JAMES K LONTZ V CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES K. LONTZ and BRIGITTE LONTZ,
UNPUBLISHED
March 26, 2009
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 281183
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 04-425621-CZ
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Meter and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this contract dispute, plaintiffs appeal by right the trial court’s grant of summary
disposition in favor of defendant. We affirm.
Defendant began selling both non-tax-qualifying (NTQ) and tax-qualifying (TQ) longterm care insurance policies to consumers in 1997. Plaintiffs purchased NTQ policies from
defendant. Plaintiffs acknowledged that their NTQ policies did not qualify for favorable income
tax treatment under the law in effect at the time they were purchased. However, the NTQ
policies contained an “exchange privilege,” which provided:
We are currently working with your state insurance department to obtain
approval of long-term care policies that will qualify for this favorable tax
treatment. Once this approval has been received, you may exchange this policy
for a new tax qualified policy without having to provide new evidence of
insurability.
This exchange privilege effectively permitted the holders of NTQ policies to exchange their
policies for TQ policies.
In 2003, defendant stopped selling long-term care insurance policies. According to the
deposition testimony of defendant’s vice president, certain of defendant’s agents or
representatives mistakenly concluded in December 2003 that the exchange privilege could no
longer be honored because of the decision to discontinue selling the policies. Defendant’s vice
president attributed this mistake to a number of things, including mistaken verbal
communications and a misunderstanding of a written bulletin that was sent out to field agents.
Defendant’s erroneous refusal to honor the policyholders’ exchange privileges lasted for
approximately six weeks.
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Plaintiffs never attempted to invoke the exchange privilege and never indicated a desire
to convert their NTQ policies into TQ policies during the abovementioned six-week period.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs sued, alleging among other things that defendant had breached the
insurance contracts by temporarily refusing to honor the exchange privilege. Plaintiffs sought
not only traditional contract remedies, but also a declaration that defendant should “cease
violating the law” and “allow [plaintiffs] to exercise the ‘[e]xchange [p]rivilege’ as initially set
forth in the insurance contracts.” The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on the basis of the
doctrines of standing and ripeness.
The trial court did not specify the court rule on which it relied to dismiss plaintiffs’
breach of contract claim. But a motion to dismiss for lack of standing is generally brought
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5). Aichele v Hodge, 259 Mich App 146, 152 n 2; 673 NW2d 452
(2003); Dep’t of Social Services v Baayoun, 204 Mich App 170, 173; 514 NW2d 522 (1994).
“‘In reviewing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5), this Court must
consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and other documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.’” Aichele, 259 Mich App at 152, quoting Jones v Slick, 242 Mich App
715, 718; 619 NW2d 733 (2000). “This Court reviews the trial court’s ruling de novo and
examines the entire record to determine whether the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Jones, 242 Mich App at 718.1
The doctrine of standing deals with the plaintiff’s interest in the litigation and “ensures
that a genuine case or controversy is before the court.” Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation v Nestle Waters North America, Inc, 479 Mich 280, 294; 737 NW2d 447 (2007).
Standing is evaluated at the time the plaintiff seeks relief from the trial court. Altman v Nelson,
197 Mich App 467, 475; 495 NW2d 826 (1992). Our Supreme Court has adopted a three-part
test to establish standing:
“‘[F]irst, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual
or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to
be “fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third,
it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be
“redressed by a favorable decision.”’” [Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm’rs, 464
Mich 726, 739; 629 NW2d 900 (2001) (citations omitted).]
1
We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has differed with this Court concerning the
applicability of MCR 2.116(C)(5) in the context of standing to sue. Leite v Dow Chemical Co,
439 Mich 920; 478 NW2d 892 (1992). However, even assuming that the trial court’s grant of
summary disposition in this case should be reviewed under MCR 2.116(C)(10), id., the standard
applicable to motions brought under subrule (C)(10) is substantially similar to the standard
applicable to motions brought under subrule (C)(5).
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In this case, plaintiffs’ failure to offer evidence that they suffered an injury in fact is fatal
to their standing to pursue a breach of contract action. Michigan law requires that a party
claiming a breach of contract prove the terms of the contract, that the defendant breached the
terms, and that the breach caused an injury. See In re Brown, 342 F3d 620, 628 (CA 6, 2003);
see also Alan Custom Homes, Inc v Krol, 256 Mich App 505, 512; 667 NW2d 379 (2003).
Plaintiffs assert that the exchange privilege offered by defendant in 1997, which provided
plaintiffs the opportunity to exchange their NTQ policies for TQ policies, constituted a term of
the parties’ contract. But even if it did, we cannot agree that the unilateral action taken by
defendant in 2003 to temporarily suspend or terminate the exchange privilege resulted in a
concrete and particularized injury. In Michigan a contract modification requires a meeting of the
minds in the same way that a meeting of the minds is necessary to create a binding contract in
the first instance. Port Huron Ed Ass’n v Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 326-327;
550 NW2d 228 (1996). “[T]he freedom to contract does not authorize a party to unilaterally
alter an existing bilateral agreement.” Quality Products & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc,
469 Mich 362, 372; 666 NW2d 251 (2003) (emphasis in original). Therefore, we find no merit
to plaintiffs’ claim of injury predicated on defendant’s alleged unilateral action. Because
defendant’s unilateral action could not have altered the contract term as a matter of law, the
value of the contract could not have been affected by defendant’s unilateral conduct.
We also reject plaintiffs’ reliance on the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation to establish
an injury. Although plaintiffs failed to present this specific argument to the trial court, we
consider it because it is an issue of law for which the necessary facts have been presented.
Steward v Panek, 251 Mich App 546, 554; 652 NW2d 232 (2002).
Nonetheless, the doctrine does not aid plaintiffs in establishing an injury in this case.
Under the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation,
[I]f, before the time of performance, a party to a contract unequivocally declares
the intent not to perform, the innocent party has the option to either sue
immediately for the breach of contract or wait until the time of performance.
[Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank, 234 Mich App 140, 163; 593 NW2d 630
(1999).]
Also under the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation, one party’s breach can excuse the
innocent party’s obligation to perform. Thomas Canning Co v Johnson, 212 Mich 243, 252; 180
NW 391 (1920); see also 17A Am Jur 2d, Contracts, § 688, p 648. Moreover, “[i]t is well settled
that a repudiation of the contract by one party relieves the nonrepudiating party of the duty to
perform any conditions precedent that may exist to the performance of the repudiating party.” 13
Williston, Contracts (4th ed), § 39:39, p 672.
However, even assuming arguendo that defendant breached the contract and that this
breach relieved plaintiffs of their obligation to notify defendant of their intent to invoke the
exchange privilege, the submitted evidence examined in a light most favorable to plaintiffs failed
to establish that plaintiffs had ever articulated a past or present intention to exercise the exchange
privilege in the first instance. Given this absence of evidence, coupled with the complete lack of
evidence that defendant ever specifically indicated that it would not honor such a request by
plaintiffs, the doctrine of anticipatory breach does not assist plaintiffs in establishing an injury in
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this case. Plaintiffs failed to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding their standing to
bring a breach of contract action against defendant. Accordingly, the trial court properly
dismissed this claim.
Plaintiffs’ claim also embodied a request for declaratory relief, requesting that the trial
court declare that defendant was prohibited from unilaterally changing the insurance policies to
eliminate the exchange privilege. However, we are not persuaded that plaintiffs have
demonstrated any basis for disturbing the trial court’s decision to dismiss the claim for
declaratory relief.
MCR 2.605 governs a trial court’s power to enter a declaratory judgment. The court rule
provides in part that “[i]n a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, a Michigan court of
record may declare the rights and other legal relations of an interested party seeking a
declaratory judgment, whether or not other relief is or could be sought or granted.” MCR
2.605(A)(1). Because the language in this rule is permissive, the decision whether to grant
declaratory relief is within the trial court’s sound discretion. PT Today, Inc v Comm’r of
Financial & Ins Services, 270 Mich App 110, 126; 715 NW2d 398 (2006). But “the existence of
an ‘actual controversy’ is a condition precedent to the invocation of declaratory relief.” Id. at
127. The requirements of an “actual controversy” and an “interested party” in MCR 2.605
“incorporat[e] traditional restrictions on justiciability such as standing, ripeness, and mootness.”
Associated Builders & Contractors v Dep’t of Consumer & Industry Services, 472 Mich 117,
125; 693 NW2d 374 (2005).
We agree with the trial court’s decision to dismiss plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief
on the basis of the doctrine of ripeness. Because plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim rested on
speculative and contingent future events—namely, defendant’s hypothetical refusal to honor the
exchange privilege upon plaintiffs’ invocation of the privilege, which may never have
occurred—it was not ripe for declaratory relief. Huntington Woods v Detroit, 279 Mich App
603, 615-616; ___ NW2d ___ (2008).
We note that whether defendant had breached the exchange privilege presented a distinct
question from whether the exchange privilege was, in fact, a term of plaintiffs’ contracts.
Moreover, it is true that declaratory relief has been found appropriate where it will “‘serve some
practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation either as to present
or prospective obligations.’” Flint v Consumers Power Co, 290 Mich 305, 310; 287 NW 475
(1939) (citation omitted).
However, while a court is not bound by a parties’ choice of labels, Johnston v City of
Livonia, 177 Mich App 200, 208; 441 NW2d 41 (1989), the record supports the trial court’s
determination that plaintiffs sought declaratory relief with respect to the breach of contract claim
only, and not with respect to the separate and distinct issue of whether the exchange privilege
constituted a contract term. Indeed, given that the parties had agreed that plaintiffs had a
contractual right to exercise the exchange privilege, any dispute concerning whether the
exchange privilege constituted a term of plaintiffs’ contracts was moot. A court will not reach
moot issues or declare principles or rules of law that have no practical effect in a case, unless the
issue is one of public significance that is likely to recur yet evade judicial review. Federated
Publications, Inc v Lansing, 467 Mich 98, 112; 649 NW2d 383 (2002), clarified in part on other
grounds Herald Co v Eastern Michigan Univ Bd of Regents, 475 Mich 463, 470-472 (2006).
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Plaintiffs have not established that the issue of whether the exchange privilege constituted a
contract term is likely to recur yet evade judicial review.
We will not disturb the trial court’s decision when the court has reached the correct
result. Taylor v Laban, 241 Mich App 449, 458; 616 NW2d 229 (2000). The substance of
plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief related to their breach of contract claim, and any dispute
over whether plaintiffs’ insurance policies contained an exchange privilege term was moot.
Moreover, plaintiffs’ claims were not ripe for judicial review because they rested on contingent
future events that might have never occurred. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to establish the
requisite actual controversy to obtain declaratory relief in this case. The trial court reached the
correct result by dismissing plaintiffs’ claim in this regard.
Finally, we reject plaintiffs’ newly raised argument that summary disposition was
premature because discovery was incomplete. “Although incomplete discovery generally
precludes summary disposition, summary disposition may nevertheless be appropriate if there is
no disputed issue before the court or if further discovery does not stand a fair chance of finding
factual support for the nonmoving party.” VanVorous v Burmeister, 262 Mich App 467, 476477; 687 NW2d 132 (2004). Michigan’s discovery rules do not allow for “‘fishing
expedition[s].’” Id. at 477 (citation omitted). A party opposing summary disposition on the
basis of incomplete discovery must comply with the requirements in MCR 2.116(H) by
presenting affidavits to support its position. Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 570-571; 719
NW2d 73 (2006). Because plaintiffs failed to offer the necessary affidavits to show that their
position would be supported by additional discovery, they may not now complain that summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) was premature. Coblentz, 475 Mich at 571.
Having concluded that the trial court reached the correct result by dismissing plaintiffs’
claims, we need not consider the remaining arguments raised on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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