PEOPLE OF MI V PHILLIP TREMAINE NORRIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 14, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283289
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-008723-01
PHILIP TREMAINE NORRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Meter and Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83,
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 11 to
18 years for the assault conviction and two to five years for the felon-in-possession conviction,
and a consecutive two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals
as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise from the April 18, 2007, shooting of Dwayne Goings.
Goings testified that he was waiting in his car outside a party when defendant and another man
approached him with a gun. Goings tried to drive off, but several gunshots were fired and
Goings received two bullet wounds. Goings identified defendant as the shooter. Another
witness, Ronald Johnson, testified that he had known defendant for approximately two years.
After hearing gunshots, he looked out the side door of his house and saw defendant running
down the street with a gun.
I. Effective Assistance of Counsel.
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, thereby requiring
a new trial. We disagree.
Because defendant did not raise this issue in a motion for a new trial or request for a
Ginther1 hearing, our review is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v Williams,
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-1-
223 Mich App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel,
defendant has the burden of showing that counsel made an error so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that counsel’s deficient
performance so prejudiced defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Mitchell, 454
Mich 145, 156; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). Defendant must overcome a strong presumption that
counsel’s assistance was sound trial strategy. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521
NW2d 557 (1994). To demonstrate prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s error.
People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 125, 132; 748 NW2d 859 (2008). Defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating both deficient performance and prejudice and, therefore, necessarily bears the
burden of establishing the factual predicate for his claim. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600;
623 NW2d 884 (2001).
Defendant first argues that his mother and his girlfriend were both prohibited from
testifying at trial because they were present during the testimony at the preliminary examination,
and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make sure they left the courtroom after he
moved to sequester witnesses at the preliminary examination, and for failing to move to allow
their testimony at trial notwithstanding the alleged violation of the sequestration order. The
record does not support this argument. Although the record discloses that defense counsel
moved to sequester witnesses at the preliminary examination, there is no indication in the record
that defendant’s girlfriend or mother were present during testimony, that defense counsel desired
to offer their testimony at trial in support of an alibi defense, that the prosecutor opposed any
testimony by these witnesses, or that the trial court prohibited either witness from testifying at
trial. Thus, defendant has not established the factual predicate for his claim.
Furthermore, decisions about whether to call or question a witness are matters of trial
strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). This Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, People v Avant,
235 Mich App 499, 508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999), nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the
benefit of hindsight. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). Defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s decision not to call
defendant’s mother and girlfriend as alibi witnesses was a matter of sound trial strategy,
especially where counsel was able to present defendant’s alibi defense through two other
witnesses.
Defendant also argues that counsel was ineffective for not filing a pretrial motion
challenging Goings’s pretrial identification of defendant in a photographic array while at the
hospital. Defendant presents no argument in support of this issue, however, and fails to explain
what basis existed for challenging the identification procedure. Absent a cognizable basis for
successfully challenging the photographic identification, there is no basis for concluding that
counsel was ineffective in this regard. Counsel is not required to make futile motions. People v
Darden, 230 Mich App 597, 605; 585 NW2d 27 (1998).
We also find no merit to defendant’s argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach witnesses with inconsistencies between their trial testimony and prior statements, or to
establish their alleged bias against defendant. The record discloses that counsel cross-examined
both Goings and Johnson about inconsistencies between their trial testimony and their prior
police statements and preliminary examination testimony. Counsel elicited that defendant’s
-2-
actual appearance differed from Goings’s description of the shooter, and that there were
differences in Goings’s account of the offense in his police statement compared to his testimony
at trial. Counsel similarly elicited that there were inconsistencies between Johnson’s description
to the police and defendant’s actual appearance. Counsel also elicited that Johnson admittedly
did not like defendant because of prior incidents between them. Although defendant argues that
counsel should have elicited testimony explaining the basis for his prior disagreements with
Johnson, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel wanted to avoid
disclosing those reasons as a matter of trial strategy, such as to avoid portraying defendant in a
bad light. Counsel’s success in eliciting Johnson’s admitted dislike of defendant was enough, by
itself, to enable counsel to argue that Johnson was biased.
Further, defendant has not shown that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call
an expert witness on eyewitness identification, especially considering that counsel was able to
challenge the identification testimony through cross-examination. Moreover, because one of the
witnesses, Johnson, testified that he was familiar with defendant and had known him for two
years, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different had a
defense expert testified. Darden, supra at 132.
Lastly, as defendant concedes, the record does not support defendant’s claim that counsel
was ineffective because he did not give defendant an opportunity to testify at trial. Indeed,
defendant stated in a posttrial letter that counsel advised him not to testify after defendant
informed counsel that he was under a lot of stress, thus suggesting that defendant was not called
to testify as a matter of strategy. Moreover, defendant presented an alibi defense at trial and was
able to present that defense without his testimony, because two other alibi witnesses had already
testified.
For these reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that he was deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel at trial.
II. Defendant’s Standard 4 Brief
Defendant raises two issues in a pro se supplemental brief, filed pursuant to Supreme
Court Administrative Order No. 2004-6, Standard 4, neither of which has merit.
He first argues that his right to due process was violated because the police failed to
preserve exculpatory evidence, that evidence being fingerprint evidence from Goings’s car and a
party store videotape. Because defendant did not raise this issue below, it is unpreserved and our
review is limited to plain error affecting substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). There being no record support for defendant’s claim that the
challenged evidence ever existed, we reject this claim of error.
At trial, Goings testified that defendant reached for the door handle of his car as he drove
away and agreed that defendant “probably” touched it, but Goings did not recall whether he
mentioned that to the police. Investigator Fisher testified that he did not ask that the car be
examined for fingerprints because he “had nothing to indicate that anybody ever touched the
vehicle.” A police evidence technician testified that the car was in police custody, but he was
never asked to check it for fingerprints. Similarly, there is no indication in the record that a party
-3-
store videotape of the offense existed. Indeed, defendant states in his brief that the police failed
to even determine whether the store had a videotape.
Although the government must provide a defendant with existing exculpatory evidence in
its possession, it is not required to develop evidence that does not exist. People v Anstey, 476
Mich 436, 460-461; 719 NW2d 579 (2006); People v Sawyer, 222 Mich App 1, 6; 564 NW2d 62
(1997). Because the record indicates that Goings’s vehicle was never examined for fingerprints,
and there is no evidence of a videotape of the offense, defendant has not established a plain error
affecting his substantial rights.
Finally, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of
assault with intent to commit murder because the evidence failed to establish his identity as the
person who committed the offense, or to show that the perpetrator acted with the requisite intent
to kill. We disagree.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court reviews the
evidence de novo in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the charged crimes were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979);
People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 94-95; 617 NW2d 721 (2000). The standard of review is
deferential and this Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility
choices in support of the jury’s verdict. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78
(2000).
The elements of assault with intent to commit murder are: “(1) an assault, (2) with an
actual intent to kill, (3) which, if successful, would make the killing murder.” People v Brown,
267 Mich App 141, 147-148; 703 NW2d 230 (2005). “The intent to kill may be proven by
inference from any facts in evidence.” People v Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d
146 (1997).
In this case, Goings identified defendant as the person who shot at him, and Johnson
identified defendant as the person he observed fleeing the area while armed with a gun. This
testimony was sufficient to establish defendant’s identity as the person who committed the
charged offense. People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000). The
credibility of the witnesses’ testimony was for the trier of fact to resolve, and this Court will not
resolve it anew. Id. Furthermore, Goings’s testimony that defendant fired shots at his car and
that Goings was shot twice in the abdomen was sufficient to support an inference that defendant
acted with an intent to kill. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction
for assault with intent to commit murder.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.