IN RE LEWIS/HODGE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SPENCER LAMARR LEWIS and
MALIK LAMONT HODGE, Minors.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
UNPUBLISHED
April 16, 2009
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
ANNETTE LOUISE LEWIS, a/k/a ANNETTE
LOUIS LEWIS,
No. 287707
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 05-446176-NA
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRIAN MATTHEWS,
Respondent.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and O’Connell and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent mother appeals as of right from an order terminating her parental rights to
her minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). We affirm.
I. Standards of Review
We review for clear error a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights. In re Roe,
281 Mich App 88, 95 ; ___ NW2d ___ (2008). “A circuit court’s decision to terminate parental
rights is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re
JK, 468 Mich 202, 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
II. Analysis
Respondent argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights is clearly
erroneous and not in the children’s best interests. We cannot agree. A court may terminate
parental rights if the petitioner establishes at least one of the statutory grounds enumerated in
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MCL 712A.19b(3) by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 210. “Once a ground for
termination is established, the court must issue an order terminating parental rights unless there
exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests.” In
re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Here, the trial court terminated respondent’s rights based on the following statutory
grounds:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182
or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and
the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no
reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the child's age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s
jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,
the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received
notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the
conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
*
*
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(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody
for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to
provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s
age.
*
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(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
the parent. [MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (3)(c)(ii), (3)(g), and (3)(j).]
Clear and convincing evidence sufficiently supports the trial court’s determination to
terminate respondent’s rights. In the present matter, the children were removed from
respondent’s home in September 2005 when petitioner received a complaint that one of the
children had been physically abused. The court took temporary custody over the children and a
parent agency agreement (PAA) was created for respondent, which required parenting classes, a
mother-baby program, visitations, counseling, psychological and psychiatric evaluations, drug
screens and treatment, suitable housing and income, and GED classes and completion. The
children remained in care for almost three years and during this time respondent failed to
substantially comply with this treatment plan. Respondent completed only ten of approximately
100 required screens and six of those completed screens tested positive for marijuana. She did
not visit her children for extended periods of time, the caseworker was sometimes unaware of her
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whereabouts, and she failed to get a court-ordered tuberculosis test after one child contracted
tuberculosis. Respondent also did not comply with provisions of the PAA regarding attending
counseling, completing a psychiatric evaluation, obtaining a GED, and attending the motherbaby program. She did not have stable housing or employment and she repeatedly put marijuana
use above seeing her children. Respondent’s noncompliance is evidence of her inability to
provide proper care and custody to her children. In re JK, supra at 214; In re Trejo, supra at
360-361 n 16. Under these facts, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to terminate
respondent’s parental rights constituted clear error.
Respondent, however, points out that she finished parenting classes and was working,
going to school, and attending substance abuse counseling at the time of the final hearing. In
respondent’s view, the conditions that led to adjudication can be rectified because the children
are only five and three years old, and she has “shown a determination to develop a greater degree
of maturity . . . .” For these reasons, respondent asserts that the court’s findings under
§§ 19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, a parent
must not merely “go through the motions,” but must also benefit from the services offered in
order to provide a safe and nurturing home. In re Gazella, 264 Mich App 668, 676; 692 NW2d
708 (2005). It is plain under the facts of this case that respondent failed to benefit from the
services provided despite a reasonable opportunity to do so. Thus, respondent’s argument is
unavailing. We note that even if we were to agree with respondent, statutory grounds still exist
justifying the court’s determination. Given respondent’s failure to abide by her treatment plan
and her history of a long-term serious drug problem, there remains a reasonable likelihood that
the children would be harmed if returned to her care. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Contrary to
respondent’s position, it is not necessary that there be evidence of physical harm or neglect to
support termination under § 19b(3)(j). See In re Trejo, supra at 360-361 n 16.
Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court erred by determining that termination was in
the children’s best interests. We disagree. Respondent repeatedly demonstrated over time that
she could not be depended upon to put her children before her drug use. Her continued use of
marijuana would potentially put her children at risk of harm and would likely create instability
and lack of permanency. In addition, respondent’s history of failing to follow through on
services demonstrates that there is no guarantee that respondent would benefit from services in
the future. “[T]he Legislature did not intend that children be left indefinitely in foster care . . . .”
In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 647; 468 NW2d 315 (1991). The trial court did not clearly err
in failing to find that termination of respondent’s parental rights would be clearly contrary to the
children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5).
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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