PEOPLE OF MI V JULIUS RICARDO DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 14, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280547
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2007-400889-FC
JULIUS RICARDO DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, C.J., and Jansen and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of unlawful imprisonment, MCL
750.349b, unlawful use of a motor vehicle, MCL 750.414, and domestic assault, MCL 750.81(2).
Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10, to a prison term
of 120 to 270 months for the unlawful imprisonment conviction and to jail terms of 121 days for
the unlawful use of motor vehicle conviction and 93 days for the domestic assault conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right. Because we conclude that there was no substitution of counsel,
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s prior assaults
of the victim, that there was no instructional error regarding the jury’s use of the other acts
evidence, that defendant’s conviction for unlawful imprisonment is supported by sufficient
evidence, and that there were no sentencing errors, we affirm.
I. Substitution of Counsel
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted without cause
and without defendant’s consent the substitution of trial counsel. We disagree because the
record does not establish that a substitution of counsel ever occurred.
MCR 6.005(H)(1) states that the responsibilities of a trial lawyer appointed to represent a
defendant include “representing the defendant in all trial court proceedings through initial
sentencing.” MCR 2.117(B)(3), governing the appearance of law firms, provides:
(a) A pleading, appearance, motion, or other paper filed by a law firm on
behalf of a client is deemed the appearance of the individual attorney first filing a
paper in the action. . . . That attorney’s appearance continues until an order of
substitution or withdrawal is entered. This subrule is not intended to prohibit
other attorneys in the law firm from appearing in the action on behalf of the party.
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(b) The appearance of an attorney is deemed to be the appearance of every
member of the law firm. . . .
In this case, the trial court appointed Felony Defense Counsel located at 606 Main Street
in St. Joseph to represent defendant. Thus, according to MCR 6.005(H)(1), Felony Defense
Counsel had the responsibility to represent defendant in all trial court proceedings through initial
sentencing. And, any attorney who was a member of Felony Defense Counsel could appear to
represent defendant. MCR 2.117(B)(3)(b). The first attorney to appear to represent defendant
was Richard Sammis, who the trial court identified as a member of Felony Defense Counsel.
The facts suggest that the second attorney to appear to represent defendant, Gary Campbell, was
also a member of Felony Defense Counsel. He had the same address, at least until the time of
sentencing, and worked with Sammis on defendant’s case. There was no withdrawal or
substitution of Felony Defense Counsel after the initial appointment, and neither defendant nor
the trial court questioned the appearances of either Sammis or Campbell at any time before this
appeal.
In People v Davis, 277 Mich App 676, 679-680; 747 NW2d 555 (2008), vacated in part
on other grounds 482 Mich 978 (2008), the defendant sought resentencing because his trial
counsel did not appear at sentencing. Instead, another attorney associated with trial counsel’s
firm represented defendant. The defendant did not waive trial counsel’s representation, he did
not openly consent to being represented by substitute counsel, and the trial court did not specially
appoint the attorney to represent him at sentencing. However, this Court held, in part, that
because the attorney was (1) associated with trial counsel, (2) was a member of trial counsel’s
firm, (3) was familiar with defendant’s case, and (4) defendant never objected to representation
by “substitute” counsel, defendant was not entitled to a vacation of his sentence absent any facts
suggesting that manifest injustice arose from the “substitution” of counsel. Id. at 679-680. Here,
defendant did not waive representation by Sammis, he did not openly consent to representation
by Campbell, and the trial court did not specially appoint Campbell. However, Campbell was
associated with Sammis, they were both part of Felony Defense Counsel, and Campbell was
familiar with defendant’s case and worked with Sammis on it. Thus, we hold, on the facts of this
case, that because defendant did not object to representation by Campbell, he cannot now seek
relief on this basis. Defendant has failed to prove that a substitution of counsel occurred.1
II. Other Acts Evidence
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted, pursuant to MRE 404(b),
evidence of his two other assaults of the victim. We review a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Washington, 468 Mich 667, 670; 664 NW2d 203
1
In addition, we reject defendant’s claim that he was prejudiced by Campbell’s alleged “lack of
adequate preparation.” First, the record establishes that Campbell did impeach the victim with
prior inconsistent statements. Second, there is no indication on the record, and defendant has not
established by an offer of proof, that any favorable expert testimony was available to him, that
the victim’s son could have provided any testimony beneficial to his behalf, or that evidence of
other acts by the victim was admissible to establish a motive by the victim to fabricate her
testimony.
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(2003). A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to select a principled outcome. People v
Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 269; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
“Before other-acts evidence may be introduced, the prosecution must satisfy a three-part
test: (a) there must be a reason for its admission other than to show character or propensity, (b) it
must be relevant, and (c) the danger of undue prejudice cannot substantially outweigh its
probative value.” People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 609; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). The trial
court held that evidence of the two prior assaults was admissible to prove that defendant acted in
accordance with a common plan or scheme, which is a proper purpose for the admission of other
acts evidence, MRE 404(b).
“[E]vidence of similar misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged act
occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently similar to
support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.” People
v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 63; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Distinctive and unusual
features are not required. Id. at 66. Here, during the charged and uncharged acts, defendant
became extremely upset when he believed that the victim was cheating on him. He yelled at the
victim and physically assaulted her. Accordingly, the charged and uncharged acts contain
common features beyond mere assaults, from which one could infer that defendant had a system
that involved assaulting the victim when he believed that she was not being faithful to him.
Because the evidence of the prior assaults provided an inference that defendant acted in
accordance with a common scheme, the evidence was relevant to show that the charged acts
occurred. Id. at 63.
Further, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in deciding that the highly
probative value of the evidence of the prior assaults was not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice, MRE 403. “All relevant evidence is prejudicial; it is only unfairly prejudicial
evidence that should be excluded.” McGhee, supra at 613-614. Unfair prejudice exists when
there is a tendency that evidence with little probative value will be given too much weight by the
jury by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit such as the jury’s bias,
sympathy, anger, or shock. Id. at 614. The evidence of defendant’s two prior assaults was
highly probative because it was relevant to the ultimate issue at trial, whether defendant
committed the charged acts, and the evidence of the assaults did not inject considerations
extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, as the two prior assaults were substantially similar to the
charged act.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in when it failed to instruct the jury that it
could only consider the evidence of the two prior assaults for a limited purpose. We disagree.
The record establishes that, sometime after the trial court admitted the evidence of the two prior
assaults under MRE 404(b), the court and counsel reviewed MCL 768.27b,2 and all agreed that
2
MCL 768.27b(1) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (4), in a criminal action in which the
defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the
defendant’s commission of other acts of domestic violence is admissible for any
(continued…)
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the jury would be instructed in accordance with CJI2d 5.8c. Consequently, the trial court
instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence of the two prior assaults “in deciding if the
defendant committed the offenses for which he is now on trial.” Because defendant deemed the
instruction proper, he cannot argue on appeal that the trial court erred in giving the instruction.
People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 691; 580 NW2d 444 (1998).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
unlawful imprisonment. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
prove that he knowingly restrained the victim under any of the three circumstances listed in
MCL 750.349b(1).3 We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a reasonable trier of
fact could find that all of the elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Cline, 276 Mich App 634, 642; 741 NW2d 563 (2007). "[C]ircumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from th[e] evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the
elements of a crime." People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 167-168; 622 NW2d 71 (2000).
MCL 750.349b(1) provides:
A person commits the crime of unlawful imprisonment if he or she
knowingly restrains another person under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The person is restrained by means of a weapon or dangerous
instrument.
(b) The restrained person was secretly confined.
(c) The person was restrained to facilitate the commission of another
felony or to facilitate flight after commission of another felony.
The phrase “secretly confine” means either “[t]o keep the confinement of the restrained
person a secret” or “[t]o keep the location of the restrained person a secret.” MCL
750.349b(3)(b). The “essence of 'secret confinement' . . . is deprivation of the assistance of
others by virtue of the victim's inability to communicate his predicament." People v Jaffray, 445
Mich 287, 309; 519 NW2d 108 (1994). Here, sometime around midnight, defendant took the
victim’s cellular telephone. He then forced the victim into her vehicle, and drove the victim
around, stopping at dark, isolated areas to assault her. When the victim attempted to escape at
(…continued)
purpose for which it is relevant, if it is not otherwise excluded under Michigan
rule of evidence 403.
3
Defendant does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the knowingly
restrained the victim.
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the first stop, defendant caught her and forced her to return to the vehicle by grabbing her hair.
At the gas station, defendant told the victim that, if she stepped out of the vehicle, he would drive
to Stevensville, where the victim’s son was sleeping. This evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, shows an intention by defendant to keep his confinement of the
victim a secret. The evidence was sufficient to prove that the victim was secretly confined.
IV. Offense Variables 4 and 10
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in scoring offense variables 4 and 10 at ten
points each. We disagree. We will uphold a trial court’s scoring of an offense variable (OV) if
there is any evidence to support the scoring. People v Endres, 269 Mich App 414, 417; 711
NW2d 398 (2006).
OV 4 may be scored at ten points if “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional
treatment occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.34(1)(a). “There is no requirement that the victim
actually receive psychological treatment.” People v Apgar, 264 Mich App 321, 329; 690 NW2d
312 (2004). Defendant, during his confinement of the victim, threatened to beat, torture, and kill
the victim. Defendant also implied that he would hurt her son if she tried to escape. After the
victim escaped from defendant, she was scared, crying, very upset, and in shock. The victim
reported that “she has scary visions of the events that took place that night” and that “there are
times when she just breaks down crying.” This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s
scoring of OV 4. See People v Drohan, 264 Mich App 77, 90; 689 NW2d 750 (2004), aff’d 475
Mich 140 (2006).
OV 10 may be scored at ten points if “[t]he offender exploited . . . a domestic
relationship.” MCL 777.40(1)(b). Defendant claims that the trial court erred in scoring ten
points for OV 10 because he and the victim were not a “family” and, therefore, they were not in
a domestic relationship. MCL 777.40 does not define the phrase “domestic relationship.”
However, a person is guilty of domestic assault if the person assaults “his or her spouse or
former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has or has had a dating relationship, an
individual with whom he or she has had a child in common, or a resident or former resident of
his or her household.” MCL 750.81(2); see also MCL 768.27b(5)(b). We conclude that the
Legislature intended the phrase “domestic relationship,” as used in MCL 777.40, to include those
relationships listed in MCL 750.81(2). See Brown v Mayor of Detroit, 478 Mich 589, 593; 734
NW2d 514 (2007) (“The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of
the Legislature.”); see also MCL 8.3a (where undefined terms in a statute have developed
peculiar legal meanings, those meanings should be attributed to them).
A “dating relationship” is defined as “frequent, intimate associations primarily
characterized by the expectation of affectional involvement.” MCL 750.81(6). Here, defendant
and the victim had been spending time with each other for almost a year and a half. They
engaged in consensual sexual relations. Defendant often spent the night at the victim’s
apartment, and he kept personal belongings there. In addition, defendant spent time with the
victim’s family, he took care of the victim’s son when the victim was away, and the victim spent
time with defendant’s family. The trial court’s finding that defendant and the victim were in a
domestic relationship is supported by sufficient evidence.
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We reject defendant’s argument that the trial court’s scoring of OV 4 and OV 10 violated
his Sixth Amendment right to jury, as articulated in Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct
2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). Our Supreme Court has definitely held that Blakely does not
apply to Michigan's indeterminate sentencing scheme. See, e.g., People v McCuller, 479 Mich
672; 739 NW2d 563 (2007).
V. Remaining Sentencing Issues
Defendant makes numerous other challenges to his sentence of 120 to 270 months’
imprisonment for the unlawful imprisonment conviction. All are without merit.
MCL 769.34(10) provides that if a defendant’s “minimum sentence is within the
appropriate guidelines sentence range, the court of appeals shall affirm that sentence and shall
not remand for resentencing absent an error in scoring the sentencing guidelines or inaccurate
information relied upon in determining the defendant’s sentence.” Defendant does not dispute
that his minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment falls within the recommended
minimum sentence range under the legislative guidelines, as enhanced by MCL 769.10.
Defendant claims that his sentence was based on inaccurate information because the trial
court, contrary to MCR 6.425(A)(5), failed to assess his rehabilitative potential through intensive
alcohol, drug, and psychiatric treatment. Contrary to defendant’s argument, MCR 6.425(A)(5)
only requires a probation officer to include a defendant’s “medical history, substance abuse
history, if any, and, if indicated, a current psychological report or psychiatric report” in the
presentence report. The presentence report contains a summary of defendant’s reported history
of alcohol and substance abuse. Defendant does not challenge the accuracy of the presentence
report. A presentence report is presumed to be accurate, and a trial court may rely on the report
unless effectively challenged by the defendant. People v Callon, 256 Mich App 312, 334; 662
NW2d 501 (2003). Accordingly, defendant’s argument that the trial court relied on inaccurate
information in sentencing him is without merit. Because the trial court did not rely on inaccurate
information, nor was there an error in the scoring of the guidelines, see Issue IV, supra, we are
required to affirm defendant’s minimum sentence, MCL 769.34(10), absent a sentencing error of
constitutional magnitude. See People v Conley, 270 Mich App 301, 316; 715 NW2d 377 (2006).
Defendant claims that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. However, a
minimum sentencing falling within the legislative guidelines is presumed proportional, People v
Cotton, 209 Mich App 82, 85; 530 NW2d 495 (1995), and a proportional sentence does not
constitute cruel or unusual punishment, Drohan, supra at 92. In imposing sentence, the trial
court stated that “significant punishment [was] appropriate” because of defendant’s actions. He
held the victim captive, where he “beat” and “terrorized” her, “impos[ing] physical and mental
scars that [were] gonna last a very long time.” The trial court also noted that defendant had
previously served a “full 10 years” for a conviction of assault with intent to commit great bodily
harm, which showed his inability to be “compliant.”4 Defendant has failed to present evidence
4
Based on these statements by the trial court, along with the court’s statement that the purpose of
the imposed sentence was “punishment, protection of the community, deterrence, reformation[,]
and restitution,” we find no merit to defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to articulate
(continued…)
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to overcome the presumption of proportionality regarding his minimum sentence, nor has he
presented any argument to convince us that his maximum sentence may not be proportional. We
affirm defendant’s sentence of 120 to 270 months’ imprisonment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
(…continued)
its reasons for the imposed sentence.
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