PEOPLE OF MI V BOBBY WAYNE HODGES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 2, 2009
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 280077
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 06-012777-FH
BOBBY WAYNE HODGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Servitto, P.J., Owens and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC) involving personal injury, MCL 750.520c(1)(f). We affirm.
I. Motion for Expert Witnesses at Public’s Expense
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his due process rights when it denied his
motion to appoint two expert witnesses: (1) a DNA expert and (2) a toxicology expert. We
disagree. We review the trial court’s decision whether to grant an indigent defendant’s motion to
appoint expert witnesses at the public’s expense for an abuse of discretion. People v Tanner, 469
Mich 437, 442; 671 NW2d 728 (2003). MCL 775.15, upon which defendant’s motion was
based, permits an indigent criminal defendant to obtain an expert at the public’s expense if the
defendant can show that the “expert testimony would likely benefit the defense.” Id. at 443.
Because defendant filed his pretrial motion for a DNA expert before the DNA results
were obtained, the trial court concluded that the motion was moot and defense counsel agreed.
When a defendant’s attorney explicitly states on the record that the defendant has no objection,
the argument is waived on appeal and any error has been extinguished. People v Carter, 462
Mich 206, 214-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Therefore, defendant waived his argument with
respect to the DNA expert. With respect to the toxicology expert, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion on the basis that defendant is not indigent. Defendant retained his own
attorney and was prepared to pay $10,000 for her services, and, as the trial court noted,
defendant’s recent request for bond suggested the availability of funds. Under these
circumstances, MCL 775.15 did not apply and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant’s due process rights were not violated.
-1-
II. Other Acts Evidence
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted other acts
evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b). We disagree. The admissibility of other acts evidence is
within the trial court’s discretion and will be reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear
abuse of discretion. People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 609; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). To be
admissible under MRE 404(b)(1)1, the other acts evidence (1) must be offered for a proper
purpose, (2) must be relevant to an issue of fact or consequence at trial, and (3) its probative
value must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich
52, 74-75; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), mod 445 Mich 1205 (1994). A proper purpose is one other
than establishing the defendant’s character to show his propensity to commit the offense. Id. at
74.
The prosecutor sought to introduce evidence of a similar allegation against defendant that
occurred approximately two weeks after the instant offense in order show defendant’s absence of
mistake and method of operation, or common scheme and plan. In the instant offense, the victim
became intoxicated while at a campsite with her boyfriend, defendant, and another woman.
After defendant fell asleep in the center room of a three-room tent, the victim and her boyfriend
went to sleep in a side room. The victim soon awoke feeling pain in her vaginal area. She
observed defendant lying on top of her and believed he was attempting to penetrate her vagina.
She protested and defendant rolled off of her. The victim testified that she never consented to
sexual relations with defendant. The subsequent offense involved another victim who attended a
bar crawl with her boyfriend and a group of friends, including defendant. Everyone became
intoxicated. When the group returned to one of the friend’s home, the victim fell asleep in a
bedroom. Later, the victim, who was lying on her stomach, awoke to someone penetrating her
from behind. The assailant covered her head with sheets during the assault and the victim did
not see who raped her. Defendant’s DNA was identified from a sperm sample recovered during
the victim’s subsequent vaginal examination.
We are of the view that the subsequent assault was logically related to a contested issue at
trial—whether defendant touched the victim by mistake—and was therefore offered for a proper
non-character purpose. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 385-388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
Both incidences involved defendant going out with a group of friends, drinking to the point of
inebriation, returning with the group to a place to sleep, and defendant then sexually assaulting
an intoxicated female while she slept. The allegation that defendant was involved in a
1
MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
-2-
substantially similar incident made defendant’s theory that the contact was accidental less
probable. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 66-67; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Thus, we cannot agree
with defendant’s contention that the evidence is nothing more than propensity evidence in
disguise as the prosecution met its burden of showing that the subsequent act was logically
relevant to an ultimate issue in the case. Crawford, supra at 391.
Defendant argues, however, that the other act evidence’s probative value was
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice because it confused the issues during trial. The trial
court provided a limiting instruction to prevent this effect. Juries are presumed to follow the
instructions given to them. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Therefore, defendant’s argument must fail. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted the other acts evidence.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant further contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to
support his conviction. We disagree. This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims de
novo. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). We “must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.” People v Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999).
The elements of second-degree CSC involving personal injury are that the defendant: (1)
engaged in sexual contact with the victim, (2) used force or coercion to accomplish the sexual
contact, and (3) the defendant caused the victim to suffer personal injury. People v Alter, 255
Mich App 194, 202; 659 NW2d 667 (2003); MCL 750.520c(1)(f). On appeal, the only issue is
whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of personal injury. MCL 750.520a(n)
defines “personal injury” as “bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish, chronic pain,
pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ” (emphasis added).
Mental anguish exists where a “victim experienced extreme or excruciating pain, distress, or
suffering of the mind.” People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 597; 617 NW2d 339 (2000)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Some factors that this Court has considered in finding
“mental anguish” include evidence that the victim was upset during or after the assault,
subsequent necessity for psychological treatment, an inability to conduct a normal life, fear for
the victim’s safety, and continuing feelings of vulnerability. People v Petrella, 424 Mich 221,
270-271; 380 NW2d 11 (1985).
Here, the victim’s boyfriend testified that, immediately after the incident, the victim was
the “most frightened [he] had ever seen her.” The victim experienced nightmares, had difficulty
sleeping, and sought constant protection from her boyfriend. She also feared defendant and his
friends, who knew where she lived, would return and she wanted to move out of her house.
Consequently, the victim and her boyfriend moved to California, but the incident continued to
affect her as of trial. At the time of defendant’s trial, the victim had not visited a doctor for
counseling, but had called a rape hotline. Given these facts, there was sufficient evidence for a
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered personal injury in the form of
mental anguish.
-3-
IV. Judicial Misconduct
Defendant also argues that the trial court demonstrated bias and denied him the right to
present a defense on the basis of five separate acts. We disagree. We review unpreserved
challenges of judicial bias for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). A criminal defendant is entitled to a “neutral and detached magistrate.” People v
Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, “[a] trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion and power in the matter of trial
conduct,” People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995), and there is “a
heavy presumption of judicial impartiality,” People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 391; 605 NW2d
374 (1999). Judicial rulings, as well as a judge’s opinions formed during the trial process, are
not themselves valid grounds for alleging bias “unless there is a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism such that the exercise of fair judgment is impossible.” Id. Generally, “[c]omments
critical of or hostile to counsel or the parties” do not pierce the veil of impartiality. Id.
Defendant gives only cursory treatment to four of the five allegations of judicial bias.
Defendant, for example, does not articulate how the trial court’s statement when it denied
defendant’s motion to strike the prosecution’s expert witness demonstrated any deep-seated
favoritism toward the prosecution or antagonism toward defendant. Nor does defendant identify
the trial court’s allegedly demeaning and biased comments that allegedly improperly limited
defense counsel’s questioning of defendant’s mother-in-law. Again, defendant does not explain
how these comments resulted in bias against defendant. Similarly, defendant, without citing to
any authority, claims that the trial court denied his right to present a defense when it excluded
evidence regarding whether the DNA analyst excluded the victim’s boyfriend’s DNA from the
sample on the victim’s clothing and admitted evidence regarding a 1994 felony allegation against
defendant. A defendant may not merely announce a position on appeal and expect this Court to
discover and rationalize the legal and factual basis for the allegation. Badiee v Brighton Area
Schools, 265 Mich App 343, 357; 695 NW2d 521 (2005); Great Lakes Div of Nat’l Steel Corp v
City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379, 424; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). Given defendant’s treatment of
these four allegations of bias, we consider them abandoned on appeal. Great Lakes, supra at
424.
Defendant sufficiently briefed one claim of judicial bias, citing People v Smith, 64 Mich
App 263; 235 NW2d 754 (1975). Specifically, defendant alleges that the trial court admonished
a defense witness in front of the jury, thereby giving the jury the impression that the witness was
not credible. At trial, the witness testified that he observed a hickey on defendant the day after
the incident with the second victim. The following questioning occurred:
Prosecutor.
Do you remember everything that happened a year ago?
A. - - if I think something’s very obvious - Trial Court.
Would you answer the question sir?
A. If you want me to answer, I’d say left side of his neck.
Trial Court.
That’s your best guess or do you know?
-4-
A. That’s what I would recollect. It was some time ago.
Prosecutor.
Nothing further.
A. but is was very obvious that it was there and - Trial Court.
Sir.
A. - - and it wasn’t there the day before.
Trial Court.
A.
Sir. I want you to wait here afterwards, all right?
Yes, sir.
Because the prosecutor had concluded his questioning, but the witness continued to speak and
offer unsolicited testimony, the trial court had discretion to control his outbursts. Paquette,
supra at 340. Then, outside the jury’s presence, the trial court warned the witness that he had
been in contempt of court. Our review of the record shows that the trial court did not reprimand
the witness in the presence of the jury, see Lamson v Martin, 216 Mich App 452, 458; 549
NW2d 878 (1996), and, accordingly, the trial court’s conduct did not pierce the veil of
impartiality. Wells, supra at 391. The trial court did not engage in misconduct and defendant
was not deprived of a fair trial.
V. Sentencing
Lastly, defendant claims that the trial court lacked evidence to support the scoring of ten
points for offense variable (OV) 4. We disagree. This Court reviews the trial court’s scoring of
the sentencing guidelines for an abuse of discretion. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468;
650 NW2d 700 (2002). Where there is any evidence to support the trial court’s scoring, its
decision will be upheld on appeal. Id.
Pursuant to MCL 777.34, the trial court may score ten points for OV 4 if serious
psychological injury requiring professional treatment occurred to a victim or if serious
psychological injury may require professional treatment. MCL 77.34(1)(a) and (2). There is no
requirement that the victim actually receive such treatment. People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App
728, 740; 705 NW2d 728 (2005). Here, there was evidence on the record to support the trial
court’s scoring. Hornsby, supra at 468. The victim sought psychological treatment after
defendant’s trial as a result of the incident and testified at trial that she was still affected by the
incident as of the trial date. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant also argues that the trial court’s scoring of OV 4 was contrary to Blakely v
Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), because the evidence of the
victim’s psychological treatment should have been submitted to the jury and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. However, Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing scheme does not violate
Blakely so long as the judge fixes a sentence within the statutory maximum for the crime
charged. People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140, 164; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). The judge did so here,
and, accordingly, defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.
-5-
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.