PEOPLE OF MI V JAMONE D'ANGELO ARMSTRONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 28, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283949
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 07-020140-FC
JAMONE D’ANGELO ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and Murphy and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of carjacking, MCL
750.529a, armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. He
was sentenced to concurrent prison sentences of 12½ to 25 years for carjacking, 12½ to 25 years
for armed robbery, and one to five years for felon in possession of a firearm, all consecutive to a
two-year prison sentence, with jail credit of 157 days, for felony-firearm. We affirm. This
appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant presents various arguments challenging the trial court’s aiding and abetting
instructions. This issue has been waived for appeal because defendant’s trial attorney stated at
trial that he was satisfied with the jury instructions as given. Michigan case law holds that an
affirmative endorsement of jury instructions waives any future claim of error. People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 215-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000); People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 57; 687
NW2d 342 (2004). Further, even if we considered the issue, reversal is unwarranted. To give a
particular jury instruction, there must be supporting evidence. People v Johnson, 171 Mich App
801, 804; 430 NW2d 828 (1988). A trial court’s determination whether a jury instruction is
applicable to the facts of a case is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Gillis, 474 Mich
105, 113; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). In this case, the evidence showed that defendant and two other
men acted in concert to rob the complainant of her car, cell phone, and purse, while defendant
pointed a gun at her, which supported an instruction on aiding and abetting for the crimes of
carjacking, armed robbery, and felony-firearm. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
instructing the jury on that theory of defendant’s guilt. Moreover, the instructions, while not
perfect, ultimately and fairly presented the elements of aiding and abetting. Imperfect
instructions do not give rise to error necessitating reversal if they fairly present the issues being
tried and sufficiently protect the defendant’s rights. People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574;
624 NW2d 439 (2000).
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Defendant next contends that he was denied his right of allocution, which requires a
sentencing court to give the defendant an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances he
believes the court should consider in passing sentence. MCR 6.425(E)(1)(c). Defendant failed to
raise this argument at sentencing. Therefore, we review it for plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). In People
v Petit, 466 Mich 624, 636; 648 NW2d 193 (2002), the Supreme Court found that the defendant
was given the opportunity to address the court when the court asked if there was “anything
further.” In this case, the sentencing court specifically stated defendant’s name when it asked:
“Mr. Armstrong, anything you wish to add, correct, modify or say before I proceed with
sentencing, Mr. Noble?” We find that the fact that the court ended the inquiry by also addressing
defense counsel by name did not cancel out its prior address to defendant. The court continued
by asking several times in general if there was “anything else” before it imposed defendant’s
sentence. These inquiries made by the sentencing court provided defendant with several
opportunities to speak on his own behalf if he so desired. Therefore, defendant was properly
afforded the opportunity to speak and was not denied the right of allocution. We also find that,
because defendant was properly afforded the opportunity to speak, his counsel was not
ineffective for failing to protect defendant’s right of allocution. Matuszak, supra at 58.
Finally, defendant argues that the sentencing court should have granted him additional
credit for the days he served in jail while facing charges in another case. The charges in that
other case arose within 24 hours of this case and involved use of the same white Ford Taurus that
was driven by one of the accomplices in this case. Defendant argues that the cases were related,
and he should have been given additional jail credit for the time served in the second case.
Defendant’s argument fails because the sentencing credit statute specifically provides that a
defendant is entitled to credit for time served “for the offense of which he is convicted.” MCL
769.11b; see People v Adkins, 433 Mich 732, 750; 449 NW2d 400 (1989). We also note that,
while the Taurus was involved in the two criminal cases, the cases entailed two separate and
unrelated criminal offenses. Although in Adkins, supra at 751 n 10, the Supreme Court stated in
dicta that a sentencing judge is not prohibited from granting sentence credit for time spent
incarcerated for other offenses if the court thought such action was appropriate, there was no
indication in this case that the sentencing court thought it would be appropriate to give defendant
additional credit. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to a recalculation of the credit given for
days served in jail for his other case.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
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