PEOPLE OF MI V MARK MCGIVNEY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 23, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 282547
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-013049-FH
MARK MCGIVNEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Gleicher, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right his jury trial convictions of seven counts of child sexually
abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2), and seven counts of using a computer to commit a crime,
MCL 752.796. Defendant was sentenced, as a second habitual offender, MCL 769.10, on
October 19, 2007, to 7 to 30 years in prison for all 14 convictions. We affirm.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the jury’s verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence. We disagree.
A trial court’s grant or denial of a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Unger, 278 Mich
App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence only
if the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of
justice to allow the verdict to stand. Id.
Defendant’s convictions arise from his possession of images of child pornography on his
home computer and on seven computer disks found in his house. Defendant argues that the
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence because he introduced evidence at trial that
many people use his computer and, therefore, someone else might have downloaded the illegal
images. He further argues that because he bought the computer disks in bulk from a yard sale,
there is no evidence that he is sufficiently connected to the images found on the disks. He
further notes that the images on the disks were dated from 2004.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, a considerable amount of evidence against defendant
was adduced at trial. Most importantly, some images from each of the disks were also found on
defendant’s computer, providing a basis for concluding that defendant had used the disks since
he purchased them. Additionally, the date of the images is irrelevant because the prosecutor
-1-
never limited her case regarding when or how defendant obtained the illegal images. Further,
defendant indicated to police on multiple occasions that he knew about the images on his
computer and the disks in his apartment; he apparently had the erroneous notion that his actions
had not been illegal.
The mere existence of conflicting evidence does not support the conclusion that the jury’s
verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. It was for the jury to resolve the conflicts in
the evidence. Unger, supra at 232. In order to warrant a new trial, conflicting evidence must
preponderate so heavily against the verdict that it amounts to a miscarriage of justice. Id. The
mere possibility, without evidence, that someone else might be responsible for spreading child
pornography throughout defendant’s possessions does not give rise to a miscarriage of justice.
The verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing facts
unsupported by the evidence. We disagree.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue because he did not contemporaneously object and
request a curative instruction. Unger, supra at 234-235. An unpreserved claim of prosecutorial
misconduct is reviewed for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Id.; People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “Reversal is warranted only when plain
error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” People v Callon, 256 Mich App
312, 329; 662 NW2d 501 (2003). “Further, [this Court] cannot find error requiring reversal
where a curative instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect.” Id. at 329-330.
A prosecutor may not make any statements of fact to the jury that are unsupported by the
evidence. She may, however, argue all reasonable inferences arising from facts in evidence.
People v Schumacher, 276 Mich App 165, 178; 740 NW2d 534 (2007).
In her closing argument, defense counsel argued that defendant could not have
downloaded all of the images attributed to him because some of them were downloaded on days
of the week that defendant was rarely at home. Defendant worked as a truck driver. In her
rebuttal argument, the prosecutor noted that defendant had a laptop computer which he used to
connect to the internet at truck stops, so he did not have to be at home to download child
pornography.
Defendant argues that this argument was unsupported by the facts in this case. On the
contrary, defendant himself testified that he used his laptop computer to access the internet at
truck stops. The prosecutor did not intimate, as defendant argues, that there was evidence of
defendant’s specific internet activity at truck stops. The prosecutor merely responded to defense
counsel’s argument with a reasonable inference drawn from defendant’s own testimony. There
was no plain error.
Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a
variety of errors. We disagree.
Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and law. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). A trial
-2-
court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while questions of constitutional law are
reviewed de novo. Id. However, because there was no Ginther1 hearing, our review is limited to
mistakes apparent on the record. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 38; 755 NW2d 212 (2008).
Generally, counsel is presumed effective and the defendant must show that: (1) counsel’s
performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard, and (2) that defendant was so
prejudiced by counsel’s deficiency that there is a reasonable probability that, without the error,
the outcome would have been different. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d
294 (2001). Further, the defendant must demonstrate that “the attendant proceedings were
fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Id. In order to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient, a defendant must also overcome a strong presumption that counsel was pursuing sound
trial strategy, even if the strategy is ultimately unsuccessful. Id. at 715. An appellate court will
not substitute its judgment for that of defense counsel on questions of trial strategy. Id.
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor’s argument regarding defendant’s use of the internet at truck stops. Because this
argument did not constitute misconduct, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to object
to it. Rodgers, supra at 715.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two
instances of hearsay. In one instance, defendant’s neighbor, Barbara Weigel, testified that she
heard defendant’s daughter, Kristina McGivney, exclaim, “Oh my God, dad’s doing it again.”
Weigel looked at the computer and saw that McGivney had discovered images of child
pornography on defendant’s computer. The hearsay statement was brief and seemingly
unanticipated. This Court has recognized that it may be trial strategy to avoid drawing attention
to a brief, improper statement where no tangible benefit can arise from an objection. Horn,
supra at 40. The prosecutor did not pursue the hearsay statement. Weigel’s testimony without
the brief hearsay statement would not be significantly different. Defendant has not offered any
argument to overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel was engaging in sound trial
strategy by ignoring the brief comment. Rodgers, supra at 714.
Further, we note that there was considerable other evidence to support the jury’s verdict
in this case, as detailed above. There is no reason to conclude that the outcome of the trial would
have been any different without this testimony, even if defense counsel were in error. Unger,
supra at 243; Rodgers, supra at 714.
In the second instance of hearsay, police officer James Loffing testified that Weigel told
him that there was child pornography on the computer defendant had in his apartment. Weigel
testified to this same information at trial. Thus, there was no prejudice from Loffing’s
recounting of Weigel’s complaint against defendant because it was merely cumulative. Because
there was no prejudice, defendant cannot overcome the presumption that defense counsel was
engaging in sound trial strategy when she ignored this hearsay testimony. People v Bahoda, 448
Mich 261, 287, n 54; 531 NW2d 659 (1995) (observing failure to object to innocuous errors may
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 441; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-3-
constitute trial strategy); Unger, supra at 242. Further, because it was not prejudicial, any error
by defense counsel would not require reversal because the outcome of the trial would be no
different without the error. Unger, supra at 243; Rodgers, supra at 714.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three
instances of alleged other acts evidence, ostensibly contrary to MRE 404(b). Evidence of “other
crimes, wrongs, or acts” is inadmissible unless it is logically relevant under MRE 402, legally
relevant under MRE 404(b), and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice under MRE 403. People v Knox, 469 Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004); People v
VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 61-64; 508 NW2d 114 (1993).
First, defendant argues that Weigel’s hearsay testimony was also improper other acts
evidence. There is no evidence that McGivney’s statement was referring to conduct by
defendant other than the same conduct for which he was tried and convicted. Thus, the
statement was clearly not introduced solely for the purpose of proving defendant’s conformity
with certain conduct. It was relevant evidence, and it was not improper other acts evidence.
VanderVliet, supra at 74; MRE 404(b). Defendant also argues that Weigel’s testimony that
defendant had admitted to her that he had downloaded child pornography in the past was
improper other acts evidence. Similarly, there is no indication that this was evidence of anything
other than the instant crimes. The evidence was therefore highly relevant and not unfairly
prejudicial. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to proper testimony. Rodgers,
supra at 715.
Third, Weigel testified, “When I first moved to Adrian, it was brought up to me about his
daughter, and then supposedly that he molested –,” which the trial court immediately struck from
the record and the prosecutor ignored. Defense counsel could not be expected to object to
testimony to which the trial court interjected to sua sponte struck it from the record. Such an
objection would be futile and possibly irksome to the trial court. Counsel is not ineffective for
failing to raise futile objections. Rodgers, supra at 715.
Finally, defendant argues that when the prosecutor played a tape of Detective Vincent
Emrick’s conversation with defendant during redirect-examination of Emrick, he improperly
introduced evidence outside the scope of cross-examination. In fact, the tape was introduced into
evidence after Emrick’s examination and just before the prosecutor rested her case. So,
defendant’s argument is unsupported by the facts.
Defendant also argues in a supplemental brief that defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the trial court’s error in scoring defendant’s offense variables (OVs) during
his sentencing. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to raise this issue in his motion for a new trial, our review of
this issue is limited to the existing record. Horn, supra at 38.
Defendant argues that the court erred in scoring 25 points for OV 13. Twenty-five points
should be scored for OV 13 where the offense was part of felonious criminal activity involving
three or more “crimes against a person.” MCL 777.43(1)(b). Defendant argues there is no
evidence that his crimes were not against any specific “person.”
-4-
Defendant erroneously interprets the phrase “crimes against a person” to have a
colloquial meaning. On the contrary, the sentencing guidelines clearly define this phrase. MCL
777.5 states, “Crimes against a person are designated ‘person’” in part 2 of the sentencing
guidelines. Child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2), is designated “person” in part 2
of the guidelines. MCL 777.16g. Thus, defendant’s crime constitutes a “crime against a person”
for the purposes of the sentencing guidelines, including OV 13. Defendant’s argument is
unavailing. Accordingly, defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this
erroneous objection. Rodgers, supra at 715.
Defendant’s final argument in his supplemental brief is that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the expert qualifications of multiple prosecution witnesses.
We find no merit in defendant’s argument. None of the witnesses identified by defendant were
offered as experts. Defendant’s argument on this issue is nearly incoherent and primarily
reiterates the quality of the evidence introduced against him at trial. There is no indication that
defense counsel erred with respect to the introduction of these witnesses.
We affirm.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.