but for
counsel’s decision to not call defendant as a witness, the result of the trial would have been
different.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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