MARY C LEE V UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - DEARBORN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY C LEE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN – DEARBORN
and ROBERT L SIMPSON,
No. 284541
Court of Claims
LC No. 2006-000046-MI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Cavanagh and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This action arises out of expulsion proceedings and determinations made by defendant,
University of Michigan – Dearborn (UMD), against Mary C. Lee, plaintiff and former UMD
student. After UMD decided to hold plaintiff’s expulsion in abeyance, plaintiff commenced this
action in the Court of Claims, alleging a 42 USC § 1983 claim individually against defendant
Provost Robert L. Simpson, breach of contract, and seeking a limited review of the proceedings
under Michigan’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The matter was removed to federal
district court, which dismissed plaintiff’s APA and § 1983 claim, and remanded the breach of
contract claim to the Court of Claims.1 That court granted summary disposition for defendants.
Plaintiff now appeals that order as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
The underlying facts of this case involve the events that led to plaintiff’s eventual
expulsion from UMD. In October 2005, one of UMD’s professors, Liana McMillan, made
allegations against plaintiff, asserting in a formal complaint to UMD that plaintiff had harassed
and stalked her, interfered with her ability to teach activities on campus, and had failed to
comply with the directives of campus security in violation of UMD’s Statement of Student
Rights and Code of Student Conduct (Code). Proceedings were initiated under UMD’s Judicial
1
While the action was pending in federal court plaintiff was expelled from UMD. Plaintiff did
not amend her complaint to incorporate her actual expulsion.
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Code and plaintiff was notified of a hearing to be held by UMD’s Non-Academic Conduct Board
(Hearing Board). The hearing was held on December 2, 2005, after which the Hearing Board
determined that plaintiff had violated the Code. During the hearing, no evidentiary standard was
announced and plaintiff was not permitted to cross-examine McMillan due to a timing conflict.
The Code, however, specifically provided these procedural criteria, as provided:
To find a respondent guilty, the Hearing Board must be convinced of the guilt of
the respondent by a preponderance of the evidence.
*
*
*
Respondents shall be accorded an opportunity to question information presented
against them at the hearing.
Subsequently, the Hearing Board ordered that plaintiff be expelled.
Plaintiff appealed this decision to defendant’s Appeal Board, alleging that the decision
was arbitrary and capricious, that the sanction was excessive, and that procedural errors resulted
in an unfair hearing. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the Hearing Board failed to comply with
the Code because she was not permitted to cross-examine McMillan, no standard of proof was
established when the Hearing Board was convened, and the Hearing Board members did not
approach the hearing with “open mind[s]” because they were provided materials prior to the
hearing. Subsequently, the Appeal Board determined that the Hearing Board’s sanction was
excessive and ordered that plaintiff’s expulsion be held in abeyance contingent upon plaintiff
refraining from making any contact with McMillan and seeking counseling. Despite the Appeal
Board’s decision, plaintiff nonetheless sought a re-hearing of the original decision, alleging that
she was denied a fair hearing and that the Hearing Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
Defendant Simpson denied the request consistent with UMD procedures.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint, asserting amongst other claims, breach of contract, which
is the only count of plaintiff’s complaint before this Court on appeal. Plaintiff’s claim alleged
that the Code constitutes a contract between UMD and plaintiff and that UMD’s determinations
breached the Code because those decisions did not comport with procedural or substantive due
process. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and MCR
2.116(C)(10), which the trial court granted. This appeal followed.
II. Standards of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s determination on a summary disposition motion.
Huntington Woods v Detroit, 279 Mich App 603, 614; 761 NW2d 127 (2008). Because the trial
court relied on evidence outside the pleadings, we will consider the trial court’s decision as based
upon MCR 2.116(C)(10). Silberstein v Pro-Golf of America, Inc, 278 Mich App 446, 457; 750
NW2d 615 (2008). In doing so, we must view all the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Huntington Woods, supra
at 614. Summary disposition was appropriate if no material factual dispute exists regarding a
genuine factual issue and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brown v
Brown, 478 Mich 545, 552; 739 NW2d 313 (2007).
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III. Breach of Contract
On appeal, plaintiff abandons any claim that UMD breached an express contract. Rather,
plaintiff posits several theories, albeit somewhat incoherently, under which she urges this Court
to find the existence of an implied contract: First, the Code itself constitutes an implied contract;
second, the Code creates an implied contract premised upon a theory of promissory estoppel;
and, third an implied contract arises from her supposed right to continued enrollment at UMD
free from arbitrary dismissal. In plaintiff’s view, UMD’s determinations were arbitrary and her
due process rights thereby violated because UMD did not strictly comply with the Code’s
requirements. We consider each of these arguments in turn.
A. The Code as an Implied Contract
First, as a matter of law, the Code itself, standing alone, does not create an implied
contract. Plaintiff’s argument that the Code per se creates an implied contract, in fact or in
law—which one, plaintiff does not specify—in effect asks this Court to recognize the Code as an
express contract under the guise of an implied contract. This we cannot do. Courts have
declined to strictly apply contract law in the context of student-university relationships and
claims that a contract exists between the university and the student have repeatedly failed. See
Cuddihy v Wayne State Univ Bd of Governors, 163 Mich App 153, 156-158; 413 NW2d 692
(1987); Amaya v Mott Community College, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued March 7, 1997 (Docket No. 186755); see also Doherty v Southern College of
Optemetry, 862 F 2d 570, 577 (CA 6, 1988). Further, this Court has implicitly rejected the
contention that student handbooks, codes, or other informational materials create contracts,
expressly or otherwise, between universities and their students. See Cuddihy, supra at 157-158;
see also Ewing v Bd of Regents of the Univ of Michigan, 559 F Supp 791, 800 (1983) (finding
informational materials did not expressly or through course of conduct contractually bind
university), rev’d 742 F2d 913 (CA 6, 1984), rev’d 474 US 214; 106 S Ct 507; 88 L Ed 2d 523,
ns 9 and 10 (1985) (citing district court’s opinion with approval). In any event, nothing with
regard to UMD’s course of conduct suggests that it intended to bind itself to strict compliance
with the Code’s requirements. Nor has plaintiff even alleged as such. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court properly granted summary disposition with regard to this issue.
B. Implied Contract Premised on Promissory Estoppel
Plaintiff’s second contention that the Code creates an implied contract that should be
enforced based on a theory of promissory estoppel is also unavailing. At the outset, we note that
plaintiff raises her promissory estoppel theory for the first time on appeal. Because it is not
properly preserved, we decline to review it. Shuler v Michigan Physicians Mut Liability Co, 260
Mich App 492, 523; 679 NW2d 106 (2004). In any case, even if we did consider plaintiff’s
promissory estoppel claim, it fails for several reasons. First, the claim was not properly plead
and thus summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) would have been appropriate had the
issue been before the trial court. Further, even if we were to overlook the insufficiency of the
pleadings, plaintiff’s claim would still fail as this Court has previously rejected promissory
estoppel claims in the context of student-university relationships. Cuddihy, supra at 156-158.
Moreover, promissory estoppel and implied contract are separate and distinguishable claims. An
implied contract does not necessarily arise out of the facts that lead to a promissory estoppel
claim and plaintiff does not explain how this may be the case in the instant matter, nor does she
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cite any authority in support of her theory. A party may not simply announce its position and
leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim, nor will this Court search
for authority in support of the party’s argument. Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich 87, 105; 580
NW2d 845 (1998). For all of these reasons, we cannot grant plaintiff the relief she seeks on this
basis.
C. Implied Contract Based on Due Process
Turning to plaintiff’s final argument, we find it prudent to follow the lead of the United
States Supreme Court and assume, without deciding, that a student enrolled at a university has an
implied contractual right to continued enrollment in the program that is a protected property
interest. Regents of the Univ of Michigan v Ewing, 474 US 214, 222-225; 106 S Ct 507; 88 L
Ed2d 523 (1983). This implied contractual right gives the student a right to continued
enrollment free from arbitrary dismissal. Id. In our view, the analysis to be applied is
functionally the same as a claim for procedural due process. It requires us to determine whether
UMD acted arbitrarily in first expelling plaintiff and then holding her expulsion in abeyance
upon appeal.2 Id. at 223. In other words, we must determine what process is due. At the very
minimum, what is required where a student faces a disciplinary process that threatens his or her
property interest is some type of notice and some opportunity to be heard. Goss v Lopez, 419 US
565, 579; 95 S Ct 729; 42 L Ed 2d 725 (1975); Birdsey v Grand Blanc Community Schools, 130
Mich App 718, 725; 344 NW2d 342 (1983). The due process required will vary depending on
the circumstances of each case. Flaim v Medical College of Ohio, 418 F3d 629, 634 (6 CA,
2005). Generally, in the context of disciplinary actions between a student and his or her
educational institution, courts have applied a balancing test of the following factors: “(1) the
nature of the private interest affected—that is, the seriousness of the charge and potential
sanctions, (2) the danger of error and the benefit of additional or alternate procedures, and (3) the
public or governmental burden were additional procedures mandated.” Id. at 635; see also
Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335; 96 S Ct 893; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976). In balancing these
factors, courts have kept in mind that although universities are not courts of law, the goal is that
students facing serious sanctions should be afforded a fundamentally fair hearing. Flaim, supra
at 635 n 1.
After our review of the record, it is plain that UMD sufficiently met due process
requirements. Plaintiff was provided notice of the hearing via email and through a letter. At that
time, she was also provided with a written statement of the allegations against her. At the
hearing, she was permitted to provide witnesses, present her version of the events, as well as
record the hearing. After the Hearing Board’s determination, she was afforded an opportunity to
appeal, which she did. During these proceedings, plaintiff was permitted to continue her
educational program uninterrupted. Under these circumstances, we conclude that UMD’s
expulsion determinations were not arbitrary, but rather were grounded in sound professional
judgment and consistent with due process.
2
Notably, because plaintiff did not amend her complaint to include her actual expulsion, our
review of UMD’s actions only involves the two previous expulsion-related determinations.
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The pith of plaintiff’s due process argument, however, is that UMD did not strictly abide
by the Code’s requirements and thus her due process rights were violated. Specifically, plaintiff
contends she was not permitted to cross-examine McMillan and that the burden of proof was not
provided to the Hearing Board before proceedings commenced, in violation of the Code.3 It is
true that the Code required the application of an evidentiary standard and permitted plaintiff the
opportunity to question the evidence presented against her. However, it is important to recognize
that the implied contractual right plaintiff seeks to protect arises, not from the provisions of the
Code, but from the due process requirements of the Constitution. And, as should be clear from
the above discussion, due process requires much less than that which the Code would provide.
Unfortunately for plaintiff, the Code, as well as other informational materials of a University,
does not rise to the level of an enforceable statute or rule of law, and does not even constitute a
contract, as already discussed.
In any event, assuming that all the technical errors that plaintiff complains of occurred, it
does not follow that UMD’s failure to strictly comply with the Code constitutes a violation of
due process. With respect to the burden of proof, all that is required under the Michigan
Constitution is that UMD’s decision be supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; see also McBride v Pontiac School District, 218 Mich App
113, 122-123; 553 NW2d 646 (1995). Thus, under Michigan law, due process does not require
that UMD enunciate an evidentiary standard to be applied in the context of disciplinary
proceedings. Further, cross-examination is generally not a necessary due process requirement in
the school-disciplinary proceedings, Jaksa v Regents of Univ of Michigan, 597 F Supp 1245,
1252-1253 (ED Mich, 1984), and plaintiff has not explained why it should have been
constitutionally required in her case, especially in light of the additional burden it would have
imposed on UMD. In short, although plaintiff was facing a serious sanction for her actions,
nothing about these additional procedural requirements would have made UMD’s determinations
any more accurate or any more fair such that this Court should rule that these procedures are
constitutionally required in cases like plaintiff’s. Flaim, 418 F3d at 635. The trial court did not
err by granting summary disposition for defendants.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
3
Notably, plaintiff failed to provide any affidavits or other documentary evidence showing that
UMD breached the Code and merely relied upon her own assertions. “[A] party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleading, but must, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided . . . , set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Bell v Fox, 206 Mich App 522, 524; 522 NW2d 869 (1994) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Failure to provide a genuine issue for trial provides a proper basis upon which to grant
summary disposition, as the trial court did here.
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