PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY WAYNE WARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 12, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 284314
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 03-006707-FC
ANTHONY WAYNE WARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murray and Stephens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the partial denial and partial grant of his motion for a
new trial, in which he was resentenced for his jury trial convictions of one count of criminal
sexual conduct, first degree, MCL 750.520b(1)(a), and four counts of criminal sexual conduct,
second degree, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). The court resentenced defendant to concurrent sentences
of 81 months to 18 years for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction and 81 months
to 15 years for the second-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions. We affirm, but remand
for correction of inaccuracies in the sentencing information report and the correction of errors in
defendant’s presentence investigation report.
Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of four counts of second-degree
criminal sexual conduct for which the victims were his live-together girlfriend’s two daughters,
both of whom were under the age of 13, and one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct
against one of the daughters.1 He was sentenced and appealed his convictions, which this Court
affirmed.2 He then brought this motion for relief from judgment claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel at trial and at sentencing and newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel and newly
discovered evidence, but granted defendant a resentencing hearing and reduced his sentence
1
For the purposes of this opinion, the victims will be referred to as “victim one” and “victim
two.”
2
People v Anthony Wayne Ward, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of Appeals,
issued March 1, 2005 (Docket No. 251407).
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based on incorrect scoring of the guidelines and a miscalculation of credit for time served. The
trial court also ordered a correction of the presentence investigation report.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the scoring of the sentencing
guidelines. “This Court reviews a sentencing court’s decision to determine whether the trial
court properly exercised its discretion and whether the record evidence adequately supports a
particular score.” People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 671; 672 NW2d 860 (2003). In his
motion for relief from judgment, defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the scoring of offense variables (OVs) 3, 4, and 9. Although it is clear from the
transcript of the sentencing hearing that the parties agreed to score OV 3 and 9 at zero points,
rather than ten, the corrections were not made on the Sentencing Information Report.
Furthermore, that report mistakenly states that the trial court scored OV 4, which is at issue on
appeal and discussed below, at zero points, rather than ten points as the court stated at the
sentencing hearing. The Sentencing Information Report, therefore, lists a total OV of 55 points
and Level III. The Sentencing Information Report should reflect a total OV of 45 points, which
is still Level III. Defendant was sentenced to the minimum sentence within the corresponding
guidelines range of 81 to 135 months.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in scoring OV 4 at ten points. MCL 777.34
provides that OV 4 is scored at ten points if the victim suffered serious psychological injury that
may require psychological treatment and notes that the fact that treatment was not sought is not
conclusive. The prosecution stipulated that victim one, the victim of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, did not seek psychological treatment. However, the testimony of the very young victim
regarding her tearful supplication to defendant not to assault her, along with defendant’s parental
relationship to the victim, support the trial court’s determination that the victim one may require
psychological services in the future. Therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
scoring OV 4 at ten points.
Although defendant’s OV was scored incorrectly on the Sentencing Information Report,
the error was harmless because the recommended minimum sentence range of the sentencing
guidelines would not change with the corrected score. See People v McGee, 280 Mich App 680,
686; ___ NW2d ___ (2008). Sentences within the appropriate guidelines range will not be
disturbed on appeal. See People v Melton, 271 Mich App 590, 596; 722 NW2d 698 (2006).
However, on remand for correction of defendant’s presentence investigation report (see below),
the inaccurate scoring of OV 3, 4, and 9 on defendant’s sentencing information report should
also be corrected. Id. at 593, 596.
Defendant’s presentence investigation report contains the inaccurate statements that the
evidence showed that victim one had been penetrated by defendant’s penis, and victim two stated
that she had been threatened with a whipping if she did not go along with defendant’s sexual
demands. The evidence does not support these assertions, as defendant argued below and the
prosecution conceded. MCL 771.14(6) provides that a trial court must order inaccuracies be
corrected in presentence information reports before the reports are transmitted to the Department
of Corrections. Although the trial court found that the presentence information report was
inaccurate and trial court ordered correction of the presentence information report, both parties
agree that the presentence information report was not corrected. Corrections of this type may be
made at any time. MCR 6.435. Therefore, this matter is remanded for correction of the
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presentence information report. The corrected presentence investigation report should be
forwarded to the Department of Corrections.
Defendant’s Standard 4 Brief
Defendant raises several issues in his supplemental brief, filed in propria persona and
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 2004-4, Standard 4, none of which have
merit.
First, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial
based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed
for clear error, while its constitutional determinations are reviewed de novo. People v LeBlanc,
465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland
v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
Defendant first challenges his counsel’s failure to impeach victim one with
inconsistencies in her testimony regarding when these events occurred. The trial court correctly
found that defendant did not suffer prejudice because, in criminal sexual conduct cases involving
children victims, time is not of the essence nor is it a material element of the offense. People v
Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 83; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). Defendant’s arguments that his case is
distinguishable do not establish prejudice where there was no confusion regarding the charged
offenses.
Defendant next claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. Prosecutors may not make statements that
are not supported by the facts in evidence, but may make arguments based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 450;
669 NW2d 818 (2003). Although there were instances where the prosecutor misstated the facts
in evidence, the misstatements were minor and no instance was so prejudicial to defendant that it
was not cured by the trial court’s instruction that the prosecution’s argument was not evidence.
People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). Because the prosecutor’s
misstatements of the facts were not prejudicial, defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel’s
failure to object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Next, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to address the seconddegree criminal sexual conduct charges in his closing argument. Although brief, counsel noted
in his closing that defendant denied all of the charges and that the case hung on the credibility of
the witnesses and then specifically addressed the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge.
“This Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel in matters of trial strategy, nor
will it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” People v Rockey, 237 Mich
App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Defendant has not established that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by the
closing argument. Strickland, supra at 668.
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Finally, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a socalled medical diagnosis defense to the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge. Defendant
testified that he examined victim one’s vagina for injury, but that he did not touch her, instead
motioning with his thumbs for her to open her vagina. An element of the offense of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct is that it be sexual penetration, and clearly penetration for legitimate
medical purposes is not sexual penetration. MCL 750.520b. Defense counsel did not argue that
the touching was for medical purposes, but instead argued that there was no penetration. Again,
“this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel in matters of trial strategy, nor will
it assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight.” Rockey, supra at 76-77. Further,
defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the failure to make this argument where he
made the argument himself during his testimony. The trial court did not err in finding that
defendant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
a new trial based on recanted testimony. “For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly
discovered evidence, it must be shown that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality,
was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) including the
new evidence upon retrial would probably produce a different result; and (4) the party could not,
using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial.” People v
Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 118 n 6; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). Here, recanted testimony of one of the
victims in a criminal sexual conduct case would qualify as the type of newly discovered evidence
for which a trial court could grant a new trial. However, this Court must give due regard to the
trial court’s “superior opportunity to appraise the credibility of the recanting witness and other
witnesses.” People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 560; 496 NW2d 336 (1992). The trial court
denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, finding the recantation unreliable because the
recantation was not unequivocal and victim one did not recant her entire testimony, because
victim two did not recant her testimony, and because defendant’s testimony supported some of
victim one’s testimony, including the basis for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct count.
The basis of defendant’s claim is a letter sent to him in prison by victim one, stating that
“I’m really sorry you got put in jail. I was not the one who told it was [victim two], but you did
not even do that stuff to use (sic) in the first place.” The trial court was present for victim one’s
testimony and had a better opportunity than this Court to determine if victim one’s testimony
was reliable. Further, we agree with the reasons listed by the trial court for finding the
recantation unreliable. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the recantation
was unreliable and did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial
based on recanted testimony.
Affirmed but remanded for the correction of defendant’s sentencing information report
and presentence investigation report and forwarding the corrected reports to the Department of
Corrections. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens
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