MARK SINDLER V FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARK SINDLER,
UNPUBLISHED
March 31, 2009
Plaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellee,
V
No. 282678
Delta Circuit Court
LC No. 06-018710-NO
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Defendant/Counter PlaintiffAppellant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Beckering, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse. This appeal has been decided
without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
I. Basic Facts and Procedural Background
On October 21, 1986, twenty-six-year-old plaintiff was riding his uninsured motorcycle
when a car driven by Janet Schingick struck him. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his left
leg that required numerous surgeries and other on-going medical treatment. To date, he
continues to have poor circulation, severe nerve damage, and is permanently disabled.
Schingick’s car was insured under a no-fault policy issued by defendant’s predecessor,
Maryland Casualty Company (Maryland Casualty). Schingick’s policy provided $200,000
coverage for bodily injury as well as the statutorily mandated coverage for personal protection
insurance (PIP)1 benefits. Plaintiff initiated two claims arising from the accident – a first-party
no-fault PIP benefits claim, and a third party, bodily injury (tort) claim against Schingick.
Plaintiff’s attorney, Gene Potack, negotiated a settlement of the tort claim against
Schingick for $170,000. Because Potack was concerned that the settlement might operate to bar
1
While MCL 500.3101 et seq., uses the phrase “personal protection insurance benefits,” these
benefits are commonly known as “PIP” benefits. See Allen v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 268
Mich App 342, 343 n 1; 708 NW2d 131 (2005).
-1-
plaintiff’s future claims for no-fault benefits from Maryland Casualty, he wanted any release to
clarify that any settlement of the tort claim would not affect plaintiff’s claim for no-fault PIP
benefits for his medical care. Potack insisted upon language in the release “which clearly and
unequivocally states that in consideration of the settlement” plaintiff “will continue to be eligible
for Michigan No-Fault Act medical benefits, in addition to other personal protection insurance
benefits available pursuant to the Michigan Motor Vehicle No-Fault Insurance Act.”
Maryland Casualty’s attorney, Fred Geissler, drafted a release of claims agreement with
language (release) to address Potack’s concerns. Geissler sent the release to Potack on April 18,
1989, with a cover letter stating that plaintiff “will still be entitled to claim Michigan no-fault
PIP benefits from Maryland Casualty.” The letter acknowledged that Maryland Casualty insured
Schingick under a standard Michigan no-fault insurance policy in effect at the time of the
accident. The letter confirmed that Maryland Casualty would not seek reimbursement for nofault benefits already paid to plaintiff, and that claims for future benefits will be handled “in
accordance with the law.” Geissler’s letter summarized: “I trust this relieves any concern you
may have regarding future no-fault claims. In short, the company will handle them as required
under the law, and will not deny that they had an insurance policy covering the Schingicks at the
time of the accident.”
On April 19, 1989, plaintiff and Schingick executed the release and settled the tort claim.
The release agreement provided:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS that MARK ALLEN
SINDLER and JANETTTE SINDLER, in consideration of the sum of ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND and no/100 ($170,000.00) DOLLARS to
them in hand paid by CONRAD A. SCHINGICK and PATRICIA R.
SCHINGICK and MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged, do by these presents acquit and discharge said CONRAD
A. SCHINGICK and PATRICIA R. SCHINGICK and MARYLAND
CASUALTY COMPANY and all other parties, corporations or individuals who
are alleged to be responsible, all of the above to include their agents, employees,
servants and insurers, (all of the above hereinafter referred to as “Releasees”), of
and from any and all actions, causes of action, liens, judgments, executions, debts,
dues, claims, sums of money, contracts, warranties, torts and demands of every
kind and nature, whatsoever, which they may have against said Releasees,
including claims which they now have or which they may in the future have,
which in any way arise out of or are alleged to have arisen out of an alleged
accident which took place on or about October 21, 1986 at or near M-35 (North
Shore Drive) and 43rd Avenue in Menominee, MI, except claims for personal
protection insurance benefits (Michigan “No-Fault” benefits) under MCL
500.3107.
It is understood and agreed that this is a full and final release of all claims
of any kind and nature whatsoever, except claims for personal protection
insurance benefits (Michigan “No-Fault” benefits) under MCL 500.3107, and it
releases claims that are known and unknown, suspected and unsuspected.
-2-
It is further understood that this settlement is the settlement of a disputed
matter in which liability is not admitted and is expressly denied. [Emphasis
added.]
Pursuant to Schingick’s no-fault policy, plaintiff continued to receive PIP benefits.
However, on June 14, 2006, defendant notified plaintiff that he would not be entitled to any
further PIP benefits because plaintiff did not have insurance on his motorcycle at the time of the
accident. The letter from defendant’s representative relied upon MCL 500.3103, which requires
the owner of a motorcycle to have insurance, and MCL 500.3113(b), which precludes a person
from collecting personal protection benefits for bodily injury if he did not carry the required
insurance at the time of the accident.
Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract. Defendant counterclaimed for
reimbursement for money it had paid in no-fault benefits over the preceding six years on a theory
of unjust enrichment.
Relying on the terms of the release, defendant moved for summary disposition on
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim as well as its counter-claim for reimbursement. In response,
plaintiff asserted that a condition of the settlement of the tort claim against Schingick was
Maryland Casualty’s promise to continue paying no-fault benefits. Plaintiff relied on Geissler’s
April 18, 1989 letter, and argued that he was promised ongoing PIP benefits for his medical care.
He further asserted that had he been told that his medical benefits would not be continued, he
would not have settled the tort claim for less than the $200,000 policy limit.
The trial court denied the motion stating:
This comes in under (C)(10), so there must be no dispute as to material
facts. And I can tell you as I look through here, there are disputes on material
facts.
As far as a suggestion that there is no evidence that there was a promise, I
don’t know what the trier of fact would make of it, but seventeen years of
payment after the time that there was no promise, would suggest that perhaps to a
reasonable trier of fact that that is evidence of the promise.
Also, as I viewed this and looked at everything, I’m satisfied there are
genuine issues as to material facts.
***
And as I look at everything else – Mr. Potack’s letters and everything else
– letters and everything else – I’m left with a clear belief now that a – there are
genuine issues as to extremely important material fact; and, therefore, the Court is
going to deny the motion for summary disposition.
The trial court also found a question of fact as to defendant’s restitution claim.
We granted defendant’s application for leave to appeal.
-3-
II. Standards of Review
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition
to determine if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Maiden v Rozwood,
461 Mich 109, 118-119; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). The proper interpretation of a contract is also a
question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Klapp v United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468
Mich 459, 463; 663 NW2d 447 (2003). “The primary goal in interpreting contracts is to
determine and enforce the parties’ intent.” Old Kent Bank v Sobczaqk, 243 Mich App 57, 62;
620 NW2d 663 (2000). “Whether extrinsic evidence should be used in contract interpretation is
a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” In re Kramek Estate, 268 Mich App 565,
573; 710 NW2d 753 (2005).
Whether a claim for unjust enrichment can be maintained is a question of law, which this
Court reviews de novo. Morris Pumps v Centerline Piping, Inc, 273 Mich App 187, 193; 729
NW2d 898 (2006).
III. Breach of Contract
Defendant argues that it was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s breach of
contract claim. Plaintiff acknowledges that because his motorcycle was uninsured at the time of
the accident, he is not entitled to PIP benefits under the no-fault act.2 Instead, plaintiff contends
that the release contractually obligates defendant to continue paying PIP benefits. We disagree
and hold that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
“We read contracts as a whole and accord their terms their plain and ordinary meaning.”
Scott v Farmers Ins Exch, 266 Mich App 557, 561; 702 NW2d 681 (2005). “[U]nambiguous
contracts . . . are to be enforced as written unless a contractual provision violates law or public
policy.” Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 491; 703 NW2d 23 (2005). A court must
construe a contract in its entirety and attempt to apply the plain language of the agreement if
possible. Perry v Sied, 461 Mich 680, 689; 611 NW2d 516 (2000); Meagher v Wayne State
University, 222 Mich App 700, 721-722; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). And, in Gortney v Norfolk &
Western R Co, 216 Mich App 535, 540-541; 549 NW2d 612 (1996), this Court observed:
2
Under Michigan’s no-fault act, “[t]he owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be
registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection
insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance.” Iqbal v Bristol West
Ins Group, 278 Mich App 31, 37; 748 NW2d 574 (2008); MCL 500.3101(1). MCL 500.3103
requires the owner of a motorcycle to “provide security against loss resulting from liability
imposed by law for property damage, bodily injury, or death suffered by a person arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of that motorcycle.” The current version of MCL
500.3113(b), which took effect three months before plaintiff’s accident, provides that a person is
not entitled to be paid personal protection benefits for bodily injury “if at the time of the accident
. . . the person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the
accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.”
(Emphasis added.) Maryland Casualty and plaintiff were unaware of the amendment adding the
term “motorcycle” to MCL 500.3113(b) at the time the release was executed.
-4-
The scope of a release is controlled by the intent of the parties as it is expressed in
the release. If the text in the release is unambiguous, we must ascertain the
parties’ intentions from the plain, ordinary meaning of the language of the release.
The fact that the parties dispute the meaning of a release does not, in itself,
establish an ambiguity. A contract is ambiguous only if its language is reasonably
susceptible to more than one interpretation. If the terms of the release are
unambiguous, contradictory inferences become “subjective, and irrelevant,” and
the legal effect of the language is a question of law to be resolved summarily.
Plaintiff fails to identify any ambiguity in the release and we perceive none. The plain
language of the release does not permit an interpretation that the settlement of the tort claim
created an obligation on the part of defendant to forever pay PIP benefits. The agreement
released all claims arising from the accident “except for claims for personal protection insurance
benefits (Michigan ‘No-Fault’ benefits) under MCL 500.3107.” While the release certainly
provides that plaintiff is not barred from making a claim for no-fault first-party benefits, it does
not guarantee that such benefits would be paid. Plaintiff concedes he does not qualify for
benefits under the no-fault act. The exclusion of claims for PIP benefits from the scope of the
release did not create an affirmative duty on the part of defendant to continue to pay benefits to
plaintiff after the discovery that plaintiff did not qualify for them.
Plaintiff’s reliance on correspondence between Potack, Maryland Casualty, and Grissler
is unavailing. Extrinsic evidence cannot create a question of fact where the release is
unambiguous. Hamade v Sunoco, Inc (R & M), 271 Mich App 145, 166; 721 NW2d 233 (2006)
(“Parole evidence of contract negotiations, or of prior or contemporaneous agreements that
contradict or vary the written contract, is not admissible to vary the terms of a contract which is
clear and unambiguous.”)
The plain language of the release does not create an affirmative duty on the part of
defendant to pay PIP benefits indefinitely. Defendant was entitled to summary disposition on
plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.
IV. Restitution
Defendant also argues that it was entitled to summary disposition on its restitution claim.
We disagree.
Defendant’s action to recover insurance payments made in error is equitable in nature.
Michigan Educ Employees Mut Ins Co v Morris, 460 Mich 180, 200-201; 596 NW2d 142 (1999)
(MEEMIC). Restitution is an equitable remedy that is appropriate when a person has been
unjustly enriched at the expense of another. Kammer Asphalt Paving Co v East China Twp
Schools, 443 Mich 176, 185-186; 504 NW2d 635 (1993). Unjust enrichment consists of (1) the
receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity resulting to the
plaintiff because of the defendant’s retention of that benefit. Sweet Air Investment, Inc v Kenney,
275 Mich App 492, 504; 739 NW2d 656 (2007). “[T]he law will imply a contract to prevent
unjust enrichment only if the defendant has been unjustly or inequitably enriched at the
plaintiff’s expense.” Morris Pumps, supra at 195. “[N]ot all enrichment is necessarily unjust in
nature.” Id. at 196. “A mistake of either law or fact will entitle a party to restitution unless it is
-5-
inequitable or inexpedient for restitution to be granted.” Hofmann v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 162
Mich App 424, 429; 413 NW2d 455 (1987).
In order to establish a right to reimbursement, a defendant must show the receipt of a
benefit by plaintiff, which benefit it is inequitable that plaintiff retain. MEEMIC, supra at 198.
However, “[i]f the recipient of such a benefit has relied to his detriment on it, [defendant] would
be estopped from demanding reimbursement.” Id. The burden of establishing detrimental
reliance is on the party opposing the restitution claim. Id. at 198-199.3
Here, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a change of position or
detrimental reliance as a consequence of having received the mistaken payments. We disagree.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that since the accident, he has been in constant contact with
claims representatives of defendant and its predecessors regarding payments and issues involving
his on-going medical treatment, clearly relying on defendant to provide PIP benefits in obtaining
on-going medical treatment. He did not seek alternative medical coverage and is unaware of any
other medical coverage available to him.
Moreover, he further testified that had he known he would not have been entitled to ongoing PIP coverage, he would not have settled his third-party claim for less than the policy
limits. Plaintiff’s attorney informed Maryland Casualty that plaintiff would pursue a bad faith
and excess coverage claim, and did not pursue such a claim when the tort claim was resolved.
Defendant did not counter this evidence in the trial court and does not present contradictory
evidence on appeal. To the contrary, the claims adjuster assigned to plaintiff’s claim confirmed
in his deposition that plaintiff conditioned any settlement on the understanding, albeit
mistakenly, that he would continue to be entitled to PIP benefits. Clearly, plaintiff’s action in
altering his position in the mistaken belief that PIP benefits would continue precludes liability on
defendant’s restitution claim and it would be inequitable for defendant to recover monies it
expended on third-party medical treatment for plaintiff’s injuries.
On this record, defendant was not entitled to summary disposition on its counterclaim;
rather, plaintiff is entitled to summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2) (“If it appears to
the court that the opposing party . . . is entitled to judgment, the court may render judgment in
favor of opposing party.”).
3
In MEEMIC, supra, our Supreme Court addressed an insurer’s action to recover an
overpayment of insurance benefits. The Court remanded “for evidentiary hearings and a
determination whether the insurer was equitably entitled to any reimbursement of the
overpayments on a theory of unjust enrichment, and if so, the amount of reimbursement due.”
Id. at 199. The Court instructed the trial court to consider a wide range of factors, and “all
relevant circumstances,” such as the timing of the insurer’s notice to the insured regarding a
change in the payment of benefits and “any detrimental reliance” by the insured. Id.
-6-
Reversed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.