JOSEPH HINZ V MICHIGAN STATE UNIV BD OF TRUSTEES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH HINZ, as Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF JOHN ALLEN HAWKINS,
deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
May 7, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 285125
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 07-001056-NI
ALAN ALMY,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
ALEXANDER HAMIL,
Defendant.
JOSEPH HINZ, as Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF JOHN ALLEN HAWKINS,
deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF
TRUSTEES,
No. 285126
Court of Claims
LC No. 07-000026-MZ
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Shapiro, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 285125, defendant Alan Almy appeals as of right the circuit court’s order
denying his motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). In Docket No. 285126,
defendant Michigan State University Board of Trustees (MSU) appeals as of right the Court of
Claims’s order denying its motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). We reverse
and remand.
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I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
At approximately 5:15 a.m., on March 18, 2005, Almy, a Michigan State University
(MSU) electrician, was in possession of a 2003 Chevrolet pick-up truck owned by MSU. Almy
left the truck unattended while it was running and unlocked, and parked in an area adjacent to
MSU’s Physical Plant Building. Almy left the vehicle to go inside the Physical Plant Building to
talk to fellow employees. Almy returned to the parking spot where he left the truck to find that
the truck was gone. Almy’s actions of leaving the keys in the unlocked and unattended vehicle,
allegedly contradicted MSU Basic Performance Standards Policy Numbers 8.01 and 11.02, as
well as City of East Lansing Ordinance, Sec. 44-372.
On the evening of March 17, 2005, and into the morning hours of March 18, 2005,
Alexander Hamil, age 19, had visited with friends at residence halls on the MSU campus and
consumed alcohol. Somewhere between 5:15 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., on March 18, 2005, Hamil left
the residence hall alone and walked by the MSU Physical Plant Building. While still inebriated,
Hamil, apparently attracted to the unattended, unlocked, running vehicle, got into the MSU truck
and drove off. While traveling at a high-speed rate, Hamil drove the truck eastbound on Grand
River Avenue in East Lansing, Michigan, while, at the same time and place, Hawkins, was
driving his Chevrolet Suburban westbound. Hamil drove across the centerline into oncoming
traffic and struck Hawkins’s vehicle head-on, killing Hawkins.
Joseph Hinz, as personal representative of the estate of John Hawkins, filed a complaint
in the Court of Claims against MSU and Almy. Hinz alleged, in pertinent part, that MSU,
through the acts of its employee, Almy, was negligent, or grossly negligent, for leaving the MSU
truck unattended while it was unlocked and running. Hinz also argued that MSU was liable
under MCL 691.1405, the “motor vehicle” exception to governmental immunity.
MSU moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). MSU argued that
it was immune from tort liability and that no exception to the general rule of immunity was
applicable in this case. More specifically, MSU argued that the motor vehicle exception did not
apply because an MSU employee was not negligently operating the MSU vehicle involved in the
accident at the time of the collision. MSU clarified that “‘“operation of a motor vehicle”
encompasses activities that are directly associated with the driving of a motor vehicle.’”1 Hinz
responded, arguing that MSU was liable when Almy was grossly negligent for failing to conform
to the MSU Performance Standards and the East Lansing ordinance regarding leaving vehicles
unattended.
After hearing oral arguments on the motion, the Court of Claims entered an order, neither
granting nor denying MSU’s motion for summary disposition at that time and allowing the
matter to proceed to discovery. The Michigan Supreme Court then ordered the Court of Claims
to rule on MSU’s motion for summary disposition.2 The Court of Claims held another hearing,
1
Quoting Chandler v Muskegon Co, 467 Mich 315, 321; 652 NW2d 224 (2002).
2
Board of Trustees of Mich State Univ v Court of Claims Judge, 480 Mich 1052; 743 NW2d 902
(2008).
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and then subsequently entered an order denying MSU’s motion for summary disposition. In so
ruling, the Court of Claims concluded that there was a sufficient allegation that Almy left the
vehicle in an “operational state” to bring Hinz’s claims within the motor vehicle exception.
Joseph Hinz, as personal representative of the estate of John Hawkins, also filed a
negligence action against Almy and Hamil in the Ingham Circuit Court. Hinz alleged, in
pertinent part, that Almy was grossly negligent for leaving the MSU truck unattended while it
was unlocked and running. Almy moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and
(8). Almy argued that, under the facts alleged, his conduct did not rise to the level of gross
negligence and, therefore, Hinz’s claim was not cognizable under § 7(2)3 of the Governmental
Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Almy further argued that the alleged facts demonstrated that he was
not the proximate cause of Hawkins’s death. Hinz responded, arguing that Almy was grossly
negligent for failing to conform to the MSU Performance Standards and the East Lansing
ordinance regarding leaving vehicles unattended. Hinz further argued that Almy was the
proximate cause of Hawkins’s death.
After hearing oral arguments on the motion, the circuit court concluded that the simple
act of leaving a running vehicle unlocked and unattended did not rise to the level of gross
negligence. The circuit court went on to find that, even assuming it was gross negligence, it
could not conclude that Almy’s conduct was the proximate cause of the accident. Accordingly,
the circuit court granted Almy’s motion for summary disposition.
Hinz then moved for reconsideration, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding
that Almy’s conduct was not the proximate cause of the accident. Hinz argued that there was at
least a question of fact regarding whether Almy’s conduct was “the” proximate cause of
Hawkins’s death, thereby precluding summary disposition. In other words, Hinz argued that the
issue of proximate cause should have been reserved for determination by a factfinder. Almy
responded, arguing that Hinz’s motion was without merit.
After hearing oral arguments on the motion, the circuit court stated its ruling and
reasoning on the record. In doing so, the circuit court first quoted the following statement from
Robinson v City of Detroit,4 “‘[I]n MCL 691.1407[(2)(c)] . . . the Legislature provided to[rt]
immunity for employees of governmental agencies unless the employee’s conduct amounts to
gross negligence that is the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the injury or
damage, i.e., the proximate cause.’” The circuit court then went on to reason:
Michigan Civil Jury Instruction 15.03 makes clear that the proximate cause is not
necessarily the last cause. The argument I’m hearing on behalf of the Defendant
is somehow I’m to read this language as meaning the last cause. I mean, what is
the proximate cause is . . . quite clearly a factual question.
3
MCL 691.1407(2).
4
Robinson v City of Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 462; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (alterations added).
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In many cases, and in fact, the Robinson case it can be determined as a
matter of fact. And they said police officers who were chasing individuals where
the individuals themselves in vehicles—non-governmental vehicles cause injury,
that they said is matter of fact and law—well actually they said as a matter of law.
And they conclude, Justice Taylor, at the same page, “Applying this construction
to the present cases, we hold that the officers in question are immune from suit
[in] tort because their pursuit of the fleeing vehicles was not[,] as a matter of law,
quote, ‘the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.’ The one
most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries was the
reckless conduct of the drivers of the fleeing vehicles.”[5]
I agree. In—in this case, there may have been some reckless conduct, but
I’m not prepared to say it’s a matter of law and fact. I mean, we—one thing we
know for sure, but for this conduct, this could not have occurred. That’s not true.
That is not true in the Robinson case. It’s a—it’s less clear perhaps in the
Helfner[6] case, but absolutely, if these keys are not left in the vehicle, this does
not occur. And as I say, they’re left under circumstances. Anybody who takes
this vehicle is taking it in violation of the authority of the University, in violation
of law, probably has some criminal intent.
And so, I think that a fact-finder could conclude that the immediate,
efficient, and direct cause was this failure. And I’m satisfied that it—this conduct
as described is at least a fact question as well as to whether or not there’s gross
negligence. There was error in the initial determination of the motion.
Accordingly, the circuit court granted Hinz’s motion for reconsideration, set aside its previous
order granting Almy summary disposition, and denied Almy’s motion for summary disposition.
MSU and Almy appealed, and their appeals have been consolidated.7
II. Motions For Summary Disposition
A. Standard Of Review
MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides that a motion for summary disposition may be raised on the
ground that a claim is barred because of immunity granted by law. Neither party is required to
file supportive material; any documentation that is provided to the court, however, must be
admissible evidence.8 The plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true
5
Quoting Robinson, supra at 462 (alterations added).
6
Helfner v Center Line Public Schools, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued June 20, 2006 (Docket No. 265757).
7
Hinz v Almy, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 5, 2008 (Docket Nos.
285125; 285126).
8
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).
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and construed in the plaintiff’s favor, unless the movant contradicts such evidence with
documentation.9 This Court reviews de novo the applicability of governmental immunity.10
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration.11
B. Gross Negligence
Almy argues that the circuit court erred in its determination that Hinz met his burden to
plead in avoidance on Almy’s immunity because the complaint did not set forth a cognizable
gross negligence claim and when no reasonable person could find that a governmental
employee’s conduct was grossly negligent, policy favors a court’s timely grant of summary
disposition. We agree.
The GTLA provides broad immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies and
their employees whenever they are engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental
function.12 Moreover, governmental employees carrying out a governmental function are
immune from tort liability under the GTLA so long as the employee’s conduct does not
constitute gross negligence. Specifically, MCL 691.1407(2) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the
discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and
employee of a governmental agency, . . . is immune from tort liability for an
injury to a person or damage to property caused by the officer [or]
employee . . . while in the course of employment or service . . . while acting on
behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:
***
(c) The officer’s [or] employee’s . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence
that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage.
Gross negligence is, “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern
for whether an injury results.”13 “[E]vidence of ordinary negligence does not create a material
question of fact concerning gross negligence.”14 “The plain language of the governmental
immunity statute indicates that the Legislature limited employee liability to situations where the
9
MCR 2.116(G)(5); Maiden, supra at 119; Smith v Kowalski, 223 Mich App 610, 616; 567
NW2d 463 (1997).
10
Baker v Waste Mgt of Michigan, Inc, 208 Mich App 602, 605; 528 NW2d 835 (1995).
11
Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 233; 611 NW2d 333 (2000).
12
Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 595; 363 NW2d 641 (1984); see
MCL 691.1407.
13
MCL 691.1407(7)(a).
14
Maiden, supra at 122.
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contested conduct was substantially more than negligent.”15 It is the responsibility of the party
seeking to impose liability on the governmental agency to prove that the alleged conduct was
grossly negligent.16 “To establish gross negligence as statutorily defined, the plaintiff must focus
on the actions of the governmental employee, not on the result of those actions.”17 To constitute
gross negligence conduct must suggest “almost a willful disregard of precautions or measures to
attend to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks.”18 If reasonable jurors could
honestly reach different conclusions as to whether conduct constitutes gross negligence, the issue
is a factual question for the jury. However, if reasonable minds could not differ, the issue may
be determined by summary disposition.19
We initially note that, here, it is undisputed that Almy, while starting his shift as an MSU
electrician, was performing a government function when the injury occurred.
Contrary to Hinz’s argument that Almy was grossly negligent for leaving the truck
unattended, with the keys in the ignition, and the engine running, we conclude that Almy’s
conduct was not so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury
resulted. Although Almy’s conduct may have been careless, reasonable minds would agree that
this conduct does not amount to gross negligence. That is, no reasonable juror could honestly
conclude that Almy’s conduct suggested “a willful disregard of precautions or measures to attend
to safety and a singular disregard for substantial risks.”20
Indeed, conduct similar to Almy’s has previously been held to not even rise to the level
of negligence, let alone gross negligence. In Terry v Detroit,21 a GM employee left the keys in
an unattended and unlocked, GM-owned vehicle. Subsequently, the vehicle was stolen, driven in
a high-speed police chase, and then crashed into another vehicle.22 This Court reasoned,
while it may be foreseeable to a vehicle owner that, if he leaves his keys in the
ignition, the vehicle might be stolen and driven recklessly or negligently, we
believe that this fact alone is insufficient to create liability in this type of case.
***
15
Id. at 121.
16
See Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 201; 649 NW2d 47 (2002).
17
Maiden, supra at 127 n 10.
18
In re Estate of Tarlea, 263 Mich App 80, 90; 687 NW2d 333 (2004).
19
Jackson v Saginaw Co, 458 Mich 141, 146-147; 580 NW2d 870 (1998); Briggs v Oakland Co,
276 Mich App 369, 374; 742 NW2d 136 (2007).
20
Tarlea, supra at 90.
21
Terry v Detroit, 226 Mich App 418, 421; 573 NW2d 348 (1997).
22
Id. at 420-421.
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[W]e conclude that GM did not have a duty to protect plaintiffs from the harm
that resulted from [the defendant’s] theft of GM’s vehicle and subsequent reckless
driving. Plaintiffs stress foreseeability based on GM’s alleged policy of leaving
keys in unlocked vehicles and its knowledge of prior thefts. However, we find
that the connection between GM’s conduct and plaintiffs’ injuries was simply too
attenuated to impose a duty and resulting liability for breach of the duty on GM.
Rather, the accident was more closely connected to [the defendant’s] criminal
conduct in stealing GM’s vehicle and driving recklessly.
***
In sum, we simply do not find that GM’s practice of leaving keys in employee
automobiles creates the kind of unreasonable risk of harm to third persons such as
plaintiffs that would warrant the imposition of a duty under this state’s common
law. To hold otherwise would, in effect, make parties like GM insurers against
the criminal misconduct of others.[23]
Notably, in support of his position Hinz relies on Davis v Thorton, to support the
proposition that the act of leaving keys in an unlocked, unattended, and possibly still-running
vehicle can give rise to liability for negligence when such conduct violates an ordinance. Here,
Almy allegedly violated an MSU policy and an East Lansing city ordinance by leaving the
vehicle unattended, with the keys in the car, and the engine running. However, this Court has
held that the presumption arising from violation of an ordinance or statute is merely one of
ordinary negligence, not gross negligence.24 And, as stated, “evidence of ordinary negligence
does not create a material question of fact concerning gross negligence.”25
Additionally, although it is tragic that Almy’s careless conduct ultimately led to
Hawkins’s death, as stated, the proper focus is on the government employee’s actions, not on the
result of those actions.26 The mere fact that a death results from a government employee’s
actions does not in and of itself support a conclusion that the employee acted in a manner that
evidenced a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury occurred.27
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in determining that Hinz had met
his burden to plead in avoidance of Almy’s immunity and, therefore, erred in denying Almy’s
motion for summary disposition.
23
Id. at 426, 427-428 (emphasis in original).
24
Poppen v Tovey, 256 Mich App 351, 358; 664 NW2d 269 (2003).
25
Maiden, supra at 122.
26
Id. at 127 n 10.
27
Id.
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C. Proximate Cause
Almy argues that the circuit court erred in ruling that his asserted negligence may be
“the” proximate cause of Hawkins’s death as a matter of law. We agree.
To be the proximate cause of an injury, gross negligence of a government employee that
subjects him to liability must be the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding
the injury.28 Proximate cause is usually a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact, but if the
facts bearing on proximate cause are not disputed and if reasonable minds could not differ, then
the issue is one of law for the court.29
In his brief, Hinz gives many different dictionary definitions for the word “proximate”
because he claims that this Court may turn to dictionary definitions to help construe an
ambiguous term; however, Hinz fails to mention that the Robinson Court already defined
proximate as the “one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury.”30 And
we are bound to follow that interpretation.31
In Robinson v City of Detroit, the plaintiff was the personal representative of a passenger
sitting in the backseat of car that was involved in a collision.32 Detroit police officers had
noticed the car weaving from lane to lane, so they activated their police lights.33 Instead of
stopping, however, the driver of the car began to flee and then hit another non-police vehicle.34
The backseat passenger died as a result of the collision.35 The plaintiff sued the individual police
officers seeking to hold them personally liable, but the Michigan Supreme Court held that the
police officers’ conduct was not the proximate cause of the resulting injury, rather the proximate
cause was the reckless conduct of the driver of the fleeing vehicle.36 According to the Court,
“the Legislature provided tort immunity for employees of governmental agencies unless the
employee’s conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the one most immediate, efficient, and
direct cause of the injury or damage, i.e., the proximate cause.”37 The police officers were
28
Robinson, supra at 462.
29
Nichols v Dobler, 253 Mich App 530, 532; 655 NW2d 787 (2002); Dep’t of Trans v
Christensen, 229 Mich App 417, 424; 581 NW2d 807 (1998); Rogalski v Tavernier, 208 Mich
App 302, 306; 527 NW2d 73 (1995).
30
Robinson, supra at 446.
31
People v Beasley, 239 Mich App 548, 556; 609 NW2d 581 (2000).
32
Robinson, supra at 448-449.
33
Id. at 449.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 449, 462.
37
Id. at 462.
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immune from liability because their conduct was not the one most immediate, efficient, and
direct cause preceding the injury.38
Like in Robinson, where the police officers’ conduct was a cause of the injury but not the
proximate cause, Almy’s conduct was a cause of the resulting injury but it was not the proximate
cause. As in Robinson, where the driver recklessly fleeing was the one most immediate,
efficient, and direct cause preceding the injury, in this case the one most immediate, efficient,
and direct cause preceding the injury was not Almy leaving the keys in the car with the engine
running but Hamil stealing the car, driving it recklessly, and crashing it into Hawkin’s car.
Accordingly, because the facts in this case are undisputed and reasonable minds could not
differ, we conclude that the circuit court erred in ruling that Almy’s asserted negligence may be
the proximate cause of Hawkin’s death as a matter of law, and, therefore, the court erred in
denying Almy’s motion for summary disposition.
D. The Motor Vehicle Exception
MSU argues that the Court of Claims erred in concluding that Hinz met his burden to
plead in avoidance of MSU’s governmental immunity by invoking the motor vehicle exception
to the GTLA and claiming that the death resulted from Almy’s operation of the truck. We agree.
“To survive a motion for summary disposition, brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the
plaintiff must allege facts warranting the application of an exception to governmental
immunity.”39 MCL 691.1405(5), the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, states
that:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage
resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the
governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is
owner. . . .
In Chandler v Muskegon Co, the plaintiff, not a government employee, was helping to
clean transit buses for Muskegon County.40 A Muskegon County employee parked one of the
buses, turned off the engine, and started to exit through the bus doors when the doors closed on
his neck for failure to release the hydraulic air pressure valve.41 The plaintiff attempted to pry
the doors open and injured his shoulder in the process.42 The Michigan Supreme Court held that:
38
Id.
39
Smith, supra at 616.
40
Chandler, supra at 316.
41
Id.
42
Id.
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In the context of a motor vehicle, the common usage of the term “operation”
refers to the ordinary use of the vehicle as a motor vehicle, namely, driving the
vehicle. In this case, the injury to plaintiff did not arise from the negligent
operation of the bus as a motor vehicle. The plaintiff was not injured incident to
the vehicle’s operation as a motor vehicle. Rather, the vehicle was parked in a
maintenance facility for the purpose of maintenance and was not at the time being
operated as a motor vehicle.[43]
Chandler, therefore, makes clear that the negligent operation of a vehicle requires that the motor
vehicle was being operated as a motor vehicle, and the exception encompasses only activities
that are directly associated with the actual driving of a motor vehicle.44
The dissent argues that the injury in this case directly relates to the vehicle’s operation
because “[t]urning on the vehicle’s engine for the purpose of driving it on the public roads is
operation of the vehicle.”45 Arguably, as the trial court also concluded, Almy left the vehicle in
an “operational state,” which facilitated Hamil’s driving away of the vehicle. However, this
Court’s decision in Poppen v Tovey46 is instructive on this point. In Poppen, the defendant, a
municipal employee who drove a city truck, parked the truck on a curb, turned it off, left the
warning lights on, and walked away for several minutes.47 The plaintiff struck the parked truck
from behind and suffered injury from being ejected from his vehicle during the crash.48 This
Court held that the motor vehicle exception to the GTLA did not apply because the municipal
employee was not operating the truck when he walked away from it and the vehicle’s presence
on the road was no longer directly associated with driving.49 Although the facts in this case are
not identical to Poppen, when Almy parked and left the vehicle, its presence on the road was no
longer directly associated with driving, and Almy himself was no longer operating it as a motor
vehicle.
The dissent also cites Martin v Inter-Urban Transit50 to support its position that operation
of a motor vehicle need not directly involve the driving of the vehicle. In Martin, the plaintiff
slipped and fell down the steps of a shuttle bus that the City of Grand Rapids owned and
operated.51 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiff satisfied the motor vehicle
exception to governmental immunity because “[t]he loading and unloading of passengers is an
43
Id. at 321-322 (emphasis in original).
44
Id. at 320-321.
45
Post at ___.
46
Poppen, supra.
47
Id. at 352.
48
Id. at 352, 253.
49
Id. at 356.
50
Martin v Inter-Urban Transit, 480 Mich 936; 740 NW2d 657 (2007) (Martin II).
51
Martin v Inter-Urban Transit, 271 Mich App 492, 493; 722 NW2d 262 (2006) (Martin I).
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action within the ‘operation’ of a shuttle bus.”52 We believe this case is distinguishable from
Martin. In its short opinion, the Michigan Supreme Court was specifically speaking to the
operation of shuttle buses, the purpose of which is to load people onto the bus, drive them to
their destination, and unload them; making the loading and unloading of people part of the
operation of the shuttle bus. Thus, Martin does not bear on the circumstances here.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Court of Claims erred in concluding that Hinz met his
burden to plead in avoidance of MSU’s governmental immunity by invoking the motor vehicle
exception to the GTLA and claiming that the death resulted from Almy’s operation of the truck.
Reversed and remanded for entry of orders granting Almy and MSU summary
disposition. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
52
Martin II, supra at 936.
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