BANK ONE NATIONAL ASSN V FRANK A VENTIMIGLIO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BANK ONE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
April 2, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 283824
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 2006-003118-CH
FRANK A. VENTIMIGLIO, BRANDA M.
VENTIMIGLIO, and PARAMOUNT BANK,
Defendants/Third Party PlaintiffsAppellants,
and
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
DIANE MAGNOLI and MICHAEL A.
MAGNOLI,
Third Party Defendants.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Fort Hood and Davis, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for
summary disposition. We affirm, finding that the trial court reached the right result for the
wrong reason. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Jimmy and Diana Reynolds entered into a land contract to buy the real property here at
issue (“the house”) from Michael Magnoli’s construction company (“the Company”) for
$250,000. According to Magnoli’s affidavit, the Reynoldses decided to get bank financing1 for
1
Plaintiff is the successor in interest of that bank.
-1-
the land contract and also to get extra cash to pay creditors. They agreed to use the proceeds of
the bank loan to pay $170,000 of the land contract and to then give the Company a mortgage for
$50,000 (the amount remaining on the land contract). The Reynoldses closed on their bank loan
on August 20, 1998, and had a right to cancel that expired at midnight on August 25, 1998. They
executed the $50,000 mortgage to the Company also on August 20, 1998. That mortgage was
titled “second mortgage” in recognition of the bank’s mortgage as being the first mortgage. On
August 24, 1998, the Company granted the house to the Reynoldses by warranty deed. The deed
did not note any exceptions. The Reynoldses did not cancel the bank loan, and the transaction
with the bank took effect on August 26, 1998. The Company conveyed the deed and an affidavit
of indemnity identifying the land contract to the title company handling the transaction, and
received its $170,000 payoff in return. The Company recorded its $50,000 mortgage on
September 11, 1998, and the bank recorded its mortgage on October 6, 1998. The Reynoldses
defaulted on both mortgages. The Company’s mortgage was foreclosed and the house was sold
at a sheriff’s sale on November 8, 2002; the Magnolis bought the house at the sheriff’s sale.
About one month later, the bank’s mortgage (which by that time had been assigned to plaintiff)
was foreclosed and a second sheriff’s sale of the same house was held; the bank bought the
house. In 2004, the Magnolis sold the house by warranty deed to defendants the Ventimiglios,
who gave the corporate defendants a mortgage on the house. Plaintiff sued to quiet title.
Both sides moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue
of material fact). The trial court decided the motions without oral argument, ruling in favor of
plaintiff and against defendants. The trial court first noted that defendants’ interests hinged on
the $50,000 mortgage from the Company to the Reynoldses, and concluded that that mortgage
had been extinguished by the warranty deed from the Company to the Reynoldses because it was
not noted as an exception on the deed. Because the Company’s mortgage was not recorded at the
time the deed was conveyed, there was no constructive notice of its existence. Finally, the trial
court noted that MCL 565.151 provides:
That any conveyance of lands worded in substance as follows: “A.B.
conveys and warrants to C.D. (here describe the premises) for the sum of (here
insert the consideration),” the said conveyance being dated and duly signed,
sealed and acknowledged by the grantor, shall be deemed and held to be a
conveyance in fee simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, with covenant from
the grantor for himself and his heirs and personal representatives, that he is
lawfully seized of the premises, has good right to convey the same, and
guarantees the quiet possession thereof; that the same are free from all
incumbrances, and that he will warrant and defend the title to the same against
all lawful claims. [Emphasis added by the trial court.]
The court concluded, “Therefore, Bank One was entitled to assume that the property was
free and clear of all other mortgages, especially in the absence of any language in the warranty to
the contrary.”
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). We
must review the record in the same manner as must the trial court to determine whether the
movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Morales v Auto-Owners Ins, 458 Mich 288,
294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998). Our review is limited to the evidence that had been presented to the
-2-
trial court at the time the motion was decided. Peña v Ingham Co Rd Comm, 255 Mich App 299,
313 n 4; 660 NW2d 351 (2003).
The trial court erred when it concluded that the warranty deed discharged the Company’s
mortgage. The failure of a warranty deed to identify encumbrances does not nullify an existing
encumbrance; it instead gives the grantee a cause of action against the grantor for breach of the
covenant. See, e.g., Reed v Rustin, 375 Mich 531; 134 NW2d 767 (1965). However, although
the trial court erred in granting plaintiff summary disposition for the reasons it gave, our review
of the record supports plaintiff’s case for a different reason. Michigan’s “race-notice” recording
statute, MCL 565.29, provides in relevant part:
Every conveyance of real estate within the state hereafter made, which
shall not be recorded as provided in this chapter, shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, of the same
real estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
Thus, a party having notice of a prior unrecorded mortgage is not a good-faith purchaser
under this statute and cannot take advantage of the protection it offers good-faith purchasers.
Michigan Nat’l Bank & Trust Co v Morren, 194 Mich App 407, 410-411; 487 NW2d 784
(1992). The Magnoli affidavit explained the sequence of events and that the Company’s
mortgage was signed as part of the closing transaction; the Magnolis were fully aware of the
bank’s prior mortgage so the Company was not a good-faith purchaser and the bank’s first
mortgage has priority over the Company’s mortgage. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
granted plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Alton T. Davis
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.